SUDDEN STOPS, THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE

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SUDDEN STOPS, THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE

  1. 1. SUDDEN STOPS, THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY: ARGENTINA’S LESSONS Guillermo Calvo, Alejandro Izquierdo and Ernesto Talvi Policy Seminar June 6, 2002 Research Department
  2. 2. OUTLINE I. Life after Russia: A Hemispheric Perspective IV. Choice of an Exchange Rate Strategy after a Sudden Stop V. Policy Recommendations and Conclusions II. The Effects of Sudden Stops on the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability III. Sudden Stops in Argentina and Chile (1998): Two Polar Cases
  3. 3. 200 400 600 800 1.000 1.200 1.400 Jan-97 May-97 Sep-97 Jan-98 May-98 Sep-98 Jan-99 May-99 Sep-99 Jan-00 May-00 Sep-00 Jan-01 May-01 Sep-01 Jan-02 Pre-Asian Crisis Pre- Russian Crisis Pre- Argentine Crisis Current level 524 bp External Financial Conditions (LEI, Spread over US Treasuries)
  4. 4. Vodka is Stronger than Tequila in LAC (Net private capital flows, US$ billions) 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 T T+1 T+2 T+3 Tequila Russia
  5. 5. Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela Sudden Stop in LAC-7 (Capital flows and CA, 4 quarters, % of GDP) Capital flows Current Account
  6. 6. Current Account Adjustment ARG BRA CHL COL ECU 1997 -12.2 -30.8 -3.7 -5.9 -0.7 1998 -14.5 -33.4 -4.1 -5.2 -2.2 1999 -11.9 -25.4 -0.1 0.2 0.9 2000 -8.9 -24.6 -1.0 0.3 0.7 2001 -5.6 -23.2 -0.9 -2.1 -0.8 Source: World Economic Outlook (IMF), April 2002. Current Account Balance, US$ billions
  7. 7. 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1997:2 1998:2 2000:2 2001:2 Trend Growth in LAC-7 (Annual growth based on quarterly data, 1997.II=100) Includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, México, Perú, Venezuela
  8. 8. OUTLINE I. Life after Russia: A Hemispheric Perspective IV. Choice of an Exchange Rate Strategy after a Sudden Stop V. Policy Recommendations and Conclusions II. The Effects of Sudden Stops on the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability III. Sudden Stops in Argentina and Chile (1998): Two Polar Cases
  9. 9. <ul><li>CAD = A * + S * - Y * = current account deficit </li></ul><ul><li>A * = tradables absorption; Y * = tradables output </li></ul><ul><li>S * = non-factor payments (interest on external debt) </li></ul><ul><li>After Sudden Stop, percentage fall in tradables: </li></ul><ul><li>  = CAD/A * = 1 -  </li></ul><ul><li> = (Y * - S * )/A * = un-leveraged absorption ratio </li></ul><ul><li>Under homotheticity,  applies to home goods, too. </li></ul>The Sudden Stop Effect on Demand
  10. 10. Sudden Stop and Equilibrium RER p h s p * p ** h SS P = P NT /P T
  11. 11. BRA ARG ECU COL CHL 0.56 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.81 Source: World Economic Outlook (IMF), and own estimates. Note: This measure is calculated in 1998 for all countries. Un-leveraged Absorption Coefficient ( w ) BRA ARG ECU COL CHL 52.5 46.2 46.1 43.0 32.4 Required % Change in Equilibrium RER Un-Leveraged Absorption RER Adjustment
  12. 12. ARG ECU COL BRA CHL B/e B* 0.08 0.02 0.59 1.76 1.30 Y/e Y* 8.63 2.94 6.36 12.34 2.85 (B/e B*)/(Y/e Y*) 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.45 Source: Own estimates. Note: Values are given for 1998. Mismatch Measure Public Debt: Dollarization and Mismatches
  13. 13. Fiscal Sustainability after a 50% RER Depreciation ARG BRA CHL COL ECU (a) Base Exercise Observed Public Debt (% of GDP) 36.5 51.0 17.3 28.4 81.0 Real Interest Rate 7.1 5.8 5.9 7.3 6.3 Real GDP Growth 3.8 2.0 7.5 3.6 2.6 Observed Primary Surplus (% of GDP) 0.9 0.6 0.6 -3.0 -0.2 i. Req. Primary Surplus (% of GDP) 1.2 1.9 n.a. 1.0 2.9 (b) Change in Relative Prices Imputed Public Debt (% of GDP) 50.8 58.1 18.7 34.9 107.2 ii. Req. Primary Surplus (% of GDP) 1.6 2.2 n.a. 1.2 3.9 NPV of ii - i (% of GDP) 14.3 7.1 n.a. 6.5 26.3 Corresponding Debt Reduction (%) 28.2 12.2 n.a. 18.7 24.5 ii - i (% of Government Expenditures) 2.3 1.0 n.a. 1.3 4.5 Source: Own estimates. Note: Values are given for 1998. n.a.: Not applicable given that the real interest is smaller than the growth of GDP.
