Market And Welfare Effects


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Market And Welfare Effects

  1. 1. Market and welfare effects of Doha reform scenarios: implications for Southeast Asia Kym Anderson and Will Martin Development Research Group The World Bank Washington DC
  2. 2. A new empirical study of the Doha Development Agenda <ul><li>Part I: What’s at stake in the Doha Round? </li></ul><ul><li>Part II: How far might Doha take the world towards global free trade? </li></ul><ul><li>Part III: Lessons and implications, particularly for Southeast Asia </li></ul>
  3. 3. What differentiates our new study? <ul><li>Its point of departure is the WTO’s July 2004 Framework agreement </li></ul><ul><li>It examines in detail each of the 3 agric pillars plus preferences, cotton subsidies, special and differential treatment, and NAMA </li></ul><ul><li>And it ‘adds up’ the consequences of current policies and prospective Doha reforms using the new GTAP protection database for 2001 </li></ul><ul><ul><li>which includes, for the first time: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>bound as well as applied tariffs </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>non-reciprocal as well as reciprocal preferential tariffs </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>key trade policy changes to the start of 2005 </li></ul></ul></ul>
  4. 4. Why a strong focus on agriculture … <ul><li>when the sector contributes <4% of global GDP and 9% of int’l merchandise trade? </li></ul><ul><li>Because while OECD manufacturing tariffs have fallen by 9/10ths over the past 60 years to <4%, agric protection has risen and its applied (bound) tariffs now average nearly 5 (10) times manuf tariffs globally; </li></ul><ul><li>And because the vast majority of the world’s poor rely on farming for a living </li></ul>
  5. 5. Why focus on agriculture (cont.) <ul><li>True, the harm to some DC farmers from OECD agric protection is reduced via non-reciprocal preference schemes such as ACP, EBA, CBI and AGOA </li></ul><ul><li>But those schemes, like agric export subsidies, rely on undesirable exceptions to worthy WTO rules </li></ul><ul><li>And those schemes exclude some significant DCs (e.g. China, Vietnam) and so may harm more poor farmers (through trade diversion) than they help </li></ul>
  6. 6. Applied tariffs of importing regions, 2001 (according to GTAP Version 6.05 database) 10 3 ALL MERCHANDISE 9 1 Other merchandise 17 8 Textiles & apparel 18 16 Agric & food Developing countries High-income countries
  7. 7. Applied tariffs of importing regions, 2001 (according to GTAP Version 6.05 database) 17 12 29 37 Vietnam 10 8 17 30 Thailand 5 5 ALL MERCHANDISE 4 4 Other merchandise 9 8 Textiles & apparel 14 5 Agric & food Other Dev. East Asia Indonesia
  8. 8. Outline of presentation <ul><li>What’s at stake: what are the potential welfare gains from full global trade reform, by country/region, due to: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>developed rel. to developing countries’ policies? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>agriculture relative to manufacturing policies? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>within agric, tariffs relative to export subsidies and domestic support? </li></ul></ul><ul><li>How close could Doha get us to completely free merchandise trade, in welfare terms, based on July 2004 Framework agreement? </li></ul><ul><li>Implications for ASEAN and other DCs </li></ul>
  9. 9. Modeling Doha reform packages using World Bank’s Linkage Model <ul><li>Recursive dynamic CGE model </li></ul><ul><li>We start with GTAP Version 6.05 protection and trade data for 2001 </li></ul><ul><li>We project on-going reforms from 2001 to 2004 (Uruguay Round including ATC, EU25 enlargement, WTO accession for China etc.) </li></ul><ul><li>Then we assume no further reform as global economy grows to 2015 (according to World Bank population, income, etc. projections), to get our global baseline scenario for 2015 </li></ul>
  10. 10. Welfare cost of current protection policies by 2015 <ul><li>Larger than GTAP estimates as of 2001, because Linkage Model: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>projects world economy to 2015 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>includes some dynamics </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>has larger trade elasticities than GTAP model </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Global cost of current tariffs and agric subsidies would be $278 billion p.a. by 2015 </li></ul><ul><ul><li>which is 0.7% of global income </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Would be much higher if the model had a stronger trade-growth linkage and included imperfect competition, economies of scale and an opening up of services markets </li></ul></ul></ul>
