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  • 1. SIPRIYEARBOOK2012Armaments,Disarmament andInternationalSecuritySummary
  • 2. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict,armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data,analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, mediaand the interested public.GOVERNING BOARDGöran Lennmarker, Chairman (Sweden)Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia)Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia)Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)Susan Eisenhower (United States)Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)Professor Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)The DirectorDIRECTORDr Bates Gill (United States)Signalistgatan 9SE-169 70 Solna, SwedenTelephone: +46 8 655 97 00Fax: +46 8 655 97 33Email: sipri@sipri.orgInternet: www.sipri.org © SIPRI 2012
  • 3. THE SIPRI YEARBOOKSIPRI Yearbook 2012 presents a combination of original data in areas such as world militaryexpenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conflictsand multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important aspects of armscontrol, peace and international security. The SIPRI Yearbook, which was first published in1969, is written by both SIPRI researchers and invited outside experts. This booklet summarizes the contents of SIPRI Yearbook 2012 and gives samples of thedata and analysis that it contains.CONTENTSIntroduction 21. Responding to atrocities: the new geopolitics of intervention 3Part I. Security and conflicts, 20112. Armed conflict 43. Peace operations and conflict management 6Part II. Military spending and armaments, 20114. Military expenditure 85. Arms production and military services 106. International arms transfers 127. World nuclear forces 14Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 20118. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation 169. Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials 1810. Conventional arms control 20Annexes 22
  • 4. INTRODUCTION capacity to affect regional and, in some cases, global security developments.bates gill In-depth tracking of armed violence around the world also reveals theSIPRI Yearbook 2012 includes contributions destabilizing role of non-state actors infrom 39 experts from 17 countries who prosecuting conflicts and engaging inchronicle and analyse important trends and violence against civilians.developments in international security, Unfortunately, the global community hasarmaments and disarmament. Their yet to fully grapple with the ongoinganalysis points to three persistent structural changes that define today’scontemporary trends that underpin a more security landscape—changes that oftendynamic and complex global security order. outpace the ability of established institutions and mechanisms to cope withConstraints on established powers them. It will certainly take time forIn 2011 established powers in the world established and newly emergent powers tosystem—especially the United States and its reach an effective consensus on the mostmajor transatlantic allies—continued to important requirements for internationalface constraints on their economic, political order, stability and peace, and on how toand military capacities to address global realize and defend them.and regional security challenges. These Struggling norms and institutionsconstraints were primarily imposed bybudget austerity measures in the wake of Multilateral organizations tasked withthe crisis in public finances experienced promoting and enforcing norms forthroughout most of the developed world. stability and security continue to face At the same time, uprisings and regime difficulties in generating the political willchanges in the Arab world drew and financial resources needed to meetinternational attention and responses, their mandates, and gaps remain whichincluding the United Nations-mandated require new or more effective mechanisms.and NATO-led intervention in Libya. The A far greater focus will need to be placedwidespread support for and expansion of on less militarized solutions to the securitytraditional peace operations over the past challenges ahead. Perhaps most crucially,decade are also facing constraints in the many of the most important securityyears ahead. Moreover, the world’s major challenges in the years ahead will notdonors to peace operations are largely readily lend themselves to traditionallooking to cut support to multilateral military solutions. Instead, what will beinstitutions and to focus on smaller and needed is an innovative integration ofquicker missions. preventive diplomacy, pre-emptive and early-warning technologies, andContinuing emergence of new powers andnon-state actors cooperative transnational partnerships.  •States around the world outside thetraditional US alliance system are buildinggreater economic, diplomatic and military Dr Bates Gill is Director of SIPRI.2 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 5. 1. RESPONDING TO ATROCITIES: set a new benchmark against which allTHE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF future arguments for such interventionINTERVENTION might be measured. However, the subsequent implementation of thatgareth evans mandate led to the reappearance of significant geopolitical divisions.Our age has confronted no greater ethical, The Security Council’s paralysis overpolitical and institutional challenge than Syria during the course of 2011,ensuring the protection of civilians, as culminating in the veto by Russia andvictims of both war and of mass atrocity China of a cautiously drafted condemnatorycrimes. Awareness of the problem of resolution, has raised the question, incivilian protection is growing and has been relation to the sharp-end implementation ofaccompanied by a much greater evident R2P, of whether Resolution 1973 wouldwillingness—at least in principle—to do prove to be the high-water mark fromsomething about it. which the tide will now retreat.New paradigms for a new century The future for civilian protectionTwo normative advances in this area are, The crucial question is whether the newfirst, the dramatically upgraded attention geopolitics of intervention that appeared togiven since 1999 to the law and practice have emerged with Resolution 1973 is inrelating to the protection of civilians (POC) fact sustainable, or whether, as suggestedin armed conflict; and, second, the by the subsequent response to the situationemergence in 2001, and far-reaching global in Syria, a more familiar, and more cynical,embrace since 2005, of the concept of the geopolitics will in fact reassert itself.responsibility to protect (R2P). This author takes the optimistic view There is now more or less universal that the new normative commitment toacceptance of the principles that state civilian protection is alive and well, andsovereignty is not a licence to kill but that, in the aftermath of the intervention inentails a responsibility not to do or allow Libya, the world has been witnessing not sogrievous harm to one’s own people. The much a major setback for a new cooperativeinternational community also bears a approach as the inevitable teething troublesresponsibility to assist those states that associated with the evolution of any majorneed and want help in meeting that new international norm. The Brazilianobligation, and a responsibility to take ‘responsibility while protecting’ initiative,timely and decisive collective action in focusing on clearer criteria for and moreaccordance with the UN Charter. effective monitoring of the use of force,Libya and its aftermath offers a constructive way forward.  •UN Security Council Resolution 1973, Gareth Evans was Australian minister for foreignauthorizing military intervention in Libya affairs (1988–96) and president of theto halt what was seen as an imminent International Crisis Group (2000–2009). He ismassacre, was a resounding demonstration currently Chancellor of the Australian Nationalof these principles at work, and seemed to University. introduction 3
