THE PEACE PROCESS AND THEPOLITICS OF CONFLICTRESOLUTIONAMRG. E. SABETThisanalysisoftheMiddleEastpeaceprocessarguesthatthea...
6 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESresortingto conventionalWesternconflictresolutionmechanisms.Thesemechanismshave fundamentall...
THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 7extentpossibleoftheadversarysweaknessesand oversights.The confi...
8 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESWeston theArabsingeneral,and on thePalestiniansinparticular,havefromtheoutsetcharacterizedth...
THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 9theirsas a matterofrightand arewillingtotradeofforforesweargood...
10 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIESThe problemwithunilateralgestures,as Kissingernoted,is thatthey"re-move a keynegotiatingasse...
THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 11outcome.25In thelightofsuch findings,itfollowsthatthestrategic...
12 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESThe Palestinianleaderthuscommitteda seriousstrategicmistakebysign-inginterimagreementsthatd...
THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 13Camp David,"he wroteina perhapsunwittingbutdevastatingindictme...
14 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIESvance oftheformula?TheJune1996ArabsummitinCairoannouncedpeaceas a "strategicchoice." Such a ...
THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 15constraintsmaynotfunctionas a long-termviable deterrentand ind...
16 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIEStablishmentof"peace" whilereconstructingtheMuslimworldand crushinggrass-rootsIslamistgroups....
THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POUTICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 17CONCLUSIONDefiningIslamas thenew enemyafterthecollapse ofcommun...
18 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES4. Howard Raiffa,TheArtand ScienceofNegotiation (Cambridge: HarvardUni-versityPress, 1982),...
THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 19destinationwas at least the 67 bordersand recognitionof a Pale...
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  1. 1. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THEPOLITICS OF CONFLICTRESOLUTIONAMRG. E. SABETThisanalysisoftheMiddleEastpeaceprocessarguesthattheapplica-tionofconventionalWesternconflictresolutionmechanismshas at-temptedtoremovethejusticeprinciplefromtheArab-Israeliconflict.Theauthorcontendsthattheshiftfroma "closedagenda"determinedbycorevaluestoan "openagenda"whereeverythingisopenforbar-gainingandfroma justice-driven"entitlement-benefits"matrixtoautility-drivencost-benefits"one,canonlyleadtoissuetransformationand theprogressivescalingbackofgoals.Acceptanceoftheadver-sarysframeworkhas reducedArabnegotiatorstosupplicantsratherthancounterpartswhoseperceptionscan be managedbytheoppo-nent.AfterexaminingArab options,the authorconcludesthatwhateversettlementemergesfromthecurrentprocessisboundtofailbecauseitcannotfulfillbasicdemandforjustice,resultingina redefi-nitionoftheconflictin itsbroaderreligiousand strategichorizons.THE FANFARE SURROUNDING THE MIDDLE EAST "PEACE PROCESS" has obscuredhowlittleithas been subjectedto systematicand objectiveanalysis.Norhave itsnegotiationprinciplesbeen sufficientlyscrutinizedto bringouttheunderly-ingnatureand structureoftheprocessoritsabilitytodeliveron itspromises.Ifa yetmore violentand bitterfutureof theArab-Israelicollisionis to beavoided,distinctionmustbe made betweenconflictresolutionas "thetrans-formationof relationshipsin a particularcase by the solution of theproblemswhichled to theconflictualbehaviorin thefirstplace" and "thesuppressionor settlementof conflictby coercivemeans,or by bargainingand negotiationinwhichrelativepowerdeterminestheoutcome."1The dis-tinctionmustbe made,then,betweenresolutionand settlement.Forunlesstheformerobtainsand incorporatestheprincipleofjustice (particularlyintheconflictscorePalestinianissue),the"peace process"cannotbutcollapseintoa reducedand unstablesettlementarrangement.PEACE TRANSFORMATION AND THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICEThe current"peace process"has attemptedto circumvent,transform,andconceptuallyobliteratethe justiceprincipleof the Arab-IsraeliconflictbyAMR G. E. SABET is visitingassociate professorof political science at Tampere University,Finland.Journal of Palestine Studies XXVII, no. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 5-19.
