"The Spanish Civil War is one of the comparatively few cases when the most widely accepted version of events has been written more persuasively by the losers of the conflict than by the winners."
With that comment in "The Battle for Spain," a revised update of his 1982 history of that war, Antony Beevor ("Stalingrad"; "The Fall of Berlin, 1945"), effectively describes the state of its English-language documentation. This has been, essentially since Franco's victory in 1939, largely the preserve of Hugh Thomas and Paul Preston, both thoroughly competent historians, but each (particularly in the case of Thomas) a strong partisan of the Republican cause.
Thomas' encyclopedic "The Spanish Civil War" (1961, with revisions) is the benchmark English-language history of the War. However, in a comparison between the two works, Beevor's account scores highly. Thomas was--and even after three up¬dates of his history remains--an unabashed apologist for the Republic and (particularly) the International Brigades. His accounts are formidable if for no reason other than the numerous footnotes that begin with the words, "conversation with...." Thomas writes as a confidant of many--if not most--of the leading figures of the Spanish Republic. Too often, however, it appears to a reader that his acceptance of their assertions was uncritical.
Beevor does not rely on Thomas' extensive network of firsthand witnesses, but this does not seem to be a disadvantage. (As a practical matter, the lack of such personal contacts reduces the incentive to write with one hand while holding an axe to a grindstone with the other.) While he examines in detail the political history and development of each of the warring factions--and subfactions, of which there were many, particularly on the Left--his is not a portrait in black and white. Rather, it compels the conclusion that neither Franco and the Spanish Foreign Legion nor Negrín and the International Brigaders were paragons of virtue. He addresses a clash of fundamental values and equally fundamental hatreds, demonstrating, to the extent that it is possible to draw a balance at all, that the quantum of evil on each side was approximately equal.
His accounts of the battles, from the initial skirmishes to the fall of Barcelona and the final defeat of the Republic by the Nationalists at the Ebro, are refreshingly lucid because they generally avoid extensive descriptions of small-unit attacks and defenses in favor of broader overviews of the individual campaigns and their outcomes. (Of course, as a military historian, Beevor knows what air and ground combat forces actually do.)
Particularly worthwhile are the detailed analyses of the successes and failures of the foreign participants: Hitler's "Legion Condor," Mussolini's varied blackshirt and army elements, and Stalin's tankers and fliers. (Beevor is at one with Thomas and Preston in providing an annihilating assessment of Mussolini's wasteful and inept involvement.)
In addressing the uneven performance of the International Brigades (and the dictatorial controls exercised by their political commissars), Beevor's account is more realistic--and less romantic--than those of such famous-but-dilettantish bit-players as Ernest Hemingway, André Malraux, and Stephen Spender.
He examines in some detail the internal left-right conflicts within the Falange, a party generally--and erroneously--viewed as both monolithic and a slavish imitation of the Nazis. In this connection, however, it would have been helpful had he explored more extensively the Falange as José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the original party chief, had envisioned it: as the true "nationalist-socialist" party that the Nazis never truly succeeded in becoming.
(The word "Nazi,"--pronounced "natzi" in both German and American English--is the German spoken shorthand for "Nationalsozialist." The "national" in that context is best translated in most contexts as "nationalist.")
Put another way, José Antonio was no fascist. (Nor, for that matter, was Franco.)
Beevor also rehabilitates to some extent Manuel Hedilla, the "left-wing" Falangista who assumed control over the party after the November 1936 murder of José Antonio by the Republicans in the prison of Alicante. He describes Hedilla's condemnation in a speech on Christmas Eve of 1936 of indiscriminate attacks on citizens who had voted for the Republic, explaining that many had done so merely out of "hunger and despair," and noting that there were "right-wingers worse than the `Reds.'" (That, of course, earned him the implacable--and permanent--enmity of Franco.)
Particularly valuable is his painstaking disentanglement of the fragmented and complicated components--PCE, FAI, POUM, PSOE, UGT, and others--that at various times and with varying degrees of competence influenced the internal politics of the Republic. He goes into considerable detail in describing the steadily increasing control of the PCE, the Partido Comunista de España, over the government and politics of the Republic.
He comple¬ments that with a concise summary of the (far less complicated) Nationalist structure: Conservatives allied with the monarchist Carlists, an alliance championed by generals Franco, Quiepo de Llano, Mola, and the enigmatic Juan Yagüe, a left-wing [i.e., more-or-less moderate-socialist] Falangist whom few would, then or now, associate with any degree of moderation. (At the end of the war, instead of naming Yagüe Minister of War, a position for which he was uniquely qualified, Franco, who never forgot anything he perceived as evidence of political unreliability, shunted him off to the meaningless job of Minister of Aviation.)
"The Battle for Spain" is not an evening's reading, and is probably not for beginners. It nonetheless provides a new and valuable perspective on a conflict that was in so many grim ways a rehearsal for World War II.
less
0 comments
Post a comment