  • 6. 2. ARMED CONFLICT n u m b e r s o f c o n f l ic t s , 2 0 01–10 50During 2011 the sudden and dramatic 40popular uprisings in parts of the Middle No. of conflicts 30East and North Africa, which togetherconstituted the Arab Spring, produced 20diverse patterns of conflict. The events of 10the Arab Spring were not, however, isolated 0in terms of contemporary conflict trends. 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Rather, developments across the region Armed Non-state One-sidedserved to underline some of the long-term conflict conflict violencechanges that have occurred in armedconflict over recent decades. This hasinvolved important shifts in the scale, n u m b e r s o f fata l i t i e s i nintensity and duration of armed conflict o r g a n i z e d v io l e nc e , 2 0 01–10around the world, and in the principal 35 000actors involved in violence. Together these 30 000changes point to the emergence of a 25 000 No. of fatalitiessignificantly different conflict environment 20 000than that which prevailed for much of the 15 00020th century. 10 000 5 000The first year of the Arab Spring 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010The uprisings of the Arab Spring spreadrapidly from country to country and soon Armed Non-state One-sidedaffected large parts of North Africa and the conflict conflict violenceMiddle East. While they shared a numberof traits—including large demonstrations,non-violent actions, the absence of single Western powers, notably France and theleaders and the use of central squares in USA, initially supported governments inmajor cities—they also differed in certain Egypt and Tunisia but then began to pushrespects. The extent of the demands made for change. In the case of Libya, theyby the protesters varied, ranging from quickly took an active stand against theimproved economic situations to regime regime, with the UN’s approval and NATOchange, as did the level of violence. as the instrument. Over conflict in Syria, While there were comparatively few China and Russia, both of which hadfatalities in Algeria and Morocco, other become increasingly critical of thecountries—including Bahrain, Egypt, international use of force, opposedTunisia and Yemen—were much more Western-led efforts to sanction the rulingseverely affected. The highest levels of regime. The scope for third-partyviolence were in Libya and Syria. involvement in solving these crises was International reactions varied, with remarkably limited, and seriousexternal support limited to a few cases. negotiations only occurred in Yemen.4 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 7. The outcomes of the first year of the Arab Over the period 2001–10 there wereSpring were mixed. There were examples of 69 armed conflicts and 221 non-stateregime change but also cases where conflicts and 127 actors were involved inpopular resistance was repressed. one-sided violence. Thus, in total, thereNevertheless, Arab politics has been were more than 400 violent actions thatchanged by this historically unique series each resulted in the deaths of more thanof events. 25 people in a particular year. The extent of organized violence at theOrganized violence in the Horn of Africa end of the decade was lower than at itsFor decades, the countries in the Horn of beginning, although the decline was notAfrica—Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya dramatic. Moreover, while in the 1990sand Somalia—have been plagued by there were wide fluctuations in the numberorganized violence. While all these of conflicts, this pattern was not repeated incountries experienced state-based armed the 2000s, indicating that the downwardconflict, non-state conflict or one-sided trend may be a promising sign of futureviolence against civilians during the decade developments.  •2001–10, non-state conflicts were by far themost common. There were 77 non-stateconflicts (35 per cent of the global total) inthe Horn of Africa. State-based armedconflict was less common: only 5 were t h e g l o b a l p e a c e i n d e x 2 01 2recorded in 2001–10. Acts of one-sided The Global Peace Index (GPI), produced byviolence were committed by 6 actors. the Institute for Economics and Peace, uses States in the region have demonstrated a 23 indicators to rank 158 countries by theirgrowing tendency to become militarily relative states of peace.engaged in neighbouring countries. For There were improvements in the overallinstance, both Ethiopia and Kenya have at scores of all regions apart from the Middle East and North Africa in the 2012 GPI. For thetimes sent troops in support of the Somali first time since the GPI was launched, in 2007,Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in sub-Saharan Africa was not the least peacefulits conflict with al-Shabab, which has in region. The events of the Arab Spring madeturn received arms and training from the Middle East and North Africa the leastEritrea. peaceful region.Patterns of organized violence, 2001–10 Rank Country Score ChangeIn previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook, 1 Iceland 1.113 –0.037 2 Denmark 1.239 –0.041the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 2 New Zealand 1.239 –0.034presented information on patterns of ‘major 4 Canada 1.317 –0.033armed conflicts’. To provide a broader 5 Japan 1.326 +0.032perspective on organized violence, the 154 Congo, DRC 3.073 +0.057focus has now expanded to include three 155 Iraq 3.192 –0.107types of organized violence: (state-based) 156 Sudan 3.193 –0.038armed conflicts, non-state conflicts and 157 Afghanistan 3.252 +0.043one-sided violence (against civilians). 158 Somalia 3.392 +0.021 security and conflicts 5
  • 8. 3. PEACE OPERATIONS AND of whether a heavy (and long-term) militaryCONFLICT MANAGEMENT footprint in peace operations is necessary. Global trendsThe year 2011 was in many respects a yearof contradiction for peacekeeping. On the A total of 52 peace operations wereone hand, after nearly a decade of record conducted in 2011, the same number as inexpansion in the numbers of operations and 2010 and the second lowest in the periodpersonnel deployed and the costs of 2002–11, confirming a downward trend thatfinancing these operations, peacekeeping started in 2009. However, the number ofshowed initial signs of slowing down in personnel deployed on peace operations in2010 and there were further indications in 2011 was the second highest of the period,2011 that military-heavy, multidimensional at 262 129, just 700 fewer than in 2010.peace operations have reached a plateau. The UN, with 20 operations, remainedOn the other hand, 2011 saw the possible the main conducting organization. In termsbeginnings of an actionable commitment by of personnel deployed, the North Atlanticthe international community to the Treaty Organization (NATO) was theconcepts of the responsibility to protect largest conducting organization for the(R2P) and protection of civilians (POC) in third consecutive year: 137 463 personnelrelation to the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, (52 per cent of the total) were deployed toLibya and Syria. operations conducted by NATO, mainly the Several factors explain the consolidation International Security Assistance Forcetrend of recent years. First and foremost is (ISAF) in Afghanistan.the global military overstretch: during the New peace operationsyears of expansion the United Nations andother organizations had difficulty in Four new peace operations were deployedpersuading countries to contribute in 2011: two in South Sudan, one in Libyasufficient troops and force enablers such as and one in Syria.helicopters. The emergence of newcontributors such as Brazil, China andIndonesia, while a positive development, n u m b e r o f p e ac e o p e r at io n s ,did not significantly fill the demand gap. A 2 0 0 2 –1 1second factor is the ongoing global financial 60downturn, which had a more discernable 50 No. of operationsimpact on peacekeeping in 2011 as 40governments outlined budget cuts for their 30militaries and advocated leaner operations 20and quicker exits in multilateral 10frameworks such as the UN. Third, over the 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011past decade contemporary peace operationshave faced ‘mission creep’ in terms of the Conducting organization:explosion of mandated tasks, which often Ad hoc Regional Unitedrequire civilian expertise and open-ended coalition organization Nationstime frames. This has led to a questioning or alliance6 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 9. p e r s o n n e l d e p l oy e d , b y p e r s on n e l de p l oy e d, b y o r g a n i z at io n t y p e , 2 01 1 l o c at io n , 2 01 1 Ad hoc coalition, 3179 personnel Middle East, 16 627 personnel (6 operations) (11 operations) United Nations Europe, 11 932 personnel Africa 105 347 personnel (15 operations) 86 642 personnel (20 operations) (16 operations) Regional organization or alliance Asia and Oceania Americas 153 603 personnel 134 727 personnel 12 201 personnel (26 operations) (8 operations) (2 operations) The independence of South Sudan led to unable to effectively carry out its mandatea significant reconfiguration of the UN and quickly became mired in controversypresence in the former territory of Sudan. and criticism.After much discussion on the future of the Regional developmentsUN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), themission closed in July, after Sudan As in preceding years, the largestindicated that it would not consent to an concentration of peace operations in 2011extension of its mandate. The majority of was in Africa. Personnel numbers rose inthe personnel were redeployed to the new Africa due to the expansion of the AfricanUN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and(UNMISS) and to the new border- the temporary reinforcement of the UNmonitoring mission, the UN Interim Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in theSecurity Force for Abyei (UNISFA). run-up to the deposition and arrest of Although NATO’s Operation Unified President Laurent Gbagbo.Protector falls outside the definition of In Asia and Oceania the UN Mission inpeace operation, it was nonetheless Nepal (UNMIN) closed in January 2011 andsignificant as it encapsulated the global the first steps were taken towards thedebate on how to demarcate the boundaries planned withdrawal of two operations:of peacekeeping. It was the first military ISAF and the UN Integrated Mission inintervention to be launched in the R2P Timor-Leste (UNMIT).  •framework and was mandated by the UNSecurity Council with no permanentmember objecting. However, towards theend of the operation, whatever tentativeconsensus there had been disintegratedover the extent of the responsibility. Laterin the year, the UN deployed the UNSupport Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), asmall political mission. In late 2011, the Arab League deployed itsfirst ever mission, the Arab LeagueObserver Mission to Syria. The mission was security and conflicts 7
  • 10. 4. MILITARY EXPENDITURE w o r l d m i l i ta r y e x p e n di t u r e , 2 0 0 2 –1 1World military expenditure did not 2.0increase in 2011, for the first time since Spending (US$ trillion) 1.51998. The world total for 2011 is estimatedto have been $1738 billion, representing 1.02.5 per cent of global gross domesticproduct or $249 for each person. Compared 0.5with the total in 2010, military spending 0remained virtually unchanged in real 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011terms. However, it is still too early to say United States Rest of the worldwhether this means that world military Spending figures are in constant (2010) US$.expenditure has finally peaked. The main cause of the halt in militaryspending growth was the economic policies The impact of austerity on militaryadopted in most Western countries in the expenditure in Europeaftermath of the global financial andeconomic crisis that started in 2008. These In Western and Central Europe inpolicies prioritized the swift reduction of particular, governments enacted austeritybudget deficits that increased sharply measures, including military spending cuts.following the crisis. In countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, deficit reduction was given added urgency by acute debt crises where these w o r l d m i l i ta r y s p e n di ng , 2 01 1 countries faced being unable to meet their Spending Change debt obligations, in some cases requiring Region ($ b.) (%) bailouts from the European Union and the Africa 34.3 8.6 International Monetary Fund. North Africa 13.9 25 Sub-Saharan Africa 20.4 –0.1 The falls in military expenditure brought Americas 809 –1.4 other policy debates into focus, including Central America 7.0 2.7 long-standing accusations from both sides and the Caribbean of the Atlantic that European countries are North America 736 –1.2 failing to ‘pull their weight’ in military South America 66.0 –3.9 affairs, and renewed efforts to promote Asia and Oceania 364 2.2 greater European military cooperation as a Central and South Asia 61.7 –2.7 way to reduce costs while preserving East Asia 243 4.1 Oceania 28.6 –1.2 capabilities. South East Asia 31.0 2.7 US military spending and the 2011 budget Europe 407 0.2 Eastern Europe 80.5 10.2 crisis Western and Central 326 –1.9 The US administration and the Congress Middle East 123 4.6 attempted to agree measures to reduce the World total 1 738 0.3 soaring US budget deficit. While these Spending figures are in current (2011) US$. attempts did not lead to substantive cuts in8 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 11. military expenditure, delays in agreeing a t h e r e p o r t i n g o f m i l i ta r ybudget for 2011 contributed to spending e x p e n di t u r e data t o t h e u nbeing lower than planned and resulted in a The number of states reporting to the UNsmall real-terms fall in US military Standardized Instrument for Reportingexpenditure. Military Expenditures has dropped from a The rapid decade-long increase in US high of 81 in 2002 to 51 in 2011.military spending appears to be ending. European states had the highest reporting rate in 2011 (31 of 48 states). The worst ratesThis is the result both of the ending of the were in Africa (2 of 54 states) and the MiddleIraq War and the winding down of the East (1 of 14 states).Afghanistan War and of budget deficit-reduction measures. costs of military forces; destruction ofThe economic cost of the Afghanistan and capital and infrastructure; disruption ofIraq wars normal economic activity; loss of humanOne of the dominating factors of the global capital through death, injury, displacementsecurity environment over the past and disruption to education; and loss of10 years, and a key factor influencing foreign investment and tourism. Fullmilitary spending in many countries, was estimates for these costs are not currentlythe ‘global war on terrorism’ following the available.terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September Military expenditure in Africa2001. The highly militarized policyresponse to these attacks chosen by the Africa was the region with the largestUSA, which included invasions of increase in military spending in 2011—Afghanistan and Iraq, had cost the USA 8.6 per cent. This was dominated by aover $1.2 trillion in additional military massive 44 per cent increase by Algeria, theexpenditure alone by the end of 2011, and continent’s largest spender. Algeria’smay result in total long-term costs of as continuous increases in recent years weremuch as $4 trillion. Much lower, although fuelled by increasing oil revenues and werestill substantial, costs had also been provided a ready justification by theincurred by other participants in these activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamicwars. Maghreb (AQIM), although Algeria’s The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have regional ambitions may be a morealso led to huge economic costs, including important motive. The terrorist activities of Boko Haram t h e 1 0 l a r g e s t m i l i ta r y were also a major security concern for s p e n de r s , 2 01 1 Nigeria and the military-led response to these appears to have been one factor in Nigeria’s military spending increases. However, the role of other factors, USA China Russia UK France especially oil revenues, should not be $711 b. $143 b. $71.9 b. $62.7 b. $62.5 b. ignored.  • Japan India Saudi Arabia Germany Brazil $59.3 b. $48.9 b. $48.5 b. $46.7 $35.4 b. military spending and armaments 9
  • 12. 5. ARMS PRODUCTION AND in Western Europe, although theseMILITARY SERVICES discussions have not yet resulted in widespread increased cooperation.The public spending crisis in the Global West European countries have discussedNorth has not yet had a large overall impact and begun to implement cooperativeon the major companies in the arms development and production strategies forproduction and military services industry unmanned aerial systems (UASs) and in(‘the arms industry’). The most likely June 2011 the European Commissionreason for this lack of major change is that initiated a process for developing andthe impact of the world financial slowdown producing UASs. However, these projectsis being delayed by the structure of the have not yet come to fruition, as seen in thearms industry. stagnation of the Talarion project. The economic and spending The military services industryuncertainties in both the USA and WesternEurope will have general implications for Some key military services sectors—such asthe way in which weapon programmes are maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO),developed and implemented, and so have systems support, logistics, and training ofcontributed to uncertainty as to whether foreign militaries—have been morearms sales will be maintained or increase at resistant to the impact of the drawdownthe same rate as in the past. from Iraq and to the global financial instability. Their long-term growth can beThe US National Defense Authorization Act attributed to a variety of post-cold warThe National Defense Authorization Act for changes, including structuralfinancial year 2012 has sent a mixed transformation of military needs and themessage about the US arms industry. On decrease of in-house capabilities for everthe one hand, it maintains many of the more complex systems. It seems thatUSA’s largest and most costly weapon pressure