  2. 2. 6 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESresortingto conventionalWesternconflictresolutionmechanisms.Thesemechanismshave fundamentallyalteredthepoliticalagenda oftheconflictthroughsubterfugeand issue transformation.This developmentwas facili-tatedby systemicand regionalchangesarisingfromthecollapse oftheSo-vietUnion,thesecond GulfWarand thedestructionofIraq,and American-Israelimilitaryand scientificcooperation.The applicationofWestern"conflictresolution"mechanismsrequiredtheintroductionof superordinateaxes to change the regionsregimeof alli-ances. "Moderate"Araband Jewishforcessupporting"peace" were to bealignedagainst"radicals"or "extremists"opposing itinbothsocieties.Arableaderswere to make commoncause withIsraelin fightingnotextremismper se, but Islamicresistanceto the concessional schemes being workedout-in otherwords,theywere to fighttheirown so as to claim sharedgroundwithIsrael.Paralleltothesechangesinthepoliticalconstellationwasa shiftfroma "closed agenda" determinedby immutablecore values to an"open agenda" whereeverythingis open forbargaining.Thus,insteadofaclosed agenda settingIslamistsand existingregimesas naturalalliesagainsta commonIsraelienemy,thenew open agenda evolved intoone of con-frontingtheeffectsofinjusticeratherthanitscauses.The negotiatingstrategyadopted bytheArabsaftertheGulfWarwas ar-ticulatedby PresidentHusni Mubarakof Egypt,who inJanuary1989 pro-claimedthathe and otherArableaderswere supportedin theirsearchforpeace by "thepeace lovingforcesin Israelitself."He indicatedthatafterallthesacrificesin previouswarswithIsrael,he "was notreadyto takemorerisks."2Thisstatementbasicallyacknowledgestheconflicttobe one ofcostsratherthanofentitlements,ofpragmatismratherthanrights,and conveysawillingnessto playbytherulesoftheopponent.Expressinghisratherlim-itedunderstandingoftheVietnamesecase as an exampleofa warthat"wassettledonlythroughnegotiations,"Mubarakfailedto relatetheoutcometoconditionson theground.The Vietnameseweresuccessfulinimposingtheirwillon a farmorepowerfuladversarypreciselybecause theyhad been will-ingtotakerisks,whiletheArabpartysstartingpointfornegotiationswas toconcede entitlementclaims.SincetheArabswerewillingto relinquishwhattheyhad consideredsacredsince 1948,furtherpressurecould be expectedto lead themto concede otherrightsand Jerusalemas well-after all, theprecedenthad been set. ThisintroducedstructuraltransformnationscapableofchangingthepsychologicaldistributionofpowerheavilyinfavorofIsraeland alteringtheArabpositionfromone ofdefiancetoone ofvirtualsubmis-sion. As a settlementmechanism,the "peace process" has recastthe sub-stance of the conflictby steadilycreatingthe appropriateenvironmentalmeans-endsframeworkforsuch "concessions"to be made.Negotiationconstitutesthe "artof the dialecticsof wills thatuse force(and/orpeacefulmeasures)to resolvetheirconflict."3Strategiesand tactics,in additionto optionsand the available resources,constitutethepillarsofnegotiatingdynamics.Theiroverridingprincipleis to takeadvantageto the
  3. 3. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 7extentpossibleoftheadversarysweaknessesand oversights.The configura-tiveoutcomedeterminestheagreementsreachedand how theyare imple-mented. In thissense, negotiationis a double-edgedsword:itcan resolveconflictsor exacerbatethem.Whileitis impossibleto predictwithcertaintythe resultof a negotiatingprocess,a numberof premisesmayindicateitsdirection.Thus,thefinaloutcomeofnegotiationsusuallyreflectstherelativepowerconfigurationofthepartiesconcerned;"whereone endsup dependson whereone starts";4and negotiatingoutcomesemanatenotonlyfromob-jectivematerialconditionsbut,as importantly,fromsubjectivepsychologicalfortitude.The weakerside in particularmustthusexhibitconsiderablefirm-ness to establisha credibilitythresholdsufficientto make demandsor up-hold positions.Otherwise,in cases ofasymmetricalpower,diminishedwillinevitablytranslatesintoa one-sidedopen agenda in which-as faras theprivilegedpartyis concerned-agreementmaynotnecessarilybe preferredto nonagreement.Failureofwill also allows fortheunilateralalterationoftherulesofthegameand forredefiningthenormsthatall actorsmustfollowintheirmutualrelations.5Once thisstagehasbeen reached,negotiationsub-stantivelyceases, since, as Henry Kissingernoted, "the weak do notnegotiate."6Both theAmericansand the Israelisbelieved thata step-by-stepratherthana comprehensivenegotiatingapproachwould contributeto undermin-ingtheArabconsensusof"notalks,no recognition,no peace" thatemergedattheKhartoumsummitinAugust1967. The purposewas todividetheArabworld,winde factorecognitionofIsrael,and putIsraelina strongerpositionwhenitcame tonegotiatedirectlywiththefront-linestatesand thePalestini-ans.7Israelstacticwas to bringtheArabsinto"stepbystep,practicalsettle-ments and interimagreements as a gradual incrementalprocess ofinterlockingtherivalsintopositivearrangementswhichmaymakeitmoredifficultforthemtoreverttoopen conflictand war."8Suchtacticswerecon-sistentwiththeoverallstrategyofdetachingEgyptfromtheArab-Israelicon-flict,isolatingSyria,and, on the Palestinianfront,pursuinga policy ofcantonizationin Gaza and the West Bank. Above all, the approach suc-ceeded in breakingthenecessarylinkbetweenstatecraftand war.Once allthishad been achieved,Israelreverseditsposition,withthecurrentprimeminister,BenjaminNetanyahu,callingfor"a package approach"thatcircum-ventstheagreementssignedearlier.9PEACE-JUSTICE DIALECTICSPower relationsbased on considerationsof mightfrequentlyoffenda"sense ofjustice"and fueltheemotionsof resentmentand angerthatulti-matelylead to violence. Notionsof injustice"as a reactionto a perceiveddiscrepancybetweenentitlementsand benefits"alwaysremainan inherentriskfactor.10"Peace"as theoppositeofviolenceratherthanas a reflectionofjusticeis unlikelytoovercomesuchconcerns.Bereavementsinflictedbythe