  11. 13. Aside: Why not negotiate cuts in trade measures only and forget about agric domestic support? <ul><li>Because the EU is the biggest export subsidizer, and it would insist on the US (the biggest domestic subsidizer) cutting its domestic support before agreeing to eliminate EU export subsidies (so as to share the political pain)? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>-- see next 2 two tables </li></ul></ul>
  12. 14. Agric export subsidy rates, 2001 (%, as in GTAP database Version 6.05) 6 Wheat 11 C grain 7 10 O. meat 10 40 Beef (?) 15 Rice 1 30 40 57 Dairy 73 Sugar Japan US Switz Norway EU
  13. 15. Share of PSE from domestic support (%, 2000-02, from OECD) 25 Other OECD 10 Japan 43 EU 65 US Share (%)
  14. 16. Cost of current policies, by region (as % of GDP in 2015) 0.6 ALL HICs 0.9 ALL DCs 2.5 Singapore/HK 1.7 Other EA DCs 5.3 Vietnam 0.1 China 4.0 Thailand 3.5 Korea/Taiwan 0.8 Indonesia % %
  15. 17. Factor price effects of current policies, by region (% in 2015) 4.5 7.8 7.3 Korea/Taiwan 2.4 1.8 2.0 China 4.4 3.6 5.4 Other EA DCs 1.2 2.4 1.5 Japan 8.8 15.1 23.3 Vietnam 3.7 6.3 13.4 Thailand 0.5 1.2 3.4 Indonesia Capital Skilled wages Unskilled wages
  16. 18. Key elements of the Doha Agenda as shown in the July 2004 Framework agreement <ul><li>3 agricultural pillars (including cotton) </li></ul><ul><li>Non-agricultural market access </li></ul><ul><li>Services </li></ul><ul><li>Trade facilitation </li></ul><ul><li>Special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing and esp. least-developed countries (DCs and LDCs) </li></ul>
  17. 19. Prospective Doha packages <ul><li>We focus on agric market access in particular </li></ul><ul><ul><li>because it is by far the biggest potential contributor to global and DC welfare gains </li></ul></ul><ul><li>So we assume no services reform, no new trade facilitation, but: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>phase out of agricultural export subsidies </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>reduce agricultural domestic support </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>and cut agric and non-agric bound tariffs under various alternative market access packages </li></ul></ul>
  18. 20. Agricultural market access <ul><li>Tiered formula, as sought by Harbinson, for cutting bound tariffs (with SDT) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>It yielded almost no gains to DCs </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>especially if 2% of products are exempted as ‘sensitive’ </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>So we increased each cut by 10 percentage points </li></ul></ul><ul><li>We compare it with a proportional cut of same average size for HICs and for DCs </li></ul><ul><li>And we look at effects of imposing a tariff cap of 200% </li></ul>
  19. 21. Agricultural domestic support <ul><li>Cut in bound AMS need not reduce applied support, because of binding overhang (with 1986-88 ref. prices) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>and overhang can be increased by abolishing admin prices used to calculate market price support </li></ul></ul><ul><li>We apply a tiered reduction in bound AMS </li></ul><ul><ul><li>75% if AMS>20%, otherwise 60% </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Leads to only 4 countries reducing support: </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>US 28%, Norway 18%, EU 16%, Australia 10% </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>
  20. 22. Non-agric market access and SDT <ul><li>50% cut in bound rates for high-income countries, 33% for DCs, 0% for LDCs </li></ul><ul><li>We also examine the effects of DCs (including LDCs) becoming full participants in Doha agric and NAMA cuts, </li></ul><ul><ul><li>recalling from earlier Rounds that DCs only got what they gave, in terms of increased market access (see Finger 1974, 1976; Finger and Schuknecht 2001) </li></ul></ul>
  21. 23. Services and trade facilitation <ul><li>These areas offer great potential gains, especially for developing countries </li></ul><ul><ul><li>See Hertel/Keeney chapter of our book </li></ul></ul><ul><li>But few significant signs of commitment have been forthcoming yet </li></ul><ul><ul><li>and quantification of their effects is problematic </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Hence we assume zero changes for these items in our modeled Doha scenarios </li></ul>