on public spending, which hasprogrammes, such as the F-35 (Joint Strike raised the possibility that military spendingFighter). Authorization to continue will fall, will contribute to an increase inspending on these programmes indicates demand for outsourced services such asthat arms sales in the US market are likely weapon systems MRO.to continue largely unchanged from current Diversification into cybersecuritylevels. On the other hand, new contractrules on risk sharing between the US In addition to an increased focus onGovernment and the companies winning military services, companies are relying onarms contracts mean that a potentially other business strategies in an effort toheavier burden will fall on the industry as maintain their bottom lines. A notablethese programmes develop. development has been the growth in acquisitions of specialist cybersecurityArms industry production cooperation in firms as the largest arms-producingWestern Europe companies attempt to shield themselvesThe financial crisis has seeped into the from potential cuts in military spendingdiscussions on arms industry cooperation and move into adjacent markets.10 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 13. The Indian arms industry c o m pa n i e s i n t h e si p r i t o p 10 0Many countries outside the Global North f o r 2 010 , b y c ou n t r yare attempting to develop a self-sustaining Other non-OECD, 6 companies Russia, 8 companiesnational arms industry. India’s efforts tomodernize, upgrade and maintain the Other OECD, 12 companies United States,equipment of its armed forces and to 44 companiesexpand its military capabilities have madeit the largest importer of major arms. Western Europe, 30 companies Its domestic arms industry is alsoattempting to meet this demand—for Country or region refers to the location of theexample by increasing levels of technology company headquarters, not necessarily thethrough technology transfer—but the location of production. China is excluded dueIndian defence industrial policy requires to lack of data.major reform. in 2009. Between 2002 and 2010 Top 100The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and arms sales rose by 60 per cent.military services companies Companies based in the USA remained atThe SIPRI Top 100 list ranks the largest the top of the SIPRI Top 100 and werearms-producing and military services responsible for over 60 per cent of the armscompanies in the world (outside China) sales in the SIPRI Top 100. The number ofaccording to their arms sales. Sales of arms West European companies in the Top 100and military services by the SIPRI Top 100 declined to 30, while the Brazilian companycontinued to increase in 2010 to reach Embraer re-entered the Top 100. Russia’s$411.1 billion, although at 1 per cent in real continued arms industry consolidationterms the rate of increase was slower than added another parent corporation to its top arms producers—United Shipbuilding the 10 l a rgest a r ms- Corporation.  • p r oduc i ng c o m pa n i e s , 2 010 Arms sales Profit Company ($ m.) ($ m.) 1 Lockheed Martin 35 730 2 926 2 BAE Systems (UK) 32 880 –1 671 3 Boeing 31 360 3 307 4 Northrop Grumman 28 150 2 053 5 General Dynamics 23 940 2 624 6 Raytheon 22 980 1 879 7 EADS (trans-Europe) 16 360 732 8 Finmeccanica (Italy) 14 410 738 9 L-3 Communications 13 070 955 10 United Technologies 11 410 4 711 Companies are US-based, unless indicated otherwise. The profit figures are from all company activities, including non-military sales. military spending and armaments 11
  • 14. 6. INTERNATIONAL ARMS arrangements and the transfer ofTRANSFERS technology. India, which received 10 per cent of all imports in 2007–11, is likely toThe volume of international transfers of remain the largest recipient of majormajor conventional weapons grew by conventional weapons in the coming years.24 per cent between 2002–2006 and The impact of the Arab Spring on2007–11. The five largest suppliers in arms export policies2007–11—the USA, Russia, Germany,France and the UK—accounted for three- The first year of the Arab Spring provokedquarters of the volume of exports. Outside debate about the policies of major armsthe five largest arms suppliers, China and suppliers on exports to states in the MiddleSpain recorded significant increases in the East and North Africa. Russian officials sawvolume of deliveries during 2007–11. While no reason to halt deliveries to any state inChina’s exports are likely to continue to the region not subject to a UN armsgrow, Spain’s order book for ships—which embargo. In contrast, the USA and severalaccount for the bulk of its exports— major European suppliers to the regionindicates that it will not maintain its revoked or suspended some export licencesvolume of exports. to the region and in certain cases undertook States in Asia and Oceania received reviews of their arms export policies.nearly half of all imports of major However, strategic and economic concernsconventional weapons in 2007–11. continued to play a central role in all states’Moreover, the five largest recipients of decision-making on arms exports to themajor conventional weapons—India, South region, and the impact of the Arab SpringKorea, Pakistan, China and Singapore— on arms export policies appears to havewere all located in the region. Major been limited.importers are taking advantage of the Arms transfers to South East Asiacompetitive arms market to seek attractivedeals in terms of financing, offset The volume of arms transfers to South East Asia increased threefold between 2002– 2006 and 2007–11. Naval equipment and the tr end in tr a nsfers of aircraft with maritime roles accounted for m a j o r a r m s , 2 0 0 2 –1 1 a significant share of deliveries and 30 outstanding orders by Brunei Darussalam, (billions of trend-indicator values) 25 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Volume of arms transfers 20 Singapore and Viet Nam. 15 Determinants of the types and volumes 10 of weapons sought by these six states include piracy, illegal fishing and terrorism. 5 However, territorial disputes in the South 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 China Sea probably play the most important Bar graph: annual totals; line graph: five-year role in their procurement decisions. This is moving average (plotted at the last year of borne out by defence white papers, the each five-year period). types of weapons acquired in 2007–11 and,12 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 15. the m ain importers a nd r e c i p i e n t r e gio n s o f m a jo r ex porter s of m a jor a r ms, a r m s i m p o r t s , 2 0 0 7–1 1 2 010 Africa, 9% Global Global Americas, 11% Exporter share (%) Importer share (%) 1. USA 30 1. India 10 Asia and Oceania, 44% 2. Russia 24 2. South Korea 6 Middle East, 17% 3. Germany 9 3. Pakistan 5 4. France 8 4. China 5 Europe, 19% 5. UK 4 5. Singapore 4 6. China 4 6. Australia 4 7. Spain 3 7. Algeria 4 connection with Azerbaijan’s procurement 8. Netherlands 3 8. USA 3 drive. 9. Italy 3 9. UAE 3 While a voluntary Organization for 10. Israel 2 10. Greece 3 Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) arms embargo is in force, there arein particular, a recent series of low-level different interpretations of its status bymaritime confrontations in disputed OSCE participating states and armswaters. continue to be supplied to both sides. Russia States in South East Asia are also making is a major supplier to both parties. Armeniaefforts to secure transfers of technology has a limited range of potential suppliersand diversify their sources of supply. and is overly reliant on Russia as an armsSuppliers are increasingly willing to meet supplier. In contrast, Azerbaijan hasthe demands of states in the region for recently concluded significant licensedextensive technology transfers in arms production arrangements and deals withdeals or partnerships to develop new Israel, South Africa and Turkey as it seeksweapon systems. to use foreign technology to develop anArms transfers to Armenia and Azerbaijan indigenous arms industry.  •Recent acquisitions, orders andprocurement plans by Armenia andAzerbaijan have the potential to increase t r a n s pa r e nc y i n a r m sthe risk of renewed conflict over the tr ansfersdisputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The number of states reporting their armsArmenia and Azerbaijan accuse each other imports and exports to the United Nationsof pursuing an arms race. Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) Azerbaijan has significantly increased its increased in 2011 to 85, from an all-time low ofvolume of arms imports against a backdrop 72 states in 2010. There was a notable increase in the Americas, but only one African stateof bellicose rhetoric on the use of force to reported, the lowest number since UNROCAsettle the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. was created.There is limited public information on An increasing number of governments haveArmenia’s arms imports in recent years but published national reports on arms exports,during 2010 and 2011 it announced plans to including Poland, which published its firstprocure more advanced weapon systems in reports in 2011. military spending and armaments 13