  4. 4. 8 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESWeston theArabsingeneral,and on thePalestiniansinparticular,havefromtheoutsetcharacterizedtheconflictinArabeyesas one ofentitlement-bene-fits(as opposed to themore pragmaticbargainingapproach of cost-bene-fits),meaningthatitis thenotionofrightsthatis thedeterminingfactorandthatwhateverbenefitsderivefromthe conflictsresolutionare secondary.The Arabsense of injusticehas triggeredintenseemotionalresponsesthatcannotbe quantifiedsolelyin tangibletermsor reducedsimplyto an aver-sion to loss. Phenomenologically,thesense ofjustice"engage(s) powerfulpassionsthathavetheeffectofincreasingthestridencyofdemands,amplify-ing intransigence,reducingsensitivityto threatsand value trade-offs,in-creasingthewillingnesstorunrisks,and increasingthelikelihoodofviolentbehavior."" ThishelpsexplaintheviolenceassociatedwithmilitantMuslimorganizationssuch as Hamas, Hizballah,and IslamicJihad.Theiracts arelargelythe observablesymptomsof theunobservableneed to respondtogroupinsultwithrage.12Referringto the Islamistorganizationsas terroriststructuresopposingpeace is partofan alternativediscursivemechanismthatseeks to eliminatetheentitlement-benefitsdiscrepancycontextin favorof one based on cost-benefits,the formerbeingdepicted as irrationaland the latteras rational.Buthistoricalexperienceshows thatwhen basic entitle-mentsare at stake againstoverrwhelmingodds, lessrationalityactuallyfaresbetterthanmore rationality.For instance,the Czechs behaviorwithrespecttoNazi Germanysdemands for theirland was "toorational"in thefaceofa militarythreattheybelievedtheycould notwin againstin thelong run.13In contrast,theFinnsand theNorthVietnamesewere less rationaland moreemotional,moredeterminedtofightagainsttheoverwhelmingpoweroftheSovietUnionand theUnitedStates,respectively.Finland,whilelosingtwice,earnedrespectand perhapsmade itselfless attractiveas a potentialsatellite.The NorthVietnamese,ofcourse,ultimatelyprevailed,14winninga warinwhichtheyhad lostvirtuallyall thebattles.Ithardlybearsmentioningthat,withinthecontextoftheU.S.-constructed"peace" discourse,itis fareasier to manipulatepartieswhosecalculatingmatrixdriftstowardcost-benefitquantifications(the Czech op-tion) than partieswho are not prey to such calculations(the Finn orVietnameseoption).The justicemotivediffersfromaversionto loss both prescriptivelyandextensively.Prescriptively,thedesireto see justicedone "thoughtheearthmayperish"is a driveembeddedinbasic humanvalues and is indifferenttomaterialvaluationsbased on economyor self-interest.Extensively,thejus-ticemotivediffersfromgain-lossconsiderationsin thatitinvolvesnotwhatpeople would like to have butwhattheyconsidertheirdue, theirentitle-ments.People withintheentitlement-benefitsvalue matrixusuallyare will-ing to incura heavy price forpotentiallyless usefulthingstheyconsiderHistorical experience showsthat when basicentitlementsare at stakeagainst overwhelmingodds, less rationalityactually fares betterthanmore rationality.
  5. 5. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 9theirsas a matterofrightand arewillingtotradeofforforesweargoods thattheywould liketohavebuttowhichtheydo notfeelentitled."Themode ofreasoninginvolvedin thedefenseofones entitlements,"therefore,"differsfundamentallyfromthemode ofreasoninginvolvedin thepursuitofothergoods: ittendsto be categoricaland deontologicalratherthanutilitarian."15In substance,Israel,aided byAmericanindifferenceifnotcomplicity,at-temptedto reconcilethe entitlement-benefitsdiscrepancynot by meetinglegitimatePalestiniandemandsbutbytransformingtherulesin such a waythatthePalestinianAuthority(PA), led by YasirArafat,would increasinglyact-if notactuallybelieve-as ifithad misconceivedthescope and contentofPalestinianentitlements.16As YehoshafatHarkabi,formerchiefofIsraelimilitaryintelligence,pointedout:"Makingtheopponentuneasyand apolo-geticabout his objective,is a firstsmallstep in theprocess of itserosion,inducinghimto startdiscardingit."17Thus,recentyearsappear to have wit-nessed a progressivescalingback ofPalestinianexpectations.Indeed,withtheexceptionofthehighlyskillednegotiatorHafizal-AsadofSyria,a look atthenegotiatingpatternsofArabdecision makersrevealsa significantpro-pensityto modifythevalues at stakein a fashionthatultimatelychallengestheirown entitlements.Israel,on theotherhand,continuesto maintainitsown constantsand payoffsintermsofa unifiedJerusalemunderitscontrol,possession of mostof the West Bank (despite redeploymentmaneuvers),monopolizedaccess tonuclearweapons,priorityofIsraelisecurityconcernsoverall otherconsiderations,and eventualaccess to thewaterresourcesoftheNile and theEuphrates.18Israels delinkingof securityfromchanges on the groundinJerusalemand theWestBank,and thereforefromthepoliticalheartofthe"peace pro-cess,"reflectsa furtherattemptto divestthepurportedPalestinian/Arabne-gotiatingformulaofitssubstance.DuringhisAugust1997visittotheregionin the wake of Hamas bombings in Jerusalem,U.S. envoy Dennis Rosssoughtfurtherto entrenchthe Palestiniannegotiatorwithinthisdelinkingstructure.He calledupon IsraelisandPalestinianstoworkas partnersagainstthe"commonthreat"frommilitants,emphasizingthat"securityis somethingthatservesIsraeliinterestsand Palestinianinterests."19Israelisecuritywasthusto become thePAs objective,whetheror notPalestiniandemandsforstatehoodcould orwould be met.In returnforArafatsresumptionofsecur-itycooperationwithIsrael,Ross gave a vague promise of an upcomingbroadU.S.peace initiativethatsupposedlywould addressPalestinianscom-plaintsagainstIsrael,including"some kind"offreezeon settlementexpan-sion.20ButwhenSecretaryofStateMadeleineAlbrightvisitedtheregionthefollowingmonth,she respondedto complaintsthatIsraelwas strengtheningitsgriponJerusalem,expandingcolonies,and levelingthehomes ofPales-tiniansbydeclaringthat"thereis no moralequivalentbetweenkillingpeo-ple and buildinghouses.... The PalestinianAuthoritymusttakeunilateralstepsand actionsto rootout theterroristinfrastructure."21
