Transcript of "LS2: Exploring the Complexity of Policy Design"
EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN January 2013 Research team: Rosário Macário (coord) Luís N. Filipe Maria Spandou Vasco Reis Luis Martinez Instituto Superior Técnico Universidade Técnica de Lisboa
Project objectives• Understand the main decision making processes in BRT systems• Develop a formal structure for retrospective analysis of the various interplaying policy components, and relations between institutional design and performance• Develop a systems dynamic model to search for well‐ designed and promising BRT policy packages
• Luis N. Filipe, Rosário Macário, “A first glimpse on policy packaging for implementation of BRT projects” in Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 150 – 157• Spandou M., Macário R., Decentralization as an institutional determinant for the performance of urban mobility systems, VREF CoE Workshop 26‐29 October 2011, Beijing, China • Macário R. Thinking on public accountability: How to address quality of policy design and decision‐making? 12th Thredbo Conference, 11‐15 September 2011, Durban, South Africa • + working reports
Contents• Preliminary analysis on policy packaging in Santiago Chile • Coalition analysis in New York
Objectives and goals of TS• Improve the existing public transport system of Santiago, addressing and solving the failures of the former system• Capable of maintaining or increasing the modal share of public transport while being environmentally, socially and economically sustainable (Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008)
Old transport system – issues to be addressed(Allende, I., et. al., 2007; Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008; Brione, 2009) • Defective business structure, with many small companies operating only a few services; companies organized into powerful cooperatives that were able to capture the government • No formal working relations, driver’s income linked to the number of passengers ‐ tax evasion, promotion of abusive practices, discrimination of subsidized passengers, on‐street competition • Payments done directly to drivers, who were subject to constant assaults • Defective network: 80% of the routes used one of the 6 main city streets; very long routes (average 60km), leading to high operating costs, bus bunching, congestion
Old transport system – issues to be addressed (cont.)(Allende, I., et. al., 2007; Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008; Brione, 2009) • No integration (fore or physical) making transfers expensive and low use of the metro • Old / uncomfortable and badly maintained buses, causing passenger discomfort, high air pollution and noise emissionsBut... • Relevant positive features in the old system: (Allende, I., et. al., 2007; Brione, 2009) • high network density and capillarity • high frequencies • low or no need for transfers • no subsidies • Flexibility to serve new residential areas
Main features of the TS Plan(Muñoz & Gschwender, 2009) • Organised as trunk and feeder system with the metro as the backbone • Specifications defined to minimize total social cost, operate without subsidies and subject to a maximal fare, with an average travel time similar to former system • Drivers’ salaries independent from the number of passengers – eliminate aggressive driving techniques • Operators receive the same for all passengers ‐ discrimination against poorer/subsidized passengers • Fares and services integration, including the metro – increase metro ridership
Policy Packaging in BRT TranSantiago Case StudyMain features of the TS Plan (cont.)(Muñoz & Gschwender, 2009)• Totally new fleet, with facilities for disabled riders• A new information system to passengers, based on GPS technology • Smartcard transaction, thus eliminating money handling in buses – reducing assaults to drivers• Money administered by AFT (financial and technological manager) • Awards and penalties scheme on operators’ contracts• Network of segregated bus corridors and high quality bus stops ‐ increase in average speed
Policy Packaging in BRT TranSantiago Case Study (WP3)Implementation• Transition plan foreseen for a seamless transition from the old system• Several delays (e.g. AFT implementation ) led to postponements which in turn led to relaxing of planned features (e.g. flat fare)• Changes in political power led to important changes to the plan (e.g. reduction on the scope of the information system; allowing companies to rent buses)• Despite extensive planning several problems arose on the starting date (Feb 10th 2007), causing the Chilean parliament to produce a massive report (Cámara de Diputados, 2007) used by several parties and associations to dissect the project
Some Institutional issues• Plan emerged from a very high and closed hierarchy with no independent members or technicians, leading to low public participation (Brione, 2009)• Different members of the committee had different (sometimes opposing) agendas, according to their backgrounds• No clear definition of responsibilities of each of the members of the Committee (Cámara de Diputados, 2007)• CGTS was created following the model of the agency responsible for road concessions (Coordinadora de Concesiones), assuming the concession process for roads and for bus operations were similar• Transport Authority with proper attributions could have helped overcoming some of the institutional issues identified (e.g. Allende et. al., 2007)