  14. 14. OUTLINE I. Life after Russia: A Hemispheric Perspective IV. Choice of an Exchange Rate Strategy after a Sudden Stop V. Policy Recommendations and Conclusions II. The Effects of Sudden Stops on the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability III. Sudden Stops in Argentina and Chile (1998): Two Polar Cases
  15. 15. -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 1998-I 1998-II 1998-III 1998-IV 1999-I 1999-II 1999-III 1999-V 2000-I 2000-II 2000-III 2000-IV 2001-I 2001-II Argentina -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% Chile Argentina Chile Sudden Stop in Argentina and Chile (Private Capital flows, % of GDP)
  16. 16. External Adjustment (Current Account, 4 quarters, %GDP) Argentina Chile
  17. 17. Economic Activity: GDP and Investment (s.a., 1998.II=100) Chile Argentina Chile Argentina GDP Investment
  18. 18. Real Exchange Rate ( Vis à vis the US dollar, June 1998=100) Chile Argentina “ Empalme” factor
  19. 19. The Contribution of Exports to the Current Account Adjustment (In %, 2001.III-1998.II) 52.6% 16.3%
  20. 20. Sudden Stop and the Real Exchange Rate Un-leveraged Absorption (  ) Required % change in RER to eliminate the CAD 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 Chile Argentina 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 Chile Argentina Source: Calvo, Izquierdo, Talvi (2002)
  21. 21. Key Points: Chile <ul><li>Chile recovered without international financial support and in spite of a very weak recovery in capital inflows due to its: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>relative openness </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>low levels of CAD leverage </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>low levels of public debt </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>low degree of financial mismatches in the public and the financial sector </li></ul></ul><ul><li>which allowed for a very rapid increase in exports that financed one half of the current account adjustment and prevented the real exchange rate depreciation from having adverse balance sheet effects. </li></ul>
  22. 22. An Example: Fiscal Sustainability in Argentina after a Sudden Stop in 1998 Debt to GDP ratio (%) Req. Prim. Surplus Adjust. (a) Baseline 36.5 0 .3 (b) Change in Relative Prices to close the CA deficit (RER depreciation of 46,2%) 49.7 0.7 (c) : (b) + 200 BPS Increase in Real Interest Rate 49.7 1.7 (d): (c) + 1% Reduction in GDP growth 49.7 2.2 (e): (d) + Contingent Liabilities 58.6 2.7 Source: Calvo, Izquierdo, Talvi (2002) Note: The observed primary surplus for 1998 was 0.9 percent of GDP. The baseline scenario assumes a long run rate of growth of 3,8% and a 7,1% interest rate 9.3 22.6 32.8 35.6 44.5 NPV of Req. Adjust. (% of GDP)
  23. 23. Key Points: Argentina <ul><li>Argentina’s lack of recovery and eventual collapse, occurred in spite of large international financial assistance packages and was due to the fact that: </li></ul><ul><li>Argentina had it all: a closed economy, high levels of external indebtedness and public debt, high liability dollarization and, as a result, large financial mismatches both in the public and private sector. </li></ul><ul><li>Under those conditions, the change in the equilibrium RER needed to accommodate a permanent sudden stop was large. </li></ul><ul><li>The expectation of a large real depreciation in turn, led to a large revaluation of public sector debt relative to GDP (requiring a larger fiscal effort and/or a larger debt reduction to achieve fiscal sustainability) and to a deterioration of corporate balance sheets (contingent liabilities?). The proposed fiscal adjustments were clearly insufficient for a substantially higher RER. </li></ul>
  24. 24. Key Points: Argentina (ctd.) <ul><li>The deterioration of public and private sector balance sheets deteriorated the quality of bank assets and led to a run on banks due to the fear that those losses might be partially financed by confiscating depositors. </li></ul><ul><li>The run against banks was accommodated by credit expansion of the CB, leading to a collapse in international reserves and an acceleration of the run on banks. </li></ul>