  6. 6. 10 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIESThe problemwithunilateralgestures,as Kissingernoted,is thatthey"re-move a keynegotiatingasset.In general,diplomatsrarelypay forservicesalreadyrendered."Moreover,he continued,theytemptthe adversary"todragoutthenegotiationsinordertodeterminewhetherotherunilateralges-turesmaybe forthcoming."22Notonlydid Albrightdemandsuch unilateralgesturesofthePalestinians,she refusedtoacknowledgeanyconnectionbe-tween themilitantacts of some Palestiniangroupsand theIsraeligovern-mentsbreakingofagreementsandsettlementexpansion.RossspromisestoArafatcan be likenedtoBritainsWorldWarI commitmentsto supportinde-pendence forArabsiftheyjoined thewar effortagainstOttomanTurkey.ArafatsrelationshipwithIslamistgroups,however,is too complexto en-able himto accede to U.S.-Israelidemandsfora crackdownon theirinfra-structure,atleastnotto theextentdesired.Formuchas Arafatwould liketoclamp down on theIslamists,he knows thatdestroyingthemcould meanpoliticalsuicide.EradicatingHamas and IslamicJihadwould diminishhisusefulnessas a negotiator:theIslamistsarehislasttrumpcard.Thisiswherethe inherentcontradictionsof a common securityframeworkcan be feltmoststrongly.WhiletheIsraeliswould liketo see Islamicoppositionelimi-natedtotally,Arafatcannotwithoutjeopardizinghis own survivaldo morethancontainandweaken them.Thus,thePAandIsraelcannotpursuea com-mon securitypolicy,but onlya parallel one. Arafatsdilemmais thatthissituationprojectshimsimultaneouslyas a collaborator(to theIslamists,aswell as tosome secularnationalists)and as an ineffectiveand uncooperativeleader(to theAmericansand Israelis).The resultis a concessionaryoutcomethatcan lead onlyto theerosionofthePAslegitimacy,forcingitto controlitsown people by increasinglycoercivemeasures.23However much Israelismay loathe Arafat,he representsforthemthelesser of evils and a kindof safetyvalve. His rumblingsabout not beingdictatedtobyIsraelcannotconceal thathisrealconcernisfearofgeneratingsympathyforIslamicmilitantsbyacquiescinginIsraelidemands.Moreover,the concentrationof power in Arafatshands,his personal controlof thefundsprovidedby internationaldonors,his virtuallack of accountability,and hiseffortstoweakenallotherforcesand socialinstitutions-inshort,thefactthathe has become thePAin all butname24 significantlyconsolidatesIsraelsposition.Thus,and notwithstandingtheIslamistmilitants,Israelbycontrollingthe"chiefcan controlthe"tribe."In thisrespect,thePA,thoughshortofbeing a state,is notan aberrationbuta typicalregionalplayer.PEACE CONCESSIONS AND THE STRATEGY OF DEFEATEmpiricalstudiesregardingwinnersand losers in negotiationsindicatethatthepartieswithhigheraspirationlevels actuallygetmore.Opponentswithhighaspirations,irrespectiveoftheirskillor power,ended up as win-nersineverycase wheretheyopposed low aspirants.Furthermore,negotia-tors who made the firstcompromiseended up the losers in the final
  7. 7. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 11outcome.25In thelightofsuch findings,itfollowsthatthestrategicconces-sions initiatedby thelate PresidentAnwarSadat throughthe Camp Davidregime,and in whose footstepsa numberof otherArableaders have fol-lowed, can onlylead to disastrousconsequences fortheArabworld.Thepatternof concessions thatinevitablyresultswhen one partyvirtuallyde-claresitselfdesperateto opt out of confrontationwhile the otherremainsdeterminedcan neverbe just,forseveralreasons.First,concessionsarefaironlyas longas thenegotiatorshave no need torevisetheiroriginalexpectationsabout the overallshape of the ultimateagreementor about theirstrategicgoals ofentitlement.26Leavingaside thedowngradingof Palestinianexpectationsthatpreceded Oslo, the Oslo ac-cordsallowed thePalestiniannegotiatortoanticipatea Palestinianstatecov-eringmostoftheWestBankand Gaza attheend oftheprocess.Sincethen,thePA appears to have been reducedby thenegotiatingpatternithas fol-lowed to nothingmore thanan auxiliaryIsraelisecuritystructure.Indeed,theentireArabworldhas undergonean extraordinaryscalingback ofgoals.As MubarakschiefpoliticaladviserOsama Baz remarked,theconflictbe-tween the Arabs and Israel is now over boundariesand no longerover27Israelsexistence. (In contrast,formerIsraelichiefof staffRaphael Eitandeclaredtheconflictto be "civilizational.")Second,negotiationrequiresthatpartiesbe governedbythesame rules,withneitherside havingtherighttoalterthemunilaterally.Giventhatnego-tiationis a matteroffindingtheproperformulaas a referentprincipleandthenimplementingdetail,28ifone partycan changethenegotiatingformulaatwilland theotheris constrainedbyit-thatis,ifthepartiescease tohaveequal stalematingpower-then no mechanismofjointdecisionmakingex-istsand thetalksno longerconstitutenegotiations.Itis thusthatIsraelhasunilaterallyalteredthe formulafromland forpeace, as was agreed at theOctober1991Madridconference,to peace forpeace or securityforpeace.Thischange,whichfundamentallyreorderstheprocessinIsraelsimage,be-gan undertheLaborgovernment,albeitless overtly;29to personalizetheis-sue by presentingitas a Netanyahuinitiative,as manyArabstendto do,ratherthanas a matterof Israelistrategyis to blurthe deeper factors,al-lowingtheoptionlessArableaderstobuytimebydeludingthemselvesthatareturnofLaborwillsetthingsright.Finally,while any concessions made by the Israeliside can only comefromgainsacquiredattheexpense oftheArabside,reciprocalconcessionsbytheArabsmustinevitablycome outoftheirown capital.A frameworkofmutualconcessions,whilein appearance procedurallyfair,hidesa substan-tiveinjusticeinflictedon one negotiatingparty.Whateverjustificationsarecited forthisstateof affairs-thebalance of power, the situationon theground,thefactthatIsraelwon theland militarily-thenegotiatingexerciseisessentiallyreducedtothevictorsimposingitswillon thevanquished.Thissituationinvitestermsof surrenderratherthantheconciliationthatcomesfromconflictresolution.
