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Transantiago
 

Transantiago

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    Transantiago Transantiago Presentation Transcript

    • Unconventional wisdom: theTransantiago experienceJuan Carlos MuñozBus Rapid Transport Centre of ExcellenceDepartment of Transport Engineering and LogisticsPontificia Universidad Católica de ChileMIT May 2nd, 2013
    • 2What is Transantiago?• A major transit modernization effort as no otherworldwide city has suffered.– New firms– New buses– Bus control system– Integration among services (fares, services, etc)• For many:“The worst public policy ever implemented in Chile”– New services– New fare– Touchless payment card
    • 3The bus system before Transantiago• Did not work as a network• Excessive on-street competition– Drivers paid per passenger– Average size of a firm: two buses.• High operational costs– High fares for the quality of service offered• Severe externalities: accidents, pollution, congestion• Drivers frequently assaulted• Student discrimination• Poor night servicesPeople in Santiago rated bus service very badly
    • Buses: worst service in Santiago
    • 5And even more …
    • Goals of Transantiago
    • Goals of TransantiagoTransantiago’s first goal was to modernizethe transit system in Santiago: Keep (and increase) its modal split. Improve quality of service. Offer a economically, socially andenvironmentally sustainable system.
    • Transantiago an integratedsystem
    • How would these goals be achieved?• Bus services respond to a trunk and feedersystem sing Metro as a main trunk operator• Only corporate operators are allowed. Busservices are grouped into 15 units.• Better work conditions for drivers.• No passenger discrimination• Integration among services: routes, fares,infrastructure.• Distance travelled and necessary fleet arereduced considerably• Intensive use of Metro• Gradual inclusion of new buses: somearticulated, smoother drive, disabledfriendly, etc.Centro deInformación y Gestión(CIG)AdministraciónFinanciera delSistema (AFT)Servicios de busesInfraestructuraMetro
    • How would these goals be achieved?• Considers a smart and contactlesspayment card– Allowing fare integration and eliminating cashfrom buses• Reaches the environmental goals (newbuses, fewer kilometers traveled, filters,Diesel 50 ppm)• Considers a user information system anda centralized headway control system• Considers segregated bus corridors andmodern bus stops• Cost savings would allow keeping thefares stable.
    • Traveling in Transantiago
    • 12Trunk servicesThe trunk network isgrouped into 5 firms.Trunk buses arecolored white andgreen.Metro is a sixth trunkoperator
    • Transition
    • 14• Within a year, components were to be incorporatedgradually– Operators– Buses– Infrastructure– Smart card– Card charging network– Headway control system• Finally, integrated fares and new services;simultaneously in the whole city.Transition designed between systems
    • Implementation ofTransantiago(January 10th, 2007)
    • 16• Infrastructure was not built.– Almost no exclusive bus lanes– No bus stops with pre-paid zones• Information was very poorly provided• Firms were not ready to start• GPS-based control system was not ready• Card validating devices were not trusted• A nervous authority guaranteed the income, fixedthe fare and extended trip lengthsIncomplete system
    • 17• Not enough buses, and additionally operatorslacked all incentives to operate…• Operating buses bunched consistently, losingreliability• Metro collapsed• Lack of services in some areas• A financial deficit started to growIncomplete system
    • Dramatic evidence
    • Improvements sinceFebruary 10, 2007
    • Incentives in place…
    • Bus service growthYear Commercialkm (million)Fleet AverageAgeRoutes2007 371.1 4,489 8.4 2232008 481.4 6,399 7.4 3222009 487.2 6,572 5.9 3342010 512.4 6,564 5.3 3572011 483.0 6,165 5.2 370Strict trunk and feeder logic has been relaxed to reduce the number of transfers
    • Bus technology30%10%3% 1%38%37%30%27%10% 9% 8%32%53%65%68%59% 58% 58%2% 5%31% 33% 34%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012EURO III + DFPEURO IIIEURO IIEURO I
    • Metro network2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Network length (km) 66 85 85 85 85 95 104Number of stations 78 92 92 92 93 101 108Number of train cars 636 666 751 751 751 967 967Car kilometers driven(million)52 71 94 105 106 119 131Annual ridership(million )267 331 601 642 608 621 640
    • Bus infrastructureYearSegregatedcorridorsBus onlylanesExclusive streets(peak hrs only)2007 13 68 82008 16 77 312009 65 101 312010 90 101 312011 90 101 31Red bus lanes + camera enforcement
    • Speeds per modeAVERAGE IN-VEHICLE SPEED PER MODEAVERAGE OPERATIONALSPEED (Km/hr)Mixed Traffic Bus-OnlyLaneExclusive &SeggregatedLanesExpressservice(freeway)
    • Bus infrastructureResistance from neighbourhoods and local governments
    • Bus infrastructure
    • 148 operating provisional prepaid bus stopsBus stops ….