Analytical framework to the policy package Analytical Dimensions Associated evaluation criteria Dimension 1 Clarity of objectives and goals; Objectives and goals Measurability of goals; Effectiveness against goals; Compatibility with parallel objectives/goals. Dimension 2 Breadth and diversity of potential measures; Primary measures and causal Accuracy of causal assumptions; assumptions Accuracy of distributional effects. Dimension 3 Exploitation of potential synergistic relationships; Inter‐measure interaction Mitigation of potential contradictory/redundant relationships; Skilful incorporation of quantitative and qualitative assessment. Dimension 4 Financial viability; Policy design process, technical Stakeholder engagement. and financial considerations Dimension 5 Ex‐ante mitigation of barriers and unintended effects; Barriers and unintended effects Ex‐post package flexibility.Source: AustriaTech GmbH et al., 2010
Policy Packaging in BRT TranSantiago Case StudyRed – not plannedOrange - Partial
Preliminary conclusions ‐ Package evaluationObjectives and goals• Objectives and goals of the project were clearly defined• The plan effectively addressed all the faulty issues identified in the former transport system• The plan lacked measurable targets• Positive aspects of the former system disregarded by the plan • high network density and capillarity • high frequencies • low or no need for transfers • no subsidies • flexibility to serve new residential areas-5 0 +5
Preliminary conclusions ‐ Package evaluationInter‐measure interaction • Synergetic relations, e.g. between the new bus system and the metro in order to increase ridership of the latter well explored and between • Literature shows detailed studies and modelling were conducted to determine system specifications (Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008), although some also argue that modeling used was sometimes defective (Brione, 2009)-5 0 +5
Preliminary conclusions ‐ Package evaluationPolicy design process, technical and financial considerations• Very weak public participation, claimed to be one of the major limitations of the project (Muñoz & Gschwender, 2008; Brione, 2009)• Faulty institutional design (Allende, I., et. al., 2007 ; Brione, 2009)• Very closed and limited team of experts (Brione, 2009)Barriers and unintended effects -5 0 +5• Financial viability affected by the diversion of investment to metro and urban highways around Santiago when a new Minister took power-5 0 +5
Stakeholders(besides the actors presented before)• Operator companies (associated into cooperatives ‐ gremiales) – in the old system functioned as a cartel and had the power to influence and capture governments’ actions during the creation and implementation of Transantiago; some were incorporated in the new system (TS)• Bus Drivers’ – had vary bad working conditions in the old system; were explored by the owners (operators) and had a vary bad reputation by the citizens who accused them of system’s failures;• Citizens – the ones affected by the plan• NGO’s – had an important role in creating awareness about the problems in the transportation system and had an important role in influencing the political agenda
Preliminary conclusions• Project had several problems, not caused by policy package but by implementation issues • Delays in several areas, causing the postponement of the project; • Postponement of technology and infrastrucutre (segregated busways and stops) • Diversion of funding to metro and road projects • Reduction of the information system • Operational deficit
Preliminary conclusions (cont.)• Problems affecting implementation related to weaknesses in institutional design, namely: • Implementation hierarchy highly dependent from political power • No authority officially committed to the implementation of the system • No clear definition of responsabilities and overlaping roles (in the Transantiago Directorate)
Classification of BRT systems adopted for the project(ITDP, 2007)
Case studies Classification(some features to be confirmed) Lyon Transantiago Guangzhou Transmilenio Goteburg New Delhi Belo Horizonte Janmarg
WP3 Case studies Santiago (Transantiago), Belo Horizonte, Bogotá (TransMilenio), Guangzhou BRT, Chile Brazil Colombia ChinaAnnual demand 102 392 540 n.d.(million pass. / year)Annual fare revenue 85,17 398,29 370,44 175,2(US$ millions)Commercial speed (kph) 26,18 16,5 27 18Corridors 14 7 8 1Daily demand 340,8 130,8 1800 800(thousand pass. / day)Fare integration Yes Yes Yes n.d.Maximum user fare (US$) 1,19 1,45 0,98 0,6Minimum user fare (US$) 1,19 0,16 0,98 0,6Modal split 35 38,9 59 n.d.(% Public transport)Overtaking lanes Partial Partial All Partial*Peak frequency 185 500 320 10(buses / hour)Peak load (pphpd) 12700 35000 43000 29900Pre-board fare collection Partial Partial All Yes*Real time information No No Yes Yes*Standard fare (US$) 1,19 1,45 0,98 0,24*Station boarding level Low-level platform & On-street, On-street, no level boarding High level platform Level boarding on some buses* no level boardingStation spacing (m) 416 325 783 880System length (km) 91,85 24,9 106 22,5User rating Good Average Good All data Global BRT Data (http://www.brtdata.org/) except *China BRT (http://www.chinabrt.org/en/)
