One of the best book ever written about the telecom bubble of the 1990s by one insider. It shows the mechanisms that propelled a telecommunications carrier into a world of financial fantasy and finally pure fraud. In 1992, when a young engineer, Walter Pavlo was hired by MCI Communications, the company was highly revered as the David who brought down the telecommunications Goliath, AT&T. If one wanted to be where the action was in the new world of communications, MCI was it. The only problem was the department that had hired Pavlo: Financial Services, i.e. accounts receivable, credit and collections. This consisted in collecting bills from long distance carriers and 900 numbers that used MCI network. As it happens, long distance carriers were burgeoning on the fertile left by the AT&T break-up. Companies such as WorldCom appeared on the market and started cutting the prices in order to gain market share, not profits. Actually, profit was the least of their concerns. The idea was to inflate the share value as quickly as possible and to cash in a few millions dollars in stock option to be able to retire young and rich.
900 numbers and long distance cards was a bizarre business. Scores of tiny companies rented a line in a slum and were offering dial-a-porn or dating services to people too poor to afford paying their telephone bill. Prepaid long distance card business was even fishier since cards were sold in small ethnic grocery stores and the money was collected in cash. The temptation was great to sell international minutes to India, say 20¢ a minute, when the price charged by MCI to route the call was billed 80¢ a minute. The market was humming with fly-by-nights whose only goal was to collect as much money as they can, until the 90 days past due debts limit after which MCI would trigger an alarm. In practice, MCI never cut off a delinquent creditor, it would rather get him to sign a promissory note - a legally binding promise to pay back the debt over time. Creditors would thus buy some time and the unpaid debt would grow month after month until it would really be worth disappearing in nature with bags of cash.
MCI was so lenient on its bad customers because the Sales Department was eager to show increased revenues. First of all, the account representatives bonus checks depended on the number of new customers they could sign in every year. Some reps were rumored to be taking home seven-figure pay checks. Then the Sales Department per se was under intense pressure from the board of directors and Wall Street to report earnings that would grow each quarter. The executives' bonus plan depended as well on the share price continuing appreciation. When Walter Pavlo first tried to warn the executives of the problems ahead, they told him never to come back with such alarming news. "Nobody cared about reality", commented Pavlo who was forced to invent new tricks every month to maintain bad accounts under artificial life. Fortunately, MCI accounting system was so antiquated that each month millions of dollars were received that nobody could figure out where they should go. These "vagabond payments" would wait until someone would complain and they were properly assigned to their legitimate accounts. Waiting for that to happen, the or "phantom money" as it was as well called, could be used to clean up bad debt accounts. Indeed the following month, the money had to be withdrawn, but the old bad debt would go back on the books as a new balance that was not even due.
Of course, Pavlo was not jailed for these ploys. He was arrested and tried because he averted money for his own purpose with the help of a Canadian citizen called Harold Mann. They had invented a deal where a third party would buy the bad debts to MCI and collect a hefty 36 percent interest to its creditors. Interestingly enough the National Bank of Canada was one of the main lenders to the factoring company that would secure MCI with upfront money. Of course, the interest paid by the factoring company was diverted to a Cayman Island account and MCI never received a penny from this scam. Pavlo just had to move around a bit more "phantom money" to bad debtors. In less than two years he had pocketed $6 millions. Things could have lasted forever, if MCI had not decided to be acquired by one of its most important bad debtors, WorldCom. During the due diligence process, the scam was discovered and the company sued Pavlo. The small crook was punished and went to jail for two years while MCI gladly accepted the WorldCom $30 billion offer and its executives could rip off their stock options and bonus payments for revenues that never existed.
Interestingly enough, WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers explained very clearly what happened during all these years of creative accounting and financial fantasy in a percipient letter dated October 1, 1997 that is quoted at length in Stolen Without A Gun (page 222):
"WorldCom and MCI share similar legacies: pioneering the introduction
of competition in the telecommunications marketplace and histories of
innovation, agility and growth. Indeed, these two companies are the
paradigm of the American entrepreneurial spirit."
Walter Pavlo and his co-author Neil Weinberg thought they wrote a book about personal failure and work ethics or lack of ethics. Indeed, they wrote a book that is symbolic of the whole way competition was introduced in the telecommunications market. A well-kept industry where everyone knew every one (there were no more than 200 carriers in the whole world and most of them were doing business locally anyway) was confronted overnight with thousands of payers among whom many swindlers. The arrival of the Internet and the frenzy that accompanied it, raised expectations beyond logic, especially among carriers that did not understand this offspring of the computer industry. The end-result was a giant looting spree in of the telecommunications industry that ruined the lives of many employees and much more small investors. For once though, justice was made and one of the top executives responsible for this mess was punished: Bernie Ebbers is currently serving a 25-year prison term. Bert Roberts has agreed to pay $5.5 million to settle claims by investors who said he should have known that the company's books were falsified, but he never went to jail. less
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