    • Level of service
    • AVERAGE DISTANCE AND DOOR TO DOOR SPEED PER TRIPAVERAGE DISTANCEPER TRIP (Km)AVERAGE SPEEDPER TRIP (Km/hr)Lowest standard deviation of travel time across trips of the same length
    • AVERAGE DISTANCE AND IN-VEHICLE SPEED PER TRIPAVERAGE DISTANCEPER TRIP (Km)AVERAGE IN-VEHSPEED (Km/hr)
    • Travel time composition (Santiago)01020304050607080901000%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0 MásTiempo(min)Length of trip (km) Trips Caminata Espera En vehículoWalking = 13.8 minWaiting = 8.6 minIn-vehicle = 28.5 min
    • AVERAGE DISTANCE AND IN-VEHICLE SPEED PER TRIPDISTANCE PER TRIP (Km)AVERAGETRAVELTIME(MIN)
    • Fare evolution8%10%12%14%16%18%20%22%24%26%300350400450500550600650700Jun-07Oct-07Feb-08Jun-08Oct-08Feb-09Jun-09Oct-09Feb-10Jun-10Oct-10Feb-11Jun-11Oct-11EvasionFares($)Bus Fare Metro Fare Evasion300350400450500550600650700Jun-07Oct-07Feb-08Jun-08Oct-08Feb-09Jun-09Oct-09Feb-10Jun-10Oct-10Feb-11Jun-11Oct-11Fares($)Bus Fare Metro Fare
    • Monthly Deficit (million US$)0,010,020,030,040,050,060,070,080,0may-07 nov-07 jun-08 dic-08 jul-09 ene-10 ago-10 mar-11 sep-11Deficit is about 40% of total costs. From this, over half goes to subsidize studentswho pay 1/3 of the regular fare and 15% does to new Metro lines
    • Contracts• Changed more than 17 times…– Link payment to demand and performance– Increase the visibility of individual firms to users– Eliminate maximum fines per operator– Stabilize revenues for firms– Reduce transfers for users– Drop the trunk and feeder scheme, and thefeeder zones
    • Transantiago approval rates05101520253035404550ene-07 may-08 sep-09 feb-11 jun-12Approvalrate(%)
    • December 2009: Approval rate ofPresident Bachelet at her peak: 81%“…Her approval in Santiago significantlyimproved while it remained constant in therest of the country.This is probably due to Transantiago, thelevel of approval of which has increasedsubstantially, particularly among Santiagocitizens….” (ADIMARK)
    • Satisfaction level with Metro’sQuality of Service83 8185 87 8981375257-4 -3 -2 -1 -1 -3-27-16-1179 788386 88781036462001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Dic Ago2008 2009% Satisfacción (% 6 y 7) % Insatisfacción (% 1 a 4) ISN
    • 8992 9389536786-2 -1 -1 -2-20-10-38791 92873357832003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Ago% Satisfacción (% 6 y 7) % Insatisfacción (% 1 a 4) ISNPerception of Metro’s Image
    • • President Piñera vows not to dismantle thelegacy of the Chilean Concertacion por laDemocracia• “Santiago de Chile has one of the most efficientcombined public transport networks in the world”El País, Spain (January 19, 2010)
    • • “Transantiago will become the best bus systemin Latin America in 4 or 5 years time”• Interview to Enrique Peñalosa, Former Mayor ofBogotá and creator of TransMilenio.Enrique Peñalosa (2010)
    • • Piñera se compromete a no deshacer el legadode la Concertación chilena• “Santiago de Chile dispone de una de las redes detransporte combinado más eficientes del mundo”El País de España (Enero 19, 2010)
    • • “Transantiago va a ser el mejor sistema debuses de América Latina en 4 ó 5 años”Entrevista a Enrique Peñalosa, Ex-Alcalde deBogotá y gestor del TransMilenio.Enrique Peñalosa (2010)
    • 50February 10, 2007What did we learn?In what aspects did we advance?What should Transantiago do?