  • 16. 7. WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES w o r l d n u c l e a r f o r c e s , 2 01 2 Deployed Other TotalAt the start of 2012, eight states possessed Country warheads warheads inventoryapproximately 4400 operational nuclear USA 2 150 5 850 ~8 000weapons. Nearly 2000 of these are kept in a Russia 1 800 8 200 10 000state of high operational alert. If all nuclear UK 160 65 225warheads are counted—operational France 290 10 ~300 China .. 200 ~240warheads, spares, those in both active and India .. 80–100 80–100inactive storage, and intact warheads Pakistan .. 90–110 90–110scheduled for dismantlement—the USA, Israel .. ~80 ~80Russia, the UK, France, China, India, North Korea .. .. ?Pakistan and Israel together possess a total Total ~4 400 ~14 600 ~19 000of approximately 19 000 nuclear weapons. All estimates are approximate and are as of The availability of reliable information January 2012.about the nuclear weapon states’ arsenalsvaries considerably. France, the UK and theUSA have recently disclosed important France, Russia, the UK and the USA—information about their nuclear appear determined to remain nuclearcapabilities. In contrast, transparency in powers for the indefinite future.Russia has decreased as a result of its Russia and the USA have majordecision not to publicly release detailed modernization programmes under way fordata about its strategic nuclear forces under nuclear delivery systems, warheads andthe 2010 Russia–USA New START treaty, production facilities. At the same time, theyeven though it shares the information with continue to reduce their nuclear forcesthe USA. China remains highly non- through the implementation of Newtransparent as part of its long-standing START, which entered into force in 2011, asdeterrence strategy, and little information well as through unilateral force cuts. Sinceis publicly available about its nuclear forces Russia and the USA possess by far the twoand weapon production complex. largest nuclear weapon arsenals, one result Reliable information on the operational has been that the total number of nuclearstatus of the nuclear arsenals and weapons in the world continues to decline.capabilities of the three states that have The nuclear arsenals of China, Francenever been party to the 1968 Non- and the UK are considerably smaller, but allProliferation Treaty (NPT)—India, Israel are either developing new weapons or haveand Pakistan—is especially difficult to find. plans to do so. China is the only one of theseIn the absence of official declarations, the states that appears to be expanding the sizepublicly available information is often of its nuclear forces, albeit slowly.contradictory or incorrect. Indian and Pakistani nuclear forcesThe legally recognized nuclear weapon India and Pakistan are increasing the sizestates and sophistication of their nuclearAll five legally recognized nuclear weapon arsenals. Both countries are developingstates, as defined by the NPT—China, and deploying new types of nuclear-capable14 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 17. s t o c k s o f f i s s i l e m at e r i a l s superiority in conventional arms and Materials that can sustain an explosive fission manpower. chain reaction are essential for all types of Pakistan’s development of new short- nuclear explosives, from first-generation range ballistic missiles suggests that its fission weapons to advanced thermonuclear military planning has evolved to include weapons. The most common of these fissile contingencies for the use of ‘battlefield materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear weapons’. This may lead to nuclear and plutonium. For their nuclear weapons, China, France, warheads being deployed on a more launch- Russia, the UK and the USA have produced ready posture. both HEU and plutonium; India, Israel and Israeli nuclear forces North Korea have produced mainly plutonium; and Pakistan mainly HEU. All Israel continues to maintain its long- states with a civilian nuclear industry have standing policy of nuclear opacity, neither some capability to produce fissile materials. officially confirming nor denying that it Global stocks, 2011 possesses nuclear weapons. However, it is Highly enriched uranium ~1270 tonnes* widely believed to have produced Separated plutonium plutonium for a nuclear weapon arsenal. Military stocks ~237 tonnes Israel may have produced non-strategic Civilian stocks ~250 tonnes nuclear weapons, including artillery shells * Not including 171 tonnes to be blended down. and atomic demolition munitions, but this has never been confirmed. North Korea’s military nuclear capabilitiesballistic and cruise missiles and both areincreasing their military fissile material North Korea has demonstrated a militaryproduction capabilities. nuclear capability. However, there is no India’s nuclear doctrine is based on the public information to verify that itprinciple of a minimum credible deterrent possesses operational nuclear weapons.and no-first-use of nuclear weapons. There At the end of 2011 North Korea washave been no official statements specifying estimated to have separated roughlythe required size and composition of the 30 kilograms of plutonium. This would bearsenal but, according to the Ministry of sufficient to construct up to eight nuclearDefence, it involves ‘a mix of land-based, weapons, depending on North Korea’smaritime and air capabilities’ (a ‘triad’). design and engineering skills. In May 2011 the Indian Prime Minister, According to a leaked report prepared inManmohan Singh, convened a meeting of 2011 by the UN Security Council’s panel ofthe Nuclear Command Authority—the body experts on North Korea, the country hasresponsible for overseeing the country’s pursued a uranium-enrichmentnuclear arsenal—to assess progress towards programme ‘for several years or eventhe goal of achieving an operational triad. decades’. It is not known whether North Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is also based Korea has produced HEU for use in nuclearon the principle of minimum deterrence but weapons.  •does not specifically rule out the first-use ofnuclear weapons to offset India’s military spending and armaments 15
  • 18. 8. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND warheads as well as broader strategicNON-PROLIFERATION stability issues. The most prominent of the latter related to ballistic missile defence,Russian–US nuclear arms control which was the focus of an intensifyingThe momentum behind treaty-based dispute in 2011. There was also recognitionapproaches to nuclear arms control and that deeper cuts in their respectivedisarmament was highlighted in 2011 by strategic nuclear arsenals would requirethe entry into force of the 2010 Russia–USA bringing the three other nuclear weaponTreaty on Measures for the Further states recognized by the 1968 Non-Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Proliferation Treaty (NPT) into aOffensive Arms (New START), which multilateral nuclear arms-reductionmandated additional reductions in the two process.parties’ strategic offensive nuclear forces. Nuclear proliferation concerns in Iran and The parties implemented on schedule the Syriainspections, data exchanges, notificationsand other measures set out in the treaty’s International efforts to prevent the spreadcooperative monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons remained a top priorityregime. In establishing this regime—one of in 2011. Two states—Iran and Syria—camethe treaty’s main achievements—New under intensified scrutiny during the yearSTART continued an arms control process for allegedly concealing military nuclearthrough which Russia and the USA have activities, in contravention of theirredefined their strategic relationship. commitments under the NPT. There were questions about the next A three-year investigation by thesteps in Russian–US arms control. Both International Atomic Energy Agencysides acknowledged that making further (IAEA) concluded that a building in Syriacuts in their nuclear arsenals would require destroyed by an Israeli air strike in 2007expanding the bilateral agenda to address was ‘very likely’ to have been a nucleartactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed reactor that should have been declared to the agency. The IAEA also reported that it had credible evidence that Iran had a g gr e g at e s t r at e g ic pursued nuclear weapon-related