  8. 8. 12 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESThe Palestinianleaderthuscommitteda seriousstrategicmistakebysign-inginterimagreementsthatdeferredtoa laterstagesuchfundamentalissuesas Jerusalem,refugees,and Jewishcolonies-in otherwords,by signingagreementsemphasizingtheprocessofinteractionratherthanthecontentofthenegotiatingpositions.30Sucha blunderwas a reflectionoftheArab/Pal-estiniannegotiatorsinabilitytorankprioritiesofnationalinterestsand goals,as well as theirconfusionof means and ends. Withintheframeworkof aconfidence-buildingprocess(as opposed to one based on content),prioritygoes to currentand ad hoc problemsofwhatevermagnitudeattheexpenseof long-termstrategicconsiderations,in essence resultingin a policythatgives equal weightto all issues.Indeed,thisprocess-orientatedframeworkactuallyleads to a confusionofpriorities,and ifprioritiesare confused,nolong-termnationalintereststrategycan be focused upon, nor decisionsabout thechannelingof resourcesmade. Processbecomes an end in itselfratherthanthemeans itis supposed to be.Thisloss ofstrategicbalance iswhatmade itpossibleforIsraelto "screw"thePalestiniansat Oslo II,to use LaborleaderShimonPeressfrankexpres-sion.31Indeed, whateverWesternconflictmanagementframeworkis uti-lized,theArabswilllose everytimetheyagree to be placed in an externalrulestructure.As CarlSchmittobserved,ifa people permitsanotherpartytodetermineon itsbehalfthe distinctionof friendand enemy,"thenitis nolonger a politicallyfree people and is absorbed into anotherpoliticalsystem."32In endingtheintifadaand signingtheOslo accords,Arafatgave up twoofhis mostimportanttrumpcardswithoutreceivinganythingofsubstanceinreturn.HiserrorfurtherabsolvedtheAraband otherstatesofanyembarrass-mentthatmighthavepreventedthemfromnormalizingrelationswithIsrael,effectivelybolsteringitsregionaland internationalstatusand endingitsiso-lation.In so doing,thePLO squanderedtheverylimitedleverageithad andplaced itselfin itsenemysgrip,or at best in thatof itsAmericanally(inmuchthe same fashion,thoughunderfarworse conditions,as Egypthaddone earlier).Nothingin thePAs negotiatingpatternwould seem to allowfortherealizationofitsrightsand demandsforstatehood,even as parallelexpectationson thebroaderArabfrontcontinueto decrease in lightoftheadversarysinitiativedynamics.ARAB OPTIONSThe perenniallegitimacycrisisand personalizedruleoftheArabregimesinevitablyaffecttheirnegotiatingperformanceand conflictmanagementcompetence.BoutrosBoutros-Ghali,a keyfigureinthenegotiationsthatledto theCamp David accords,wroteinhismemoirsthattheEgyptiandelega-tionnotonlydidnotknowhow toprepareforthecomingnegotiations,butdid not even know thegeneralstrategyupon whichto base itsmoves. "Itdallied myhopes thatinspirationwould come to us when we arrivedat
  9. 9. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 13Camp David,"he wroteina perhapsunwittingbutdevastatingindictmentoftheEgyptiannegotiatingpattern.33GiventhatSadatwas ata loss as towhatstep to take afterhis visitto Jerusalem,he "put himselfcompletelyintoAmericanhands,"willing"totakeCarterswordthata givenstepwas neces-sary"and unable, unlike the U.S. president,"to separate business fromfriendship."34The resultwas a diplomaticframeworkthatincludednotonlytraditionalnegotiation,mediation,conciliation,and arbitration,butalso thepresumablymoreadvanced methodsofconflictresolutionthatemphasizednotthecontentofthenegotiatingpositionsbuttheprocessofinteraction-confidencebuilding,educationformutualunderstanding,and thepursuitofsuperordinategoals,includingeconomicincentives.35The two overlappingapproachescompromisedcore issues,leadingSadatto sacrificeArabstrate-gicentitlementsinfavorofshort-termEgyptianterritorialand financialgains.The tragedyis thatthePAseemstobe followingthesame patternofcon-cessions, but withoutthe assets and leverage thatEgyptpossessed. ForEgypt,as themostpowerfulArabcountry,could offerthe Israeliside thestrategicconcession of droppingout oftheconflictequation and in returncouldbe rewardedwithterritorialgains(even ifatthecostofa loss ofsover-eigntyand self-respectand diminishedregionalstatus).The CampDavid ac-cords,in otherwords,constitutedthehighpointofthepeace strategythatcould onlybe followedbythereversalofopposites:themorepeace is pur-sued, the fewerthe returns,untila pointis reached where thereare onlynegativeresults,whichiswhatwe arewitnessingtoday.Thisessentiallycon-stitutesthedynamicsofthepeace dialectics.Giventhecurrentsituation,theArabnegotiatorshavethreemainoptions.First,theycan accept whateveris being "offered"or imposed,seekingthebest conditionsunder the circumstances.Second, theycan stallfortime,hopingfora change in circumstancethatwillpermitreversionto theland-for-peaceformula.Finally,theycan transformthenegotiatingrulesbyintro-ducingtheirown formulaand redefiningtheconflictintermsofitsbroaderreligiousandstrategichorizons,whileworkingactivelytowardtheconstruc-tionofnew