  22. 24. Results from Doha agric reform <ul><li>Tiered formula cut with SDT as per Harbinson gives the world $54 billion, but little goes to DCs </li></ul><ul><ul><li>So we increased all cuts by 10 percentage points, which gave a $72 billion global gain </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Even then, only $7 billion go to DCs </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>& if HICs exempt just 2% sensitive products (DCs 4%), global gain shrinks to $16 billion and DCs lose </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>although a 200% tariff cap reduces much of that shrinkage </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>If tiered formula is replaced by proportional one of same average cuts for HICs and for DCs, global gain is nearly as high ($64 billion) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Why bother to negotiate over a complex tiered formula? </li></ul></ul>
  23. 25. Adding non-agric market access <ul><li>Adding 50%/33%/0% cut to non-agric bound tariffs boosts global gain from agric tiered formula from $72 to $94 billion pa </li></ul><ul><li>That $94 billion gets the world 1/3 rd of the way to the potential gains from complete global free trade in merchandise </li></ul><ul><ul><li>(but that share is much smaller as % of gains from removing also all services trade barriers, unless services markets are also opened up) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>If DCs and LDCs forego SDT in market access, global gain goes up to $103 billion </li></ul>
  24. 26. Implications for DCs <ul><li>Scenario 5 package would give DCs only 1/6 th their potential gain from a move to global free trade ($14 b. out of $87 billion) </li></ul><ul><li>Even if DCs incl. LDCs were to forego SDT, as in Scenario 6, their gain rises by only $1.7 b. </li></ul><ul><li>To gain more, DCs with v. high tariff bindings such as Indonesia have to liberalize more </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Isn’t it better to do that under Doha, so as to get reciprocity and/or more aid, than unilaterally? </li></ul></ul>
  25. 27. DC welfare gains from Scenario 5 (percent change from baseline income in 2015)
  26. 28. DC welfare gains from Scenario 6 (Percent change from baseline income in 2015)
  27. 29. DC gains from full liberalization (Percent change from baseline income in 2015)
  28. 30. Other lessons and policy implications <ul><li>Potential gains from further trade reform are huge </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Even after UR and recent accessions to WTO and EU </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li> Must find the political will for Doha success </li></ul></ul><ul><li>DCs would gain disproportionately from reform </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Notwithstanding non-reciprocal tariff preferences </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>But as much would come from South-South as South-North trade growth, hence imptc of DC lib’n too </li></ul></ul><ul><li>After outlawing export subsidies, agric tariff cuts are the highest priority from a welfare viewpoint and if Doha is to be pro-development/pro-poor </li></ul>
  29. 31. Lessons and implications (cont) <ul><li>Cuts in agric tariffs and domestic support bindings need to be large to get beyond binding overhang </li></ul><ul><li>Even large cuts in agric tariffs do little if ‘sensitive’ and ‘special’ products are exempt </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Unless a tariff cap of, say, 100% is enforced </li></ul></ul><ul><li>DCs would have to make few cuts because of their huge binding overhang </li></ul><ul><ul><li>So can afford to tone down their demands for SDT (and ‘special’ products) and trade it for greater access to HIC markets (& fewer HIC ‘sensitive’ product exemptions) </li></ul></ul>
  30. 32. Lessons and implications (cont) <ul><li>Removal of cotton subsidies in US and EU would raise DC share of global cotton exports from 56% to 85% </li></ul><ul><li>Adding non-agric market access to Doha package could double the welfare gains to DCs even with SDT, bringing global gains to 1/3 rd of potential from full merchandise liberalization </li></ul><ul><ul><li>And it helps balance the N-S exchange of ‘concessions’ </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Some LDCs lose slightly because they do not reform enough to get sufficient efficiency gains to offset their terms of trade losses </li></ul>