activities o f f e n s i v e a r m s u n de r n e w in the past and said that some of the s ta r t, 1 s e p t e m b e r 2 01 1 activities might still be continuing. The Russia USA difficulties encountered by inspectors in Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and 516 822 both countries led to renewed calls to heavy bombers expand the IAEA’s legal powers to Warheads on deployed ICBMs 1 566 1 790 and SLBMs, and warheads investigate NPT states parties suspected of counted for heavy bombers violating their treaty-mandated safeguards Deployed and non-deployed 871 1 043 agreements, even beyond those set out in launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs the Model Additional Protocol. and heavy bombers The unresolved Iranian and Syrian ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; nuclear controversies raised further doubt SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile. about the efficacy of international legal16 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 19. approaches, in particular the role of the UN reprocessing (ENR) equipment andSecurity Council, in dealing with suspected technology. The NSG states could not agreeor known cases of states violating on language for the imposition of certainimportant arms control treaty obligations subjective criteria; instead, they settled onand norms. During 2011 Iran continued to conditioning the transfer of nucleardefy five Security Council resolutions, technology on signing an additionaladopted since 2006, demanding that it safeguards protocol with the IAEA and onsuspend all uranium enrichment and other the importing state being in full compliancesensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities. A with its IAEA obligations.divided Security Council failed to take An issue at the very heart of nuclear non-action on Syria’s nuclear file after the IAEA proliferation is the relationship betweenBoard of Governors had declared the the NSG suppliers and those states withcountry to be non-compliant with its nuclear weapons that are outside of thesafeguards agreement. In the view of some framework of the NPT and the NSG. Theobservers, the lack of action set the stage 2011 NSG plenary discussed whether thefor future controversies about the revised guidelines affected India’ssuitability of extra-legal measures, eligibility to receive ENR transfers and itsincluding the pre-emptive use of military possible membership of the NSG.force, in addressing proliferation concerns. Cooperation on non-proliferation, armsNorth Korea’s nuclear programme control and nuclear securityThe diplomatic impasse over the fate of the The risks of nuclear terrorism and the illicitnuclear programme of North Korea diversion of nuclear materials continued toremained unresolved in 2011. Preliminary be the focus of high-level political attentiondiscussions aimed at restarting the around the globe in 2011.suspended Six-Party Talks on the The Group of Eight (G8) agreed to extenddenuclearization of North Korea made little the 2002 Global Partnership against theprogress, despite renewed contacts Spread of Weapons and Materials of Massbetween North Korean and US diplomats. Destruction—an initiative which hasThe legal and normative challenges posed supported cooperative projects aimed atby North Korea to the global non- addressing non-proliferation, disarmamentproliferation regime were underscored by and nuclear security issues. In addition, thereports that the country had been involved UN Security Council adopted Resolutionin covert transfers of nuclear and ballistic 1977, which extended by 10 years thetechnologies to third countries on a larger mandate of the committee establishedscale than previously suspected. under Resolution 1540 to monitor and facilitate states’ compliance with theirDevelopments in the Nuclear SuppliersGroup obligations under the resolution. •In June 2011 the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) reached a controversial consensusagreement to tighten its transfer guidelinesfor uranium-enrichment and plutonium- non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 17
  • 20. 9. REDUCING SECURITY THREATS deadline of 29 April 2012 but wouldFROM CHEMICAL AND nevertheless undertake to complete theBIOLOGICAL MATERIALS destruction expeditiously. In the case of Iraq, the Organisation for the Prohibition ofBiological weapon arms control and Chemical Weapons (OPCW) concluded thatdisarmament progress has been made in razing chemicalThe Seventh Review Conference of the weapon production facilities.States Parties to the 1972 Biological and An advisory panel to the OPCW’sToxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Director-General submitted its final reportagreed to conduct a third intersessional after reviewing the implementation of themeeting process that will ‘discuss, and CWC with a focus on how the convention’spromote common understanding and activities should be structured after theeffective action’ on cooperation and destruction of chemical weapon stockpilesassistance, the review of relevant ends, sometime after 2012. The Director-developments in science and technology, General, together with the states partiesand the strengthening of, among other and the OPCW Executive Council, used thethings, national implementation of the process of formulating the report as aconvention. means to develop agreed policy guidance Despite the expectations of many states for future OPCW priorities andand analysts that the BTWC would programmes in the lead-up to the Thirdsomehow be ‘bolstered’ (e.g. by taking Review Conference, which will be held inadditional steps with respect to 2013. The report therefore presentedinstitutional strengthening and various options and activities that had beenoperational-level or ‘practical’ measures), subjected to political and technical review,the political conditions at the conference which the Director-General may use toinhibited taking decisions to establish an inform the balance and focus of futureintersessional process that is more action- activities by the OPCW Technicaland decision-oriented. Thus, the regime isevolving incrementally and is focused on d e s t r u c t io n o f c h e m ic a lprocess. w e a pons As of 30 November 2011,Chemical weapon arms control and • Iraq, Libya, Russia and the USA had yet todisarmament complete destruction of their chemicalThe 16th Conference of the States Parties to weapon stockpilesthe 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention • 50 619 agent tonnes (71 per cent) of the(CWC) witnessed exchanges between Iran declared chemical weapons had been verifiably destroyedand the USA that partly reflected wider • 3.95 million (46 per cent) declared itemsinternational tension regarding the nature and chemical weapon containers had beenand purpose of Iran’s nuclear activities. destroyedRussia and the USA confirmed that they • 13 states had declared 70 former chemicalwould be unable to complete the weapon production facilitiesdestruction of their chemical weapon • 43 of these facilities had been destroyedstockpiles by the final CWC-mandated and 21 converted to peaceful purposes18 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 21. o l d a n d a b a n d o n e d c h e m ic a l although little discussion occurred on how w e a pons to link this problem to the convention’s As of December 2011, challenge inspection request provisions. • 4 countries had declared that abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) were present Future implications of science and on their territories technology • 15 countries had declared that they have Science and technology and related possessed old chemical weapons (OCWs) since the CWC’s entry-into-force research can strongly affect chemical and • OCW destruction operations in 2011 were biological warfare prevention, response carried out in Belgium, Italy, Japan, and remediation efforts. Research on avian Germany, Switzerland and the UK influenza in particular has raised a number • Destruction operations for ACWs in China of policy implications, such as whether it is continued preferable to describe scientific research on its merits for peaceful purposes and toSecretariat. The report also reflects the avoid characterizing it in terms of potentialCWC regime’s continuing transition security threats. The debate also affectstowards other priorities that will become research funding, publication policies,more apparent once chemical weapon agreed principles in research oversight, andstockpiles are eliminated. differences in approach on agreeing and implementing appropriate safety andAllegations of chemical and biological security standards.weapon programmes Despite the inherently subjectiveDuring the Libyan civil war concern was (qualitative) nature of such assessments,expressed that the regime of Muammar scientists and technical experts workingGaddafi would employ a stock of residual for states, in principle, understand suchsulphur mustard against anti-government threats—provided their national structuresprotestors and armed rebel groups. Similar are oriented to take such threats intoconcerns were expressed regarding the account. Non-state actors—‘terrorists’ andnature and fate of possible chemical and the proverbial garage science operators—biological weapons in Syria over the course lack institutional depth and capacity toof the country’s civil unrest and tension. achieve similar levels of sophistication or The OPCW sent a special inspection output. Another key conundrum is whetherteam to Libya in November to investigate threat pronouncements—often made byreports of undeclared chemical weapons those who are not conducting scientificand it was confirmed that the Gaddafi research and development—promptregime had not declared a secret chemical al-Qaeda affiliates (or their equivalent) toweapon stockpile. The fact that the OPCW consider or to pursue the acquisition ofdid not uncover Libya’s deceptive chemical and biological weapons.  •declarations prior to the 2011 overthrow ofGaddafi raised questions about theorganization’s ability to detect violationsmore generally and prompted calls toreview the CWC’s verification regime, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 19
  • 22. 10. CONVENTIONAL ARMS international community is now polarizedCONTROL between a group of states that have committed themselves to a total ban onWith the exception of some promising cluster munitions through a separateprogress in South America and in South convention negotiated among themselves—Eastern Europe, in 2011 most developments the CCM—and a group of states that are notin conventional arms control were bound by any shared rules at all, apart fromdiscouraging as states were not willing to the laws of war.modify national positions in order to Developments in arms export controlfacilitate agreement, either globally orregionally. Efforts to improve the technical efficiency Three factors have contributed to the of export control continued in 2011 in globaldifficulty of developing conventional arms and regional organizations and in thecontrol. First, the huge and sustained informal regimes of the Missile Technologyinvestment that the USA has made in its Control Regime and the Wassenaarmilitary power has made it impossible to Arrangement. However, a commonfind solutions based on balance. Second, approach to assessing acceptable risktechnological developments have blurred remains elusive, beyond general guidelinesthe picture of which capabilities will confer agreed in the 1990s.military power now and in the future. Discussions continued in the UN on theThird, the lack of agreed rules about the use creation of a legally binding arms tradeof force—which may be for ostensibly treaty (ATT), prior to the negotiatingconstructive purposes and not only a conference to be held in July 2012. Hopesdefensive response to aggression—makes were raised that China and Russia werecountries reluctant to give up military becoming more engaged in the process.capabilities even if there is a humanitarian Nonetheless, there are significantargument in favour of restraint. differences between states over the content and purpose of a future treaty.Cluster munitions Multilateral arms embargoesThe 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions(CCM) is an example of an agreement based The only new embargo imposed by the UNon the principle that, even if a given weapon Security Council in 2011 was that on Libya.delivers some military advantage, it should States subsequently disagreed aboutstill be limited or banned because the whether or not it permitted the supply ofhumanitarian consequences of use arms to rebel forces. The Security Counciloutweigh any military benefit. was not able to agree on imposing an arms While the CCM’s parties continued their embargo on Syria despite lengthyimplementation in 2011, the parties to the discussion.1981 Certain Conventional Weapons The Arab League imposed its first everConvention failed to agree on a protocol arms embargo in 2011, on Syria. ECOWAS’sdefining rules for the use of cluster arms embargo on Guinea, imposed in 2009,munitions and banning those with was lifted in 2011. The European Union, inparticularly harmful effects. The addition to its implementation of the new20 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 23. m u lt i l at e r a l a r m s 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces e m b a r g o e s i n f o r c e , 2 01 1 in Europe (CFE Treaty) with Russia (which United Nations (13 embargoes) had suspended its participation in 2007). • Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and Conventional arms control in Europe has entities • Democratic Republic of the Congo reached a dead end, even though the need (NGF) • Côte d’Ivoire • Eritrea • Iran • Iraq for it is largely undisputed. Unresolved (NGF) • North Korea • Lebanon (NGF) territorial conflicts play a key role in • Liberia (NGF) • Libya (NGF) • Somalia blocking progress, but there is no current • Sudan (Darfur) • Taliban consensus on its specific objectives, European Union (19 embargoes) subjects and instruments. Implementations of UN embargoes (9): • Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated Confidence- and security-building individuals and entities • Democratic measures Republic of the Congo (NGF) • Côte d’Ivoire • Eritrea • Iraq (NGF) • Lebanon (NGF) In most regions confidence- and security- • Liberia (NGF) • Libya (NGF) • Somalia building measures (CSBMs) have been (NGF) elaborated as part of a broader discussion of Adaptations of UN embargoes (3): • Iran a security regime in which the behaviour of • North Korea • Sudan states is rendered understandable and Embargoes with no UN counterpart (7): predictable. • Belarus • China • Guinea • Myanmar In Europe, the Vienna Document is the • South Sudan • Syria • Zimbabwe most important element of the CSBM ECOWAS (1 embargo) regime, complemented by the 1992 Treaty • Guinea on Open Skies. In 2011 the OSCE Arab League (1 embargo) participating states adopted a revised version of the Vienna Document. However, • Syria it represents at best minimal progress over NGF = non-governmental forces. the Vienna Document 1999. If this trend is not reversed, the Vienna Document regimeUN embargo on Libya, imposed three new will continue to lose military and politicalarms embargoes during 2011, on Belarus, relevance.on South Sudan and on Syria. In South America, members of UNASUR Several significant violations of arms agreed to a series of CSBMs intended toembargoes were reported during 2011, support their wider objective of building aprimarily by the UN panels of experts common and cooperative security systemtasked with monitoring the embargoes. • in the region. Conventional arms control in EuropeThe renewed interest in conventional armscontrol in Europe that was in evidence in2010 could not be translated intosubstantial progress in 2011. By the end ofthe year, NATO member states had decidedto stop sharing information related to the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 21
  • 24. ANNEXES (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological andArms control and disarmament Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC)agreements in force, 1 January 2012 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests Use in War of Asphyxiating, (Threshold Test-Ban Treaty, TTBT) Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Bacteriological Methods of Warfare Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1925 Geneva Protocol) (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty,1948 Convention on the Prevention and PNET) Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of (Genocide Convention) Military or Any Other Hostile Use of1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to Environmental Modification the Protection of Civilian Persons in Techniques (Enmod Convention) Time of War; and 1977 Protocols I and 1980 Convention on the Physical II Relating to the Protection of Protection of Nuclear Material Victims of International and 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Non-International Armed Conflicts Restrictions on the Use of Certain1959 Antarctic Treaty Conventional Weapons which may be1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Deemed to be Excessively Injurious Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer or to have Indiscriminate Effects Space and Under Water (Partial Test- (CCW Convention, or ‘Inhumane Ban Treaty, PTBT) Weapons’ Convention)1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Activities of States in the Exploration Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) and Use of Outer Space, Including the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Intermediate-Range and Shorter- (Outer Space Treaty) Range Missiles (INF Treaty)1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Weapons in Latin America and the Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 1992 Treaty on Open Skies1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Development, Production, Stock- Treaty, NPT) piling and Use of Chemical Weapons1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the and on their Destruction (Chemical Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons Weapons Convention, CWC) and other Weapons of Mass 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Destruction on the Seabed and the Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Bangkok) thereof (Seabed Treaty) 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) Development, Production and 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Stockpiling of Bacteriological Control (Florence Agreement)22 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 25. 