  25. 25. Argentina: Political Economy after the Sudden Stop <ul><ul><li>Why was adjustment so hard to materialize? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The fact that Argentina had a fixed exchange rate and relatively sticky prices concealed the needed adjustment in relative prices. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>This provided little evidence for politicians about the need for adjustment. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Uncertainty about the duration of the standstill in capital flows and the size of RER adjustment may be one of the elements that delayed reform. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Uncertainty about how the losses of RER realignment would be distributed also contributed to delays in reform </li></ul></ul>
  26. 26. Argentina: Policies were not Enough <ul><ul><li>Fiscal : Fiscal adjustment in 2000, attempted (failed) additional adjustment in early 2001, zero-deficit law on second half of 2001, but it was already too late. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Exchange Rate : Convergence factor, though in the right direction, introduced uncertainty about prevailing convertibility rules. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Debt Management : Debt swap in mid 2001 validated extremely high interest rates, further worsening solvency, perhaps under assumption of liquidity problems. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Monetary : Expansionary monetary stance and public bank bailout led to high credit expansion and loss of reserves. </li></ul></ul>
  27. 27. Central Bank Policy Ene-01 Jul-01 Ene-02 Million Pesos -1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 Million Pesos Source: BCRA. Net Domestic Credit International Reserves Monetary Liabilities Cavallo is appointed 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 22,000 24,000 26,000 28,000 Ene-96 Jul-96 Ene-97 Jul-97 Ene-98 Jul-98 Ene-99 Jul-99 Ene-00 Jul-00
  28. 28. OUTLINE I. Life after Russia: A Hemispheric Perspective IV. Choice of an Exchange Rate Strategy after a Sudden Stop V. Policy Recommendations and Conclusions II. The Effects of Sudden Stops on the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability III. Sudden Stops in Argentina and Chile (1998): Two Polar Cases
  29. 29. Exchange Rate Defense and Abandonment <ul><li>Countries tried initially to hold to their bands, but were not successful given magnitude of RER adjustment needed. </li></ul><ul><li>Markets held expectations that the nominal exchange rate would be used to make the RER adjustment needed </li></ul><ul><li>This was reflected in very high interest rates and a substantial loss of reserves. </li></ul><ul><li>Why wait? The public sector was not heavily dollarized (except Ecuador and Argentina), but the private sector may have been. Time to hedge? </li></ul><ul><li>Exit Strategy: Flotation with IT in most cases. Why? </li></ul>
  30. 30. Exchange Rate Defense and Abandonment BRA CHL COL ECU Regime Pre Sudden Stop Target Zone: Width +/- 4% Crawling Band Rate of Crawl: To preserve PPP Width: +/- 5% Crawling Band Rate of Crawl: To preserve PPP Width: +/- 7% Crawling Band Rate of Crawl: To preserve PPP Width: +/- 5% Modifications After Sudden Stop Jan 1999: Width increased to +/-5% Dec 1998: Width increased to +/-8% with an increasing factor of 0.41% per month. Sep 1998: Realignment of the Band. Jun 1999: Second Realignment and width increased to +/- 10% Mar 1998: Realignment and width increased to +/-10%. Sep 1998: Rate of crawl increased to 20% and width increased to +/-15% Floatation Date Jan-99 Sep-99 Sep-99 Feb-99 Change in Reserves $US(Billions) /a -33.0 -2.1 -2.4 -0.5 Change in Reserves % /a -49.1% -12.9% -23.5% -24.4% a/ Between end of first quarter 1998 and the date of float. Source: IMF &quot;Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions”(various issues) and IFS.