regionaland systemicalliances.In theshortrun,itis the firstoptionthatappears themostlikelyto beadopted. Mubaraksremarkto Netanyahuthatwar is "an old (fashioned)matter... and willnotsolve anycause"36boils down to a peace-for-peaceformula.EvenwhentheArabLeague raisedthethreatofeconomicboycottfollowingIsraels decision to build a new colony on JabalAbu Ghunaym(HarHoma) inoccupied EastJerusalem,itwas as a "recommendation"ratherthana commitment.BothEgyptandJordandeclinedassociatedcallsfortheArabsto freezetheirnormalizationof relationswithIsrael on thegroundsthattheyweretiedtopeace agreementsthatpreventedthemfromdoingso.Whatevertheiractualpolicies,theArabstatescontinueto callfora returnto land forpeace. This formulainvolvesconditionality,forimplicitin theland-for-peaceconfigurationis a presumedveto:ifno landis returned,therewillbe no peace. Butto whatextentcan theArabscrediblycall forobser-
  10. 10. 14 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIESvance oftheformula?TheJune1996ArabsummitinCairoannouncedpeaceas a "strategicchoice." Such a declarationde factorendersland a residualcomponent.Ifneitherwar nor economic and diplomaticsanctionsare op-tions,thentheMadridformula(withitsinherentvetoorconditionality)is inessence dissolved.The summitthuseffectivelyreducedtheformulatopeaceforpeace, inlinewithMubaraksremark.Butnationsthatattempttopresentthemselvesas unfailinglypeacefulcan hope to obtainlittleby way ofsua-sion fromany forcestheymay have.37Nor can the veto capabilitycomefromIslamistbombings:sporadicviolenceisnotthesamethingas warcapa-bilityand can be dealtwithatthelocal securitylevelratherthanwithinthebroadercontextofthe"peace process."In sum,lackingcontrolovertheirconcessionalbehavior,theArabdeci-sion makershave contributedto theeliminationofthesecond optionalto-gethereven whilecontinuingto demanditsimplementation.Thisbeingthecase, theycan onlyact withinthe confinesof an American-Israelisecurityframework,tiltingthe balances heavilyin favorof the firstoption.Netan-yahusintransigenceand disregardforthesignedagreementsdo notmerelyreflecthiscommitmenttohiselectoralpromises,hiscommonsense negotia-tioncalculations,and his firmgraspoftheevolvingsituation;theyare alsoconsistentwithIsraelistrategyand beliefs,albeitwithoutLaborsfinesseandfig-leafoffers.And iftheArabnegotiatorsthemselvesare willingto under-minetheirentitlements,thenitishardlysurprisingthattheiropponenton hisown does notrevertto theless favorablelinkageofland forpeace.THE THIRD OPTIONIn whatamountsto a viciouscircle,capitulationismonlyfuelsbitterness,resentment,and, ultimately,the mobilizationof the forcesof indigenousresistance.Thiscan be expected,even ifinthelong run,to bringforthop-tionthree.The Palestiniancore oftheArab-Israeliconflictobscuredtheunderlyingreligiousand strategicfoundationsofconflictingwills.As long as thefocuswas on thepresumedconfrontationbetweentwo nationalisms,JewishandPalestinian,overthesame piece ofland,thesemoreinherentcontradictionsremainedin thebackground.Butwiththegradualcollapse ofnationalisticjustificationsand withtheissue ofJerusalemcomingto thefore,theArab-Israeli conflictis being reduced to its religiostrategicunderpinnings-alinkage emergingfromthe factthat"a nations interestderivesfromitsidentity."38SinceJerusalemis a religiouscause, theclash overitcannotbe secular-ized-that is,itcannotbecome a solelypoliticalissue.To theextentthatreli-gionis entitlementcategorical,thecitycannotbe theobjectofcompromise.Thisbeing thecase, "peace" outcomesand legalitieswill remainmarginal,applicable in thedomainofpoliticsas long as thecoerciveframeworkthatproducedthemcontinuesin place. In therealmofreligion,however,such
  11. 11. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 15constraintsmaynotfunctionas a long-termviable deterrentand indeed aremorelikelytopromoteconflictinsofaras theyfrustratethepursuitofentitle-ments,identity,and basic values.39In theArab/Islamicworld,Islamistgroupsaredrivenmainlybythejusticemotive,whichis value-oriented(entitlement-benefits),whileactorscommit-tedtothe"peace process"tendtobe moreutility-ori-ented (cost-benefits).This poses an acute problemfor the application of Westernconflictresolutionmechanisms in an Islamic context.First,militantIslamistgroupsand Muslimsingeneralcontinue,as amatterof faithand values, to rejectthe enemyirre-spectiveofwhattakesplace atthepoliticallevel.Sec-ond,thecontendingpartiestotheconflictdo notseeanythingin commonwithone another,nor is theredesireto coexist.40Third,while thePalestinianissue is being transformedthroughthepeace strategy,itis also being countertransformedintoa corereligiousprinciple-a substantivechangethatcould foreshadowa futureIs-lamic-Jewishconflict.Whatevertheoutcomeofthe "peace process"in thepoliticaldomain,itis unlikelyto resolvethebroaderconfrontationthatisnow