Case studies Janmarg (Ahmedabad), New Delhi, Lyon, Goteborg, India India France SwedenAnnual demand 15,6 16 n.d. n.d.(million pass. / year)Annual fare revenue 5,52 5,51 2,57(US$ millions)Commercial speed (kph) 25 17 17 21Corridors 2 1 1 4Daily demand 52 53,5 4,7(thousand pass. / day)Fare integration n.d. NoMaximum user fare (US$) 0,3 0,49 $1,50Minimum user fare (US$) 0,3 0,1 $1,50Modal split 17 48(% Public transport)Overtaking lanes NonePeak frequency 30 104 20(buses / hour)Peak load (pphpd) 1055 5500Pre-board fare collection NoneReal time information YesStandard fare (US$) 0,2 0,49Station boarding level On-street, no level boardingStation spacing (m) 550 644System length (km) 39 5,8 4User rating Good All data Global BRT Data (http://www.brtdata.org/) except *China BRT (http://www.chinabrt.org/en/)
National Cultural Dimension •Individualism (IDV) the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its members. •Masculinity / Femininity (MAS) what motivates people, wanting to be the best (masculine) or liking what you do (feminine) •Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) the extent to which the members of a culture feel •Power distance (PDI) threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and the extent to which the less powerful have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid members of institutions and these organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed •Long-term orientation (LTO) unequally the extent to which a society shows a pragmatic future- oriented perspective rather than a conventional historical short-term point of viewSource:Hofstede Center (geert-hofstede.com/united-states.html)
Case Study: New York City Public TransitIncl. Select Bus Service
Theoretical frameworkThe concept of (individual orcorporate) actor presupposesthe following assumptions:•The resources brought to anaction situation by the actor•The valuation that actors assignto states of the world and toactions•The way actors acquire, process,retain and use knowledge INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENTcontingencies and information FRAMEWORK (adapted from Ostrom, 2005)•The process actors use forselection of particular courses. OBJECTIVEThe action situation:•Participants•Positions Analyze the individual•Outcomes components of the case•Action-outcome linkages (or allowable study institutional design andactions) highlight strengths and•Control the participants exercise•Information weaknesses that affect policy•Costs and benefits assigned to outcomes and performance
NEW YORK CITYU.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Economics andStatistics Administration U.S. Census Bureau http://www.nycgo.com/neighborhoods
Socio‐economic diversity New Yorks five boroughs overview Jurisdiction Population Land area 1 July 2011 square square Borough of County of Estimates miles km Manhattan New York 1.601.948 23 59 The Bronx Bronx 1.392.002 42 109 Brooklyn Kings 2.532.645 71 183 Queens Queens 2.247.848 109 283 Staten Island Richmond 470.467 58 151 City of New York 8.244.910 303 786 State of New York 19.465.197 47.214 122.284 [3 Source: United States Census BureauCounty Borough Density Bachelors Language Homeowners Households, Persons per Median Total number Mean Persons degree or other than hip rate, 2006‐2010 household, household of firms, 2007 travel time per sq. higher, % of English 2006‐2010 2006‐2010 income 2006‐ to work mile, 2010 persons age spoken at 2010 mins , 25 , 2006‐ home, pct age 2010 5 , 2006‐ workers 2010 age 16 , 2006‐2010New York Manhattan 69.467,5 57.0% 40.0% 22.8% 732.204 2,09 $64,971 307,128 30,1Kings Brooklyn 35.369,1 28,8% 45,9% 30,3% 903,991 2,68 $43.567 253.129 41,6Richmond Staten Island 8.030,3 28,5% 29,6% 70,3% 164.279 2,76 $71.084 37.844 42,0Bronx The Bronx 32.903,6 17,6% 56,0% 20,7% 472.464 2,79 $34.264 111,028 41,7Queens Queens 20.553,6 29,5% 56,2% 45,5% 774.311 2,81 $55.291 236.900 42,0New York City 27.012,5 33,3% 48,3% 33,0% 3.047.249 2,59 $50.285 944.129 39,2New York State 411,2 32.1% 29,2% 55.2% 7.205.740 2,59 $55,603 1.956.733 31,3
Metropolitan Transportation Stakeholders Authority* Authorities New York City Transit Associations MTA Bus Company Advocacy Groups Long Island Rail Road Metro‐North Railroad New Yorks Public Transit Bridges and Tunnels Union* The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey Permanent Citizens Advisory Committee* New York City Department of Transport Straphangers Campaign* New York Metropolitan Transportation Council Citizens Budget (MPO)* Commission* New York State Department of Transportation Transportation Alternatives New York State Comptroller Manhattan Institute Federal Transit Administration etc* Interviews with stakeholder representatives were conducted during field visit
FEDERAL Department AgencySTATE New York City REGIONAL LOCAL NOTE: This is a very simplified representation of NYC´s Public Transit Institutional design. There are three types of financial flows (Federal, State and Local); individual financial mechanisms are still under investigation.
