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DoDi 5000.02 And Resource Informed Army Modernization

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An overview of the relationship between DoD 5000.02 and Resource-Informed Army Modernization. Specifically addresses Reset, Brigade Combat Team Modernization, and Ground Combat Vehicle planning. ...

An overview of the relationship between DoD 5000.02 and Resource-Informed Army Modernization. Specifically addresses Reset, Brigade Combat Team Modernization, and Ground Combat Vehicle planning. Emphasizes the importance of product support and technology insertion.

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DoDi 5000.02 And Resource Informed Army Modernization DoDi 5000.02 And Resource Informed Army Modernization Presentation Transcript

  • DoDI 5000.02 and Resource-Informed Army Modernization
    Prepared for the RMS Partnership
    Government-Industry Training Seminar, November 17-18, 2009
    “DoDI 5000.02 and You: The Impact on RMS/L & Systems Engineering”
    Dr. Russell Vacante, President
    William D. Bajusz, Ph.D.
    Senior Logistics Consultant
    William.Bajusz@goldbeltwolf.com
    www.LinkedIn.com/in/williambajusz
    Goldbelt Wolf, LLC.
    An SDB 8(a) Alaska Native Corporation
    5500 Cherokee Avenue
    Suite 100
    Alexandria, VA 22312
    www.goldbeltwolf.com
  • Purpose
    To provide a basis for discussion of how DoDI 5000.02 relates to resource-informed Army modernization – from an RMS, logistics, and systems engineering perspective
    RMS Partnership’s President’s Editorial
    • Are there “lessons learned” from less than a year’s application of DoDI 5000.02?
    • Is there a common understanding between Services and industry partners?
    • How compatible is technology insertion with Performance Based Life Cycle Product Support requirements?
    Fluid Environment
    • Downward pressures on DoD budget
    • Reexamination of Product Support
    • Level of troop commitment to, and strategy in Afghanistan
    • Retrograde from Iraq
    • Imperatives for full scale Army modernization
    2
  • Agenda
    DoDI 5000.02 – Selected Excerpts
    Future of Performance Based Life Cycle Support
    Resource-Informed Army Modernization
    Precepts
    Concluding Observations
    3
  • DoDI 5000.02 – Selected Excerpts
    “Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for the rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, recognizing up front the need for future capability improvements.”
    Enclosure 2, 2.a
    “PMs for all programs shall formulate a viable Reliability, Availability,
    and Maintainability (RAM) strategy that includes a reliability growth program
    as an integral part of design and development. RAM shall be integrated with
    the Systems Engineering processes, documented in the program’s Systems Engin-
    eering Plan (SEP) and Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP), and assessed during
    technical reviews, test and evaluation (T&E), and Product Support Reviews (PSRs).
    Enclosure 2, 5, d (5)
    “Life-cycle sustainment planning shall be considered during Materiel
    Solution Analysis, and shall mature throughout Technology Development. An LCSP
    shall be prepared for Milestone B.”
    Enclosure 2, 8, c (1), (a)
    “The PM shall work with the user to document performance and sustain-
    ment requirements in performance agreements specifying objective outcomes, measures
    Resource commitments, and stakeholder responsibilities. The PM shall employ effective Per-
    formance Based Life-Cycle Product Support (PBL) planning, development, implementa-
    tion and management.”
    Enclosure 2, 8, c (1), (d)
    4
  • Total Life Cycle Product Support Cost Reduction
    5
    Weapon System Acquisition Reform Product Support Assessment
    • Life Cycle Product Support Vision and Guiding Principles
    • New Business Model
    • Resource Misalignment
    • Governance
    • Partnership Sub-optimization
    Emphasizes and reinforces the use of Performance-Based Product Support strategies
    • Hon Jack Bell (DUSD L&MR) Delivered the Defense Department’s Keynote Address on “Maintaining Warfighter Readiness” at the Annual DoD Maintenance Symposium – October 28, 2008
    • Army Business Case Analysis Policy issued 18 Aug 2005
    • Implements guidance necessary to conform with USD/ATL BCA Policy Memos issued in 2004
    • Identifies Type I (Feasibility) and Type II (Formal) BCAs
    • Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (ATL) PBL Guidance Document on “Implementing a Life Cycle Management Framework” Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Services – July 2008
    DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, signed December 8, 2008
    Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-23), signed May 22, 2009
  • Driving Costs Down, Performance Up
    6
    The Process
    OSD PBL Maturity Model
  • Perspective on the Army
    Sustain
    Prepare
    Reset
    Transform
    Holistic
    “Whole of Government”
    Core Enterprises
    • Readiness (FORSCOM)
    • Human capital (TRADOC)
    • Services and infrastructure (IMCOM)
    • Materiel (AMC)
    Enterprise-Wide
    Organizing Principle: What are pragmatic RMS, logistics, and engineering actions to enable Readiness
    and Strategic Flexibility and to continue to meet rapidly changing current
    demands at lowest possible cost?
    Resource-Informed Modernization Strategy
    7
  • Defense Acquisition Management System
    8
  • First Principles
    Congressional
    Funding
    Financial
    Infrastructure
    Warfighter
    Needs
    Accountability
    ?
    Sub-optimized Tracking Systems Cause Needless Environmental Instability for the Government PM
    9
  • An RMS Perspective: Issues, Processes, Programs & Stakeholders
    Concepts
    • NSS
    • NMS
    • GDF
    • DODD
    • DODI
    JCS
    • Joint Staff
    • JPG
    • JROC
    • JCIDS
    UCCs
    • Regional
    • Functional
    QDR
    CONPLANS
    OPLANS
    Current Global Commitments