slowlybutominouslytakingshape.Externalmechanismsseekingartificiallytoconstructcommongoals orin-terestsbetween theadversariesdo notapply in thecase ofJerusalemandwould be seen as yetanotherattemptto impose alienstructures.Thisis es-peciallytruewhen conventionalWesternconflictresolutionprinciplesholdthat"peacemaking"isnotpossibleuntilconflictshave "ripened,"thatis,untilcostshave escalatedto thepointwherepartiesarepreparedto settle.41Warmaybe condemned,but"sanctions,punitiveexpeditions,pacifications,pro-tectionof treaties,internationalpolice, and measuresto assure peace re-main."42The harvestin the Arab/Islamicworld is there to see: Egyptprostrateand ineffectual;Syriaisolatedand pressured;Jordan,an American-Israelivassal; Palestinianscantonized;Iraq destroyed;Libyaand Sudan em-bargoed;theArabianpeninsulavirtuallyoccupied; Algeriain the gripof abloodbath;Iranand militantIslamistgroupstobe containedorcrushed.Ontheotherside is a robustJewishstatewitha nuclearcapabilityand militarilyfarmorepowerfulthanall itspotentialadversariescombined.Ithas been saidthatthesecond GulfWarwas an issue-transformingeventthatcaused theArabsto recognize"notonlythattheycould notfightIsraelbutthatmanyofthemhad no interestindoingso."43WhilethemajorityoftheArabpeople-as distinctfromtheirlargelydelegitimizedrulers-maynotsharethisconclusion,itis one thatperception-alteringmechanismsseek toinduce.44Withinsuch a reconstructionoftheregionalorder,SamuelHunt-ingtons"clashofcivilizations"argumentcan be perceivednotsimplyas anintellectualexerciseto be supportedor refutedattheanalyticallevel,butasthetheoreticalcover fora policyin the actualprocess of implementation.Thispolicyattemptsto createtheripeenvironmentalconditionsforthees-Islamist groups are drivenmainly by thejusticemotive,which is value-oriented,while actorscommittedto the peaceprocess" tend to be moreutility-oriented.
  12. 12. 16 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIEStablishmentof"peace" whilereconstructingtheMuslimworldand crushinggrass-rootsIslamistgroups.However,to the extentthatIslam is an activevalue thatdeterminesthesubjective(and wherepossible theobjective)na-tureoftheconflict,itconstitutesan organizationalcountermechanismthatwill continueto block the alterationof the conflictstructure.In ArabandMuslimeyes,and despiteAmerican-Israelieffortsto convincethemother-wise, thisconflictis a zero-sumgame,forifAmerican-Israeli"peace" is toconstitutetheregionsnew interest,thiswill requirethetransformationoftheregionsidentity.The factthatIslam ontologicallyis entitlement-driven(focusingon con-tent)whilethe"peace process"epistemologicallyis cost-articulated(focus-ing on process) sets them on incommensurableplanes of interaction.Harmonizingthoughtsystems,however,requiresthattheybe positionedwithinthesame logical framework.45To harmonizethe "thoughtlogic" ofthe Arab/Muslimworld with that of the "peace" strategyrequires thatcounterthoughtsbe peripheralizedand ifnecessarycrushed.Whatisatstakeconsequentlyis no longerthe politico-nationalproblemof usurpationoflandbutrathertheveryextractionofa nationsreligio-nationaland historicalheritage.An Arab negotiatorwhose thoughtis reconstructedwithintheframeworkof his adversarysis essentiallyreduced to a supplicantratherthana counterpart.His willand perceptionsofrealitycontinueto be man-aged and alteredby the opponent,withany settlementlikelyto hingeoncontingentpowerrelations.Hereinliestheessence oftheso-called"civiliza-tionalclash"and itscamouflagedlinkto the"peace process."In focusingon the new Islamic enemy,the UnitedStateshas targetedwhatitcalls "terrorist"groups,aiming,withthe collaborationof clientre-gimesand withvaryingdegrees of success, to neutralizeand marginalizethem.AnyIslamistoppositionalgroup is thusdepicted as a "disturberofpeace . . . [and]designatedto be an outlawofhumanity."46Whileitmaybefeasibleto crushsuchgroupsthroughtheoverwhelmingpower ofthestateand/orexternalassistance,thisdoes not solve theproblemas long as theenvironmentalconditionsleadingto theiremergenceremainin place andregenerate.Nordoes theirsuppressionnecessarilylead to thecontainmentofIslamicdynamism,sincethevitalityofIslamis notconstrainedby,or de-pendentupon, theirexistence.Finally,even thoughmanyofthosegroupscould be (or have been) marginalized,theyneverthelesshave succeeded inscoringa majorstrategicvictoiyby mainstreamingIslam in public lifeandsocietyat large.Islamicsymbolspenetratethesocietyand thepoliticaldis-courseoftheMuslimworldmorethanever,and,ina dialecticalfashion,theretreatofpoliticalIslamhas been accomplishedbytheadvancementofIs-lam as a social condition.47Neutralizingthesesubtleundercurrentswouldrequirenotonlycrushingthemilitants,butin effectsnuffingout thevaluesystemon whichtheirmotivationsare based. In otherwords,the systemwould have to be attackedin itsbasic values and not merelyitspoliticalagenda.