1997 Inter-American Convention Against 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, the Illicit Manufacturing of and Light Weapons, their Ammunition Trafficking in Firearms, and Other Related Materials Ammunition, Explosives, and Other 2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Related Materials (CIFTA) Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Semipalatinsk) Use, Stockpiling, Production and 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further and on their Destruction (APM Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Convention) Offensive Arms (New START)1999 Inter-American Convention on 2011 Vienna Document 2011 on Transparency in Conventional Confidence- and Security-Building Weapons Acquisitions Measures c h r o n o l o g y 2 01 1 , s e l e c t e d Agreements not yet in force, 1 January events 2012 14 Jan. President Zine-Al Abidine Ben Ali is 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban forced to leave Tunisia Treaty (CTBT) 5 Feb. New START enters into force 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE 12 Mar. The Arab League asks the UN to Treaty impose a no-fly zone over Libya 2010 Central African Convention for the 11 Apr. Forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara, Control of Small Arms and Light and supported by French and UN Weapons, Their Ammunition and All forces, capture and arrest Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo Parts and Components That Can Be 27 May The leaders of the G8 agree to extend Used for Their Manufacture, Repair its 2002 Global Partnership against and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention) the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Security cooperation bodies 20 June The EU imposes an arms embargo on Notable changes in 2011 include the Belarus admittance of South Sudan as the 18 July The International Court of Justice decides that the disputed temple area 193rd member of the United Nations, the Preah Vihear belongs to Cambodia, entry into force of the Constitutive Treaty not Thailand of UNASUR, the closure of the Western 6 Aug. Al-Shabab announces a ‘tactical’ European Union and the suspension of withdrawal from Mogadishu, Syria from the Arab League. Somalia Three states acceded to the Hague Code 22 Sep. The IAEA endorses an action plan on of Conduct against Ballistic Missile nuclear safety Proliferation and one to the Zangger 20 Oct. The Libyan National Transitional Council announces the capture and Committee. No new members joined the killing of Muammar Gaddafi other strategic trade control regimes—the 14–25 The Fourth Review Conference of Australia Group, the Missile Technology Nov. the CCW Convention is held Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers 18 Dec. The last US soldiers leave Iraq Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.  • annexes 23
  • 26. SIPRI’S DATABASESSIPRI’s databases provide the foundation for much of its research and analysis and are anunrivalled source of basic data on armaments, disarmament and international security.Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST)Provides a federated system of databases on topics related to international relations andsecurity, accessible through a single integrated user interface.www.sipri.org/databases/first/SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations DatabaseOffers information on all UN and non-UN peace operations conducted since 2000, includinglocation, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number ofpersonnel, costs and fatalities.www.sipri.org/databases/pko/SIPRI Military Expenditure DatabaseGives consistent time series on the military spending of 172 countries since 1988, allowingcomparison of countries’ military spending: in local currency, at current prices; in USdollars, at constant prices and exchange rates; and as a share of GDP.www.sipri.org/databases/milex/SIPRI Arms Transfers DatabaseShows all international transfers in seven categories of major conventional arms since 1950,the most comprehensive publicly available source of information on international armstransfers.www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/SIPRI Arms Embargoes DatabaseProvides information on all multilateral arms embargoes implemented since 1988.www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/24 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
  • 27. HOW TO ORDER SIPRI YEARBOOK 2012SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International SecurityPublished in July 2012 by Oxford University Press on behalf of SIPRIISBN 978-0-19-965058-3, hardback, xx+560 pp., £100/$185SIPRI Yearbook 2012 can be ordered from book shops, from most online booksellers ordirectly from Oxford University Press:www.oup.com/localecatalogue/cls_academic/?i=9780199650583Further details are available at www.sipri.org/yearbook/ sipr i y e a r book online Access the SIPRI Yearbook online is included in purchase of the print edition. Benefits of the online edition include • The complete text of the SIPRI Yearbook • Simple but powerful search across editions since 2010 • Copious deep linking to authoritative Internet resources • The authority of the SIPRI Yearbook whenever and wherever you are online www.sipriyearbook.orgTRANSLATIONSSIPRI Yearbook 2012 will be translated into• Arabic by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS), Beirut www.caus.org.lb• Chinese by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), Beijing www.cacda.org.cn• Russian by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow www.imemo.ru• Ukrainian by the Razumkov Centre (Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, UCEPS), Kyiv www.razumkov.org.uaThese translations are funded by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protectionand Sport. Contact the publishing organizations for further details.
  • 28. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI YEARBOOK 2012Armaments, Disarmament and International SecurityThe SIPRI Yearbook is a compendium of data and analysis in the areas of • Security and conflicts • Military spending and armaments • Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmamentThis booklet summarizes the 43nd edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, which includescoverage of developments during 2011 in • Armed conflict, with features on the first year of the Arab Spring and conflicts in the Horn of Africa and a broad look at organized violence • Peace operations and conflict management, including accounts of new operations in South Sudan, Libya and Syria • Military expenditure, highlighting the effects of government cuts in Europe and the United States and examining the cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq • Arms production and military services, with features on military services and the Indian arms industry • International arms transfers, highlighting exports to states affected by the Arab Spring and transfers to South East Asia and to Armenia and Azerbaijan • World nuclear forces, including stocks and production of fissile materials • Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, including implementation of New START and revision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s guidelines • Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials, highlighting the impact of advances in science and technology • Conventional arms control, including multilateral arms embargoes and a feature on cluster munitionsas well as a lead essay by Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister, on the newgeopolitics of intervention and extensive annexes on arms control and disarmamentagreements, international security cooperation bodies, and events during 2011.