    Logistics CPM
    IT Infrastructure
    • Legacy Systems
    • CLOE
    • AILA
    • BCS3
    • LIW
    LMP
    • ABCTM
    • Ground Combat Vehicle
    AC/RC
    Rebalance
    OSD, e.g.,
    • USD AT&L
    • USD P&R
    • Director, PA&E
    • APS
    • Army Strategy
    • ASPG
    • ACP
    • ARPL
    • FMs
    • ARs
    • Memoranda
    GTA
    SALE
    • IUID
    • SIM
    • RFID
    Other Army Logistics Initiatives & Programs, e.g.,
    • PBL
    • Adaptive Logistics
    • ILAR
    • FLS
    Army Staff
    AESIP
    Army Secretariat, e.g.,
    • ASA(ALT)
    • DUSA B/T
    OSD Initiatives, e.g.,
    • DoD Logistics Roadmap
    • HCS
    • IUID
    • RFID
    • CBM+
    • RBS
    AMC
    CBM+
    Balance CSS
    (AC/RC)
    Support to Other Services
    Support From Other Services
    TRADOC
    Decision Support Tools, e.g., PFSA, CASA
    FORSCOM
    GCSS-A
    F/T
    IMCOM
    ASCC
    Distribution
    ILS (TLCMS)
    DRU
    DLA
    (BRAC 2005)
    • DoS
    • DHS
    • DoJ
    • DoA
    • MNF-I
    • NATO ISAF
    • (UN), (GOI), (GOA),
    (GOP)
    AP3
    PII (GPRA)
    • E.O. 13450
    • OMB PBB
    • Outcome goals and objectives
    • PART
    • Logistics Portfolio
    Congress
    Off-Year PPBE
    • PCPs
    • PDM
    • BCPs
    • PBDs
    • OMB Submission
    • Execution Review
    AWCF
    DWCF
    GAO
    FY 2010 DoD PresBud
    • Base Budget
    • Overseas Contingency Ops
    Other Defense Agencies, e.g.,
    • DCMA
    • DFAS
    Public Private Partnerships
    10
  • Pivot Points
    November 17, 2008: Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Government of Iraq calls for withdrawal of all US forces by 12/31/2011
    Redeployment
    Equipment retrograde
    April 06, 2009: Secretary Gates cancels vehicle component of Army’s Future Combat Systems program
    Officially cancelled on June 23rd by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Carter
    Creation of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization effort
    Technology insertion increments
    For FCS “spin outs”
    Creation of new Ground Combat Vehicle Program
    11
  • Army Force Development: Parallel Streams
    Technology insertion arrangements for some vehicles sub-optimized – e.g., Stryker S Mod
    12
  • Precepts
    Current and emerging commitments drive Army acquisition (and organizational structure)
    FCS: counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat issues invalidated the engineering trade-space where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency and greater information awareness were judged adequate to compensate for less armor
    MRAP: “urgent need” ~6,400 procured
    M-ATV: “urgent need” – JROC Requirement for 5,200, with ~2,200 now being produced
    Systems engineering process needs to be proactive and the SEP adaptive
    QDR and new GDF will help but
    Burden will be on the PM to be attuned to emerging issues
    Army PM needs to have greater stability in funding
    In macro: improved funding accountability systems and processes that are responsive to Congressional oversight requirements
    In micro: longer duration (5-10 years) contracts with performance incentives that induce industry to bear greater share of the risk
    Incremental development with technology insertion is key in current environment
    Army PM has no ready access to technology maturation plan relevant to his/her program
    Distributed technology development
    In Army, e.g., LIA, RDECOM, PEOs
    Across Industry
    Information gathering and assimilation processes have been outstripped by the pace of technology
    Army PM doesn’t have a convenient “window” into all relevant Army guidance, related Army program developments, and stakeholders
    Army PM does not have the ability to readily access pertinent information about OSD or other Service programs and initiatives
    DoD Logistics Roadmap
    13
  • Concluding Observations
    Given the “unusual” experience of the Army in the past year, it is difficult to draw any durable “lessons learned” from the application of DoDI 5000.02
    Secretary Gates’ decision on FCS certainly consistent with tenets of DoDI 5000.02
    However, have learned that DoDI 5000.02 provides sound framework for acquisition and RMS in an environment where the “unusual” has become the norm
    Incremental modernization through technology insertion
    Up front consideration of product support in the acquisition cycle
    Is there a common understanding between the Services and their industry partners?
    It depends on who you ask
    PM and PSI may agree on need for longer duration contract, but that perception may not be shared by Service’s contracting authority or the Congress
    Technology insertion and product support are not only compatible, they are inseparable in a resource-constrained environment
    Need to be paying greater attention to technology insertion and product support in Reset, and product support in BCT Modernization
    GCV is an opportunity to “get it right” from a DoDI 5000.02 perspective
    14
  • Quo Vadis?
    15