NY State Public Transit LegislationPublic Authorities State Law Public Authorities Accountability Act of 2005 Transportation State Law Public Authorities Reform Act of 2009
passenger tripsPassenger miles Unlinked Traffic and Mobility Characteristics ‐New York‐Newark NY‐NJ‐CT‐ Data Source: Texas Transportation Institute
Traffic and Mobility Characteristics ‐New York‐Newark NY‐NJ‐CT‐ Data Source: Texas Transportation InstituteVMT = Vehicle Miles Travelled
Commuters Commuters to ManhattanFigures adapted from Moss, M.L., Qing, C.Y. and Kaufman, S. (2012). Commuting to Manhattan: A study of residence location trends for Manhattan workersfrom 2002 to 2009. Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management, New York University Wagner School of Public Service, March 2012
New York State & Local Government Financeshttp://www.census.gov/govs/
State and Local Government Finances (Revenue sources) http://www.census.gov/govs/2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010
State and Local Government Finances (Expenditures) 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010http://www.census.gov/govs/
State and Local Government Finances (Outstanding debt)2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 http://www.census.gov/govs/
MTA 1991‐2011 Total Funding Sources Data source: National Transit Database Fund Source 1991‐2011 FaresOp 35,56% StateOp 19,22% LocalCap 17,47% LocalOp 12,44% FederalCap 10,76% Other Op 2,91% OtherCap 0,68% StateCap 0,66% FederalOp 0,31% ReconciliationOp 0,00% TOTAL 100,00%
NOTES:•The services of MTA Long Island Bus are operated since 2011 by a private operator,Nassau Inter-County Express (NICE), i.e. Veolia Transport, after Nassau County´sdecision.•MTA Staten Island Railway is a division of MTA New York City Transit Data source: National Transit Database
Total operating expenses = Vehicle operations expenses + Vehicle maintenance expenses + Non-vehicle maintenance + General administration expenses Data Source: National Transit Database New York City DOT = New York City Department of Transportation Directly operated (DO) Purchased transportation (PT)Heavy rail (HR) rapid MTA New York City Transit transit MTA Staten Island Railway MTA Metro‐North RailroadCommuter Rail (CR) MTA Long Island Rail Road MTA Long Island Bus MTA Metro‐North Railroad Bus (MB) MTA New York City Transit New York City DOT MTA Bus Company Demand response MTA New York City Transit MTA Long Island Bus (DR) New York City DOT MTA Metro‐North Railroad Ferryboat (FB) New York City Department of Transportation New York City DOT
A story of budgetary cutsGovernor Paterson Proposes Austere Budget to Close State Deficit (NYT, December 16,2008) M.T.A. Approves Austerity Budget (NYT, December 17,2008) “The board of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority on Wednesday approved an austerity budget for 2009 that calls for painful cuts in bus, subway and commuter rail service and a steep increase in fares and tolls, all aimed at plugging a $1.2 billion deficit” PHOTO CREDIT: DNAinfo/Yepoka Yeebo
Ravitch MTA Rescue Plan (December 2, 2008) Assigned on June 10, 2008, by Governor David A. Paterson to recommend strategies to fund MTA essential capital projects and operating needs.SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS Urgency for immediate actionImpose a New Regional Mobility TaxCreate the MTA Capital Finance AuthorityEstablish a Regular Cycle of Predictable Fare and Toll IncreasesImpose Cashless Tolling on the East River and Harlem River Bridges:Improve Bus Service in the Region:• “the Commission recommends that the MTA implement a new and promising bus strategy – Bus Rapid Transit to add a state of the art dimension that promises significant travel time, efficiency and comfort benefits”Strengthen Governance of the MTAIncrease Transparency and AccountabilityMitigate the MTA’s Proposed 2009 Fare and Toll Increase and Anticipated Service Reductions
Payroll mobility tax (Source: New York Post, 24Aug2012)• Then‐Gov. David Paterson enacted it after the MTA faced a $1.8 billion budget shortfall in 2009• The tax adds a 34‐cent surcharge to every $100 an employer pays out, and applies to the 12 New York counties served by the MTA.• Governor Cuomo and the legislative leaders have agreed in December 6, 2012 to reduce the MTA payroll tax on small businesses while maintaining the necessary funding for the MTA from other sources. The State would compensate the MTA for the $250 million in lost revenue. (http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/1262011GrowTheEconomy)• MTA payroll tax ruled unconstitutional by state Supreme Court on August 22, 2012• This would have a ripple effect that wipes away nearly $2 billion in funding, a devastating blow that would lead to “extreme” fare hikes.
