Chips presentation on bouchs aeronautical study


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"Presentation CHIPS Information Day organised by Skyguide, October 2013
Presenter: Philip Church of Helios
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Chips presentation on bouchs aeronautical study

  1. 1. Airports Aeronautical Study for Buochs Performance Based Navigation Assessing Safety in CHIPS Air Traffic Management Space Telecoms Maritime Philip Church, Helios 15th October 2013 Rail
  2. 2. Agenda • • • • • • • Introductions Background to study Environment Approach The Procedure Hazard Assessment Key conclusions
  3. 3. Background • Requirement for an instrument approach procedure to Buochs airport (LSZC) driven by main airport operator Pilatus: • PC6, PC7MkII/PC9, PC12 and PC21 • Buochs • a former military aerodrome • no instrument approach procedures to the aerodrome • In times of a closed cloud layer, aircraft approaching must: perform an ILS approach to the nearby Emmen (LSME) military airfield ° aborting the approach below clouds ° continuing VFR to Buochs ° However, Emmen ILS only active during military hours
  4. 4. Background - justification • Variability of weather at Buochs means that without an IAP, operations associated with test flights or the arrival of aircraft for maintenance are restricted • Publication will enable instrument approach procedures to Buochs realising approximately 200 additional movements per calendar year • Availability would substantial improve the safety and minimise the disruption to Pilatus’ business due to weather • Pilatus expecting up to 800 instrument approaches per year • However: • runway at Buochs not designated an instrument runway • runway lighting not ICAO Annex 14 compliant
  5. 5. Environment - Existing facilities • Buochs aerodrome (LSZC) • Visual runway • Elevation • Blind transmissions - 07L/25R, 2000m x 40m 449 m / 1473 ft 134.125 MHz (TWR OPS) • All flights need pre-authorisation • TWR ATC provided. ATC in approach and arrival until transfer to tower either with Emmen APP or DELTA Zurich in the region of RONIX. • Existing instrument procedures • Only for departure
  6. 6. Environment - Changes introduced • Lower minima • Circling minima (3000 ft) • LPV (630-940 ft) • LNAC (860-920 ft) • Instrument approach to fictitious runway • Requirement for more controlled airspace to protect aircraft on approach • Increased ATC coordination – IFR/VFR • AIP inclusion – new aerodrome responsibilities • new processes
  7. 7. Environment - IAP Options • Traditional – straight in approach not possible due to terrain • Only RNAV approach possible would be an RNP AR approach down to RNP 0.18 or less ° no Pilatus aircraft RNP AR certified • Alternative: • a Point-in-Space (PinS) approach • followed by a visual segment to Bouchs • Missed Approach Point (MAP) over Lake Lucerne (north of LSZC) avoiding high terrain. • However: • current ICAO definition of PinS approach is helicopter only • implementation would deviate from ICAO criteria
  8. 8. Approach – ICAO requirements • Under ICAO guidance, an aeronautical study should then be performed to analyse the risk and prove the safety of the approach procedure • Essentially a FOSA – ATM aspects out of scope • The aeronautical study need to specifically address: • How the flight procedure is designed and implemented • Whether the aircraft performance is sufficient for the requirements of the procedure in normal and non-normal configurations and • Whether the flight crew procedures are adequately specified to ensure acceptable safety both for normal and non-normal situations.
  9. 9. Approach – Scope of the study • Study SHOULD NOT undertake a complete review of the operations • Study SHOULD analyse : • Differences introduced through the flight procedure • The potential impact that these operations may have on standard cockpit operating procedures in normal and nonnormal situations • As such the study was a qualitative assessment of changes to hazards arising from the new operation, identifying risk and proposing mitigations as appropriate
  10. 10. Approach – Consistency with ICAO Establishing the context HAZID and risk mitigation workshop Documentation of aeronautical study results • A description of problems and objectives; • Selection of procedures, methods and data sources; • Identification of undesired events; • An analysis of causal factors, severity and likelihood; • A description of risk; • Identification of possible mitigating measures; • An estimation of the effectiveness of mitigating measures; • Choice of mitigating measures; • Presentation of results.
