Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg,
Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of
Science by David Lindley
Problems With Lindley's Defense Of Qm
Werner Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle” challenged centuries of
scientific understanding, placed him in direct opposition to Albert Einstein,
and put Niels Bohr in the middle of one of the most heated debates in
scientific history. Heisenberg’s theorem stated that there were physical
limits to what we could know about sub-atomic particles; this “uncertainty”
would have shocking implications. In a riveting account, David Lindley
captures this critical episode and explains one of the most important
scientific discoveries in history, which has since transcended the
boundaries of science and influenced everything from literary theory to
television.
Personal Review: Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and
the Struggle for the Soul of Science by David Lindley

I have read two of Lindley's books `Where Does The Weirdness GO' and
`Uncertainty' , and think they are both excellent--perhaps, the best of the
popular books on QM. Yet, I still have many doubts (as do many other
readers, I am sure) about Lindley's claims and defenses of QM. Let me get
into my basic doubts with an analogy. Parmenides, the Pre-Socratic, could
never really account for the realm of `Becoming'. His problem was how to
get from the realm of `Being' to that of `Becoming' (to account for
`Becoming' by assuming a sensory confusion of an individual mind was to
beg the question insofar as it was the multiplicity of individuals itself that
had to be explained). Lindley tries to address and answer the problem of
`Schrodinger's' Cat' in a curiously semi-analogous way--I'll skip Bohr's
response (given in 'Uncertainty') insofar as it seems to confuse two senses
of `probability'. Lindley seems to believe that the atoms, electrons, etc. that
constitute the cat are each in a genuinely `undetermined/indeterminate'
state (more on this later), but that from these quantum states--a 'quantum
state' being "a fickle and elusive thing"--you can derive, or get to a
classical state, a state of the cat that is definitely either dead or alive--in
other words, an ordinary and familiar object operating according to
ordinary and familiar laws. According to Lindley, there is no problem in this
procedure. To get to this `classical state', Lindley asserts (and it seems to
be no more than an unsupported belief) that because of the jostling around
of the zillions of atoms, electrons, etc in and around the cat, a classical
familiar cat somehow naturally emerges--or rather, it 'just happens'. I
suggest that this assertion/belief (an explanation?) is quite a stretch--and
as it is difficult to see how you get from Being to Becoming, it is similarly
difficult to see how one clearly gets from a state of genuine `ontological
indeterminacy' to a state of `ontological determinacy'. I understand the
desire of the defenders of QM, given the basic beliefs of QM, to come up
with some sort of explanation for the existence of ordinary objects. But
Lindley's explanation regarding the `how it all happens' is sadly obscure.
There seems to be a missing link (a `bridge--think `bridge law'-- if you will)
that is never stated or argued for, and without that bridge, the explanation
is lacking. Lindley (and others?) is seemingly operating merely on blind
faith. He seems to think it evident that from the Heraclitean flux of all those
indeterminate particles with their indeterminate states transitioning from
one state to another that, voila, a familiar determinate cat will 'happen'.
And, of course, if causal laws are not a factor, one might wonder why a cat
should 'happen' rather than a perfect replica of Botticellli's 'Birth of Venus'?
A feeble attempt, as I see it, to get from the world of QM to the familiar
world of ordinary objects. A problem solved--but not with clarity, but rather
with bare assertion! Another problem: how can Lindley even talk of a
cosmic (causal?) interconnection of particular atoms, electrons, states,
etc., and their moving (going from `here' to `there') in his quantum helter-
skelter flux, unless they are being measured. Indeed, isn't that the whole
message of QM, that nothing at all can be known unless/until it is
measured?--remember Wheeler's remark on p. 70 of 'Where Does The
Weirdness GO': "No elementary phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it
is a measured phenomenon." Indeed, if the state and properties of atoms
and electrons and photons are truly indeterminate (ontologically

indeterminate!) `before measurement', don't they, before they are
measured, violate the fundamental laws of logic (think of the Principles of
Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle)? Lindley tells us that "...an
electron is in some literal sense a little bit here and a little bit there at the
same time"-- p.195 of 'Uncertainty'--is he here thinking of a bus whose
front-end can be `here' whereas the rear-end can be `there'? I think not.
Lindley might object that the basic laws of logic do NOT apply in the realm
of QM, but then, can one, given Lindley's account of QM, even think of an
electron or photon or atom `as an electron, photon, or atom as such' prior
to it's being experimentally verified as such? To think of any of these
particles is to think of them as being in possession of certain specific
determinate properties! If `it' (whatever `it' now is) and all of `its properties'
are `genuinely indeterminate'--neither `this' nor `that', neither `here' nor
`there'-- just what precisely are we thinking about when we think of that
'truly indeterminate something, being in a similarly indeterminate state'?
Perhaps Lindley has not really thought out the consequences involved in
denying the Laws of Logic (if such a denial is even conceivable).And if,
somehow the aforementioned laws of logic do not operate on/at the
quantum level, at what level, if at all, do they begin to `kick in'? And, again,
if they do NOT operate at the quantum level, does that imply that they
simultaneously apply and do not apply? Are, then, events both caused and
uncaused? Are states both indeterminate and determinate? Let's face it, if
'Not both P and not-P' is false, then 'Both P and not-P' is true. Finally, in
both books, there seems to persistently occur the questionable inference
that from the fact that we are, at this stage of physics, unable to know
(determine) what state a particle is in, the conclusion that it is not in `any
determinate state' at all. Isn't this, in philosophical terms, a confusion of
epistemology and ontology? Similarly, I have problems with the seemingly
cavalier way Lindley disposes of the idea that `every change requires a
change' (i.e., that `events have causes'). To say `I do not know what the
cause of X is', is NOT equivalent to saying that `I know that X has NO
cause'.
Imagine Lindley going to his physician to inquire about a nose-bleed. One
can't help but wonder what Lindley would say when he is told, after a
thorough examination, that his nose-bleed was uncaused--that it 'just
happened'. Not, mind you, that the physician was saying that he did not
know what the cause was, but, rather, that he KNEW that the sad event
had NO reason for its being, that it had NO cause at all! Now, really, wasn't
Einstein rightfully concerned?
I really like Lindley's books, have given them several readings, and would
recommend them highly to anyone searching for an intro to QM. I have
read Herbert and Gribbin, but they do not read as well as Lindley. But
still...

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