    • The most relevant objectives are stillfar ahead
    • 52Transantiago’s first goal was to modernize the publictransport system of Santiago: At least maintain, but hopefully increase,its modal split. Improve quality of service. Offer a economically, socially andenvironmentally sustainable system.Transantiago’s second goal was to meetcertain emission targets
    • What did we learn?• A transformation of such magnitude should have requireda minimum legal, institutional and financial support• Such a transformation required more citizen participationand better information for users and prospective users• A more realistic vision of the new system should havebeen offered• The transformation could not be asked to be self-financed• It required continuity of authorities and those in charge• If structural elements were not in place, implementationshould have been delayed• A bad start is irreparable• Simultaneous changes to a system ought to be avoided
    • • The great importance of detailed engineering (i.e. at busstops)• The importance of infrastructure (bus-only streets, pre-paidzones, priority at traffic lights). Car users should not bewinners of this process !• If uncontrolled fare evasion grows• The relevance of reliability and comfort• The need to reduce transfers and make them asconvenient as possible• Headway control is crucial• It seems reasonable to start with an excess supply thatmay be filled up relatively soonWhat did we learn?
    • Achievements
    • Achievements• Formalized bus industry with new international companies• Externalities reduced significantly (accidents, pollution, congestion,noise)
    • Bus-involved accidents010002000300040005000600070002005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
    • Achievements• Formalized bus industry with new international companies• Externalities reduced significantly (accidents, pollution, congestion,noise)• Low floor buses improve access for users with reduced mobility• Fare integration with all buses and Metro• Metro moves twice as much people• Students no longer discriminated and drivers are no longer robbed• War for the passenger is over• Modern bus terminals• An economy sector has been formalized and drivers workshifts respectlabor legislation
    • Challenges and goals
    • 362523141311877554433210% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%SPEEDTHE BIP! CARDFREQUENCYPAYMENT SYSTEMCOMFORTNICER DRIVERS/BETTER EDUCATED/BETTER TREATMENT BY DRIVERSUSEFUL SERVICESCLEANBUSESROOMIER BUSESDRIVERS DRIVE BETTERCOMFORTABLE SEATSNEW BUSES/INBETTER CONDITIONSLESS TRANSFERSMORE SECURE BUSES/SAFER TRIPSBETTER ACCES TO BUSESNOTHING/NO ONEON THE BUS: WHICH ASPECTS DO YOU VALUE MORE WHEN TRAVELLING IN A BUS OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM?Most valued attributes
    • Challenges and goals• Operational– Bus headway control– Bus infrastructure (segregated corridors, stations, traffic signal priority)– Fare evasion• Information for users– Online and Off-line– Metro and buses seen as a single system• Subsidies– How much is reasonable?– Focalize• Institutional– Formalize the program– A single authority!• Win the heart of its users
    • Lessons for other cities
    • Lessons for other cities• Design issues– Consider subsidies, otherwise you will abuse of big buses– Critical BRT components can not be postponed– Avoid a rigid trunk and feeder network.– Consider express services from the beginning• Modernizing incumbent operators is feasible although very complicated– Carrot or stick• Business model– Start witha low risk model to attract bidders– Shift towards more demand-driven revenues as steady state is approached.• Institution with managerial, legal, financial, technical attributions
    • Lessons for other cities• Implementation issues– Start with formalize the firms– Implement fare integration city-wide– Based on the new load profiles adjust bus capacity to routes– Introduce new vehicles and infrastructure (compatible) sequentally in each corridoraccording to BRT principles
    • Unconventional wisdom: theTransantiago experienceJuan Carlos MuñozBus Rapid Transport Centre of ExcellenceDepartment of Transport Engineering and LogisticsPontificia Universidad Católica de ChileMIT May 2nd, 2013