SBS line County Launched PHASE I BRT PROJECTS Fordham Road Bronx Jun 2008 First and Manhattan Oct 2010 Second Avenues 34th Street Manhattan Nov 2011 Hylan Staten Island Sep 2012 Boulevard Nostrand Brooklyn Service to Avenue‐Rogers begin 2013 Avenue PHASE II BRT PROJECTS M60 (upgrade Queens planned existing M60 to LaGuardia Airport) Webster Bronx planned Avenue http://www.nyc.gov/html/brt/html/routes/routes.shtmlwww.mta.info/nyct/service/images/SelectBusServ1.gif
SPEED AND RELIABILITY •Frequent service •Station spacing (about every half a mile) •Off-board fare payment •Traffic Signal Priority (TSP) •Bus lanes PASSENGER COMFORT AND CONVENIENCE •Enhanced stations •Low-floor and up to three doors BRT vehicles •Brandingwww.mta.info/mta/planning/sbs/Photo courtecy: Maria Spandou
Interesting Issues highlighted during the interviews (I)CULTURAL / INSTITUTIONAL• Cultural barriers ‐ “Public goods provided by the public sector” philosophy• Clarification of role ‐ Governor´s de jure and de facto role and influence• In people´s perceptions MTA is supervised by the City of New York, instead of the NY State (Governor)FINANCIAL• Unstable and uncertain financial flows• Competition within NY state counties for funding and financing, in the form of negotiations• Money availability ‐ Funds Appropriation processes are timely• Debt increase ‐ Bond issuing affected strongly MTA´s financial situation
Interesting Issues highlighted during the interviews (II)CAPACITY BUILDING• MTA´s participation in a number of benchmarking networks (e.g. Community of Metros – CoMET, International Bus Benchmarking Group) PARTICIPATION AND COLLABORATION• Awareness / accountability ‐ Informal “watchdog” role played by the advocacy groups• Public participation is encouraged through public hearings, prescribed by law. Interviewees had different perceptions about effectiveness• Relationships have been built between certain stakeholders that allow for initiatives of collaboration when an issue/problem appearsCONFLICTS• Tension between labor unions and MTA in face of the new contract negotiations, due to MTA´s budgetary restraints.
Interesting Issues that are worth attention• How is independence and autonomy of MTA Board guaranteed?• Innovative funding sources and conditions for maximum acceptability?• Would outsourcing practices (except for current DRT) provide any benefits to the performance of the system under current institutional design?• How are regulatory and competition issues addressed?• How are current and future BRT systems incorporated in such a complicated institutional, organizational and financial context?
Preliminary Conclusions (I)• Soft Institutional changes are more probable than radical ones, due to the conditions established by the legal framework• There are no patterns of funding and financing, as depicted from analysis of federal, state and local financial flows data• Leadership and reputation are important elements of the personal preferences of the decision‐makers• Personal and corporate reputation are most of the times incentive factors that influence positively the peroformance of system
Preliminary Conclusions (II)• Transparency and openness of information and data promote accountability and constant formal & informal assessment of the system´s performance• Participation of the various stakeholders in a number of networks, promote collaboration and capacity building. In cases of “power/influence of scale” objectives are more probable to be achieved• New York City´s economic dynamic and attractiveness, Political and financial/funding parameters and mobility culture are, macroscopically, some of the most important determinants of the system´s performance.
Thank you for your attention ! Prof. Rosário Macário firstname.lastname@example.org Luís N. Filipe (Transantiago) email@example.com Maria Spandou (New York City) Bus Rapid Transit firstname.lastname@example.org Across Latitudes and Cultures VREF Center of Excellence
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