  31. 31. BRA CHL COL ECU 601.7 1266.3 1069.3 1669.0 Note: First table reports the difference between the peak interest rate during the period (before floating) and average figure for quarter previous to sudden stop. Source: IFS (IMF). Increase in Deposit Rates (Basis Points) Defense: Interest Rates and Reserves BRA CHL COL ECU 49.1 12.9 23.5 24.4 Fall in Reserves (Percent)
  32. 32. ARG BRA CHL COL ECU Dollar Loans/Total Loans (%) 61.6 - 9.4 - 60.4 Tradable Production/ 10.4 7.5 26.0 13.6 25.4 Total Production (%) 1/ Source: Central Banks. 1/ Proxied by exports. Financial Mismatches, June 1998 Banking Sector: Dollarization and Mismatches
  33. 33. Valuation Effects and Choice of an Exchange Rate Regime <ul><li>Closed, highly indebted, highly dollarized and mismatched economies are vulnerable to large RER swings and substantial valuation effects that may deem a country insolvent after a sudden stop. </li></ul><ul><li>Fiscal dominance is present: monetary policy is subordinated to fiscal insolvency. </li></ul><ul><li>Hypothesis: Countries that chose to float with IT were successful in cases where fiscal dominance was absent and monetary policy became credible. </li></ul>
  34. 34. <ul><li>Chile successfully brings down devaluation expectations after choice of new regime </li></ul><ul><li>Ecuador struggles: interest rates reach highest values at time of announcement of flotation, only fall after announcement of dollarization </li></ul>Two Polar Flotation Cases: Chile and Ecuador Chile Ecuador 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Jan-98 Apr-98 Jul-98 Oct-98 Jan-99 Apr-99 Jul-99 Oct-99 Jan-00 Apr-00 Jul-00 Oct-00 Jan-01 Apr-01 Jul-01 Oct-01 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 Jan-98 Mar-98 May-98 Jul-98 Sep-98 Nov-98 Jan-99 Mar-99 May-99 Jul-99 Sep-99 Nov-99 Jan-00 Mar-00 Float Dollarization
  35. 35. <ul><li>Debt resolution and fiscal adjustment (primary surplus 2001: 5% of GDP) </li></ul>500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000 Dec-98 Mar-99 Jun-99 Sep-99 Dec-99 Mar-00 Jun-00 Sep-00 Dec-00 Mar-01 Jun-01 Sep-01 Dec-01 Ecuador: Dollarization is Not Enough (Sovereign Bond Spread) Default   Dollarization  Agreement EMBI+ EMBI+ Ecuador
  36. 36. 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 ECU 3.4 0.4 -7.3 2.3 5.2 GDP Growth CHL 7.4 3.9 -1.1 5.4 3.3 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Inflation CHL 6.1 5.1 3.3 3.8 3.7 ECU 30.6 36.1 52.2 96.2 37.0 1999 vs 1998 2001 vs 1998 1999 vs 1998 2001 vs 1998 CHL 11.1 102.3 CHL 2.4 15.3 ECU 8.0 41.9 ECU 5.0 11.3 Exports Change / Current Account Change, % Exports Change, % Two Polar Flotation Cases: Chile and Ecuador
  37. 37. OUTLINE I. Life after Russia: A Hemispheric Perspective IV. Choice of an Exchange Rate Strategy after a Sudden Stop V. Policy Recommendations and Conclusions II. The Effects of Sudden Stops on the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability III. Sudden Stops in Argentina and Chile (1998): Two Polar Cases
  38. 38. Policy Lessons: <ul><li>1. Closed economies (C) , with high public debt ( D) and large financial mismatches (M) , are vulnerable to changes in international conditions that require an adjustment in the current account deficit since they may require large changes in equilibrium RER. </li></ul><ul><li>2. Large changes in the RER, could turn a sustainable fiscal position into an unsustainable one and lead to major solvency problems. Solvency problems can lead to fiscal dominance, making monetary policy not credible. In those cases, flotation is a difficult task. </li></ul><ul><li>3. Countries like Brazil, Chile and Mexico are much less dollarized than Argentina and, therefore, have more leeway to use the exchange rate as an instrument. However, there are limits to exchange rate flexibility because all of them may find it difficult to issue debt other than in foreign currency or indexed to a foreign currency. </li></ul>
  39. 39. Policy Lessons (cont.) <ul><li>4. CDM economies are vulnerable independently of the exchange rate regime that is adopted. </li></ul><ul><li>5. In CDM economies it is dangerous to have: </li></ul><ul><li>a) High levels of public indebtedness. Rules that allow governments to reach lower debt levels or even a creditor position should be given serious consideration </li></ul><ul><li>b) Banks with weak links to the international capital market. In particular, State-Owned banks should be subject to Narrow Banking rules or privatized </li></ul><ul><li>6. Exchange rate flexibility could play a useful role if the C, D or M are dropped. Otherwise, exchange rate flexibility might do more harm than good . </li></ul>
  40. 40. Policy Lessons (cont.) <ul><li>7. In the short run, the C is hard to drop, and dropping D or M could be traumatic (as exemplified by Argentina’s default and pesification). </li></ul><ul><li>8. Solving a solvency crisis involves wealth redistributions across sectors. The way and the speed at which those redistributions are made are crucial in determining how fast a crisis gets resolved. </li></ul>
  41. 41. Research Department

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