  11. 11. The procedure - What is PinS? • Point-in-Space (PinS) approach procedures • The procedure is to the DH/MAPt to allow subsequent visual flight manoeuvring for approach and landing – the THR may not be aligned with the final approach segment • Criteria are specified in ICAO PANS-OPS (Doc 8168 Vol II Part IV) and include: • • • • System tolerance limits for GNSS receivers Speed limits for final and missed approach segments Limits on leg lengths Descent gradients: ° Optimum noted as 6.5% (400 ft/NM) up to operationally justified maximum of 13.2% (800 ft/NM) • Recommended T/Y approach configuration
  12. 12. The procedure example VFR missed approach Note speed limits Proceed “Visual” SBAS required
  13. 13. The procedure - VFR vs Visual • Proceed VFR: • • • • • Requires the pilot to proceed from the MAPt to the selected Landing area on the approach chart with no less than the visibility and ceiling required on the approach chart For flights not terminating at the selected landing area on the approach chart, the pilot is required to proceed from MAPt under the applicable VFR for ceiling and visibility required by the air law The pilot is responsible for obstacle and terrain avoidance from MAPt to the landing site A missed approach procedures is not provided between the MAPt and the landing site The landing site is not required to be in sight from the MAPt • Proceed Visual • • • Requires the pilot to acquire and maintain visual contact with the FATO or elements associated with the FATO such as heliport lighting, precision approach path indicator (PAPI) at or prior to the MAPt Obstacle and terrain avoidance from the MAPt to the FATO is the responsibility of the pilot A missed approach procedures is not provided between the MAPt and the landing FATO
  14. 14. The procedure – IAP design
  15. 15. The procedure – IAP design
  16. 16. A view from the MAPt
  17. 17. A view from the MAPt
  18. 18. The procedure – Airspace requirements
  19. 19. Safety Argument
  20. 20. Hazard Assessment • A HAZID workshop was held on 19th January 2012 at Pilatus training centre in Buochs • Objectives of the HAZID workshop were to: • Review the accuracy of the operational concept; • Identify the hazards that existed from the operation by phase of flight, including: associated with hazards; ° existing mitigations or recovery mechanisms (preventing worst effect). ° • Identify the hazard causes, including: existing mitigations that would prevent the hazard occurring; ° required new mitigations; ° analysis of the impact of new mitigations. °
  21. 21. Hazard Identification • Hazards were identified on a phase of flight basis • Enabled a methodical approach to assessment of the new approach procedure when compared to a standard instrument approach and the actions that the flight crew would be expected to make in each instance. • Note aeronautical study required because: • the implemented procedure requires differences to ICAO requirements and • the assessment is needed to determine whether these design differences place additional mitigating requirements on flight operations
  23. 23. Hazards Identified Phase of Flight Operational impact Severity Frequency Aircraft unable to join the IF Initial Increased pilot workload Minor Remote Aircraft off track during the initial segment Initial CFIT Catastrophic Extremely Improbable Inability to continue SBAS procedure Intermediate Increased pilot workload Minor Probable Inability to continue LNAV procedure Intermediate Increased pilot workload Minor Probable Obstacle without vertical clearance Final CFIT Catastrophic Extremely Improbable Inability to continue SBAS procedure Final Increased pilot workload Minor Probable Inability to continue LNAV procedure Final Increased pilot workload Minor Probable Aircraft off track Final CFIT Catastrophic Aircraft descends below minima Final CFIT Catastrophic Aircraft descends below track Final Pilot workload Major Remote CFIT Catastrophic Extremely Remote Description of hazard Loss of pilot situational awareness during visual transition DH/MAPt Visual segment Extremely Improbable Extremely Improbable
  24. 24. HAZARD #11 - Loss of pilot situational awareness during visual manoeuvring • The inability to determine the visual reference points either from meteorological conditions or due to familiarity with the terrain in minima conditions • Flight crew workload in configuring aircraft and transitioning to visual flight • Lack of flight crew familiarisation with the environment to be able to orientate with respect to the terrain • Changing meteorological conditions between the DH/MAPt and the runway • distance to go of approximately 7NM between DH and MAPt • Flight crew inability to determine meteorological minima before passing the decision point • approximately 13 seconds to identify the required VRPs at the standard approach speed based on a 900ft ceiling
  25. 25. HAZAD #11 – risk mitigation • No existing mitigations were currently available • The probability of the CFIT whilst Extremely Remote needed to be improved to make the hazard tolerable • Mitigations: • • • • Aerodrome PPR extension Training Charting Meteorology • Training deemed most important element and essential to make hazard ‘Tolerable’ In effect - an authorisation only procedure on the basis of training being required
  26. 26. HAZAD #11 – risk mitigation • Charting: • A visual chart should be published as part of the approach chart would provide the flight crew with guidance for visual part of the procedure (i.e. clear VRPs define for the decision point) and additional VRPs for the visual segment • Charting the approach after the DH/MAPt as a visual segment would enable the aircraft to remain IFR in the event that the approach had to be abandoned after the MAPt • Perhaps different minima based on crew qualifications
  27. 27. HAZAD #11 – risk mitigation • Meteorology • An additional meteorological observation point (under the control of Buochs aerodrome) to provide redundancy and capability to cover more of the visual segment • Local meteorological conditions can change quickly, and the lowest minima on the charts should therefore only be available to flight crew with a familiar local understanding of the dynamic MET changes • It was noted that this mitigation would require additional time and cost – and possibly delay implementation
  28. 28. In conclusion • Focus on those risks arising from the parts of the procedure not aligned with ICAO Standards • A standard aeronautical hazard assessment process, based on assessment of risk per phase of flight and analysis of potential causes and mitigations • Many of the hazards identified, and their basic causes, were common to existing LPV and LNAV procedures • Mitigations already had examples in Switzerland: • Visual approach chart for Sion or the circling approach at Bern • Operational approval similar to the procedures in Sion and Lugano • Recommendation for initial trials with experienced, local authorised and trained flight crew
  29. 29. Airports Air Traffic Management Thank you for your attention Philip Church +44 1252 451 668 Space Telecoms Maritime Rail