  13. 13. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POUTICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 17CONCLUSIONDefiningIslamas thenew enemyafterthecollapse ofcommunismconsti-tutes a strategicdecision foreshadowingthe American-Israeliproject ofredrawingthepoliticalmap oftheArabworld.The expectationamongmanyMuslimsthatthisprojectwilltargetnotonlymarginalizedIslamistgroupsorMuslimregimesbut,morebroadly,mainstreamIslamhas slowlyintroduceda subtlemessianicstreakintotheirconflictperceptionsand contributedtoraisingforebodingsofupcomingapocalypticevents.As theseinterest-identityadverselinkagesbecome increasinglytranspar-ent,and as contiguousArabcountries,especiallyEgypt,graduallyrecognizeonce morethatIsraelis nota threatonlytothePalestinians,theconflictwillcontinueto changein proportionto theintensityofthosefeelings.ThatIs-lamis beingpoliticizedis not,therefore,simplya matterofa religiousdoc-trinethatdoes notallow fortheseparationofreligionand politics,butmorefundamentallya matterofjusticeand strategicconsiderationsas well. In itscalltoarms,Islamisnotaboutviolenceand extremism;rather,itis aboutthelegitimateand unequivocalrighttoself-defense.Threatstosecurity,identity,and religiousvalues cannotbe containedbysuppressionor bymeresettle-mentarrangements.By the same token,the "peace" being offeredis notaboutnegotiationsand cooperationbutaboutthedestructionofvalues.The"peace process"is sayingthatmotivesattheverycore ofhumanneeds willhave to be neutralized.Westernconflictresolutionmechanismsdo not seem well-equipped tocope withtheseunique characteristicsofpresentand futureArab-Israelian-tagonisms.Availabletheoreticalconstructshave externalizedreligiousbe-liefs as determiningcomponents,reducingthem to culturallyalterablevariables.Religiousconvictions,however,and especiallyMuslimviews oftheJewish/Zionistadversary,remainfixedconflictparameters.Conflictthe-orysreactionhas been to rejectsuch factorsas a sourceofcognitivedisso-nanceand todismissreligionas a matterofunwelcomecomplexitythatfallslargelyoutsideitsken.Meanwhile,theseconflicttheorieshave failedto ad-dresscrucialquestionsas to whether"theweak have the rightto make adifferentsetofrulesforthemselves."48Moreimportantly,theyhave failedtocope withtheIsraeli-Palestinianshowdown as one facetof a multidimen-sionalconflictinwhichreligionis a parameter,nota variable.The fearthattheArab/Muslimworldwillgo Islamist"reflectsthefearthatWesternsettle-mentmechanismsdo not and cannotmeetthebasic humanneeds of theregionspeople.NOTES1. JohnBurton,Con,flict:Resolutionand Prevention (London: MacmillanPress Limited,1990), p. 3.2. "PresidentHosni Mubarak:The In-evitabilityof Peace (21 January1989)," inWalterLaqueur and BarryRubin,eds.,The Israeli-ArabReader, 5thed. (NewYork: Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 546-47.3. Edward N. Luttwak,Strategy(Cam-bridge:Belknap Press of HarvardUniver-sityPress, 1987), p. 241.
  14. 14. 18 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES4. Howard Raiffa,TheArtand ScienceofNegotiation (Cambridge: HarvardUni-versityPress, 1982), p. 215.5. Raimo Vayrynen,ed., New Direc-tions in ConflictTheory(London: SagePublications,1991), pp. 4-5.6. Norman G. Finkelstein,Image andRealityof theIsraeli-Palestinian Conflict(New York: Verso, 1995), p. 237.7. Michael Field,Inside theArabWorld(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniver-sityPress, 1994), p. 384.8. YehoshafatHarkabi,Arab Strategiesand Israels Response (New York: TheFree Press,1977), p. 103.9. Interview,Newsweek, 23 June 1997,p. 39.10. MelvinJ.Lerner,"The JusticeMo-tivein Human Relations,"in MelvinJ.Ler-ner and SallyC. Lerner,eds., TheJusticeMotive in Social Behavior: Adapting toTimes ofScarcityand Change (NewYork: Plenum Press, 1981), pp. 12-13.11. David A. Welch,Justiceand theGenesis of War (Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993), p. 20.12. JohnW. Burton,Global Conflict(London: WheatsheafBooks Ltd.,1984), p.13.13. Michael Handel, Weak States intheInternational System(London: FrankCass, 1981), p. 93.14. Ibid.15. Welch,Justiceand the Genesis ofWar, pp. 20-21.16. Ibid.,p. 20.17. Harkabi,Arab Strategies,p. 88.18. In Reportofa Study Group Con-vened by theAmerican Academy ofArtsand Sciences, itwas proposed that"re-gional waterplans would be an importantcomponent of the bilateraland multilat-eral accords. The opportunityto increaseaccess to waterwould serve as one of theinducementsforIsrael to negotiatesecur-ityaccords withitsneighbors.Projectstobe given highprioritywould include theUnityDam on theYarmouk Riverinvolv-ingJordan,Syriaand Israel,pipelines forwaterfromthe LitaniRiverin Lebanonand fromTurkeyor Egypt,and a jointJordan-Israeldesalinizationplantin Eilat/Aqaba." The reportis in Ann M. Lesch,Transitionto Palestinian Self-Govern-ment (Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress, 1992), p. 158. Note the pafternofconcessions requiredof the Arabs in or-der forIsrael to accept negotiatingsecur-ityaccords withthem,Israelisecuritybeing paramount.Even beforethe adventof Netanyahu,"securityforpeace" ratherthan"land forpeace" was essentiallywhat was being demanded.19. Howard Goller, WashingtonPost,12 August1997.20. SamarAssad, Los Angeles Times,12 August1997.21. BarrySchweid, WashingtonPost,10 September1997.22. HenryKissinger,Diplomacy (NewYork: Simon and Schuster,1994), pp. 467and 488.23. See furtherGlenn E. Robinson,"The GrowingAuthoritarianismof theArafatRegime,"Survival 39, no. 2 (Sum-mer 1997), 54.24. Ibid., 45.25. ChesterL. Karrass,The NegotiatingGame (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,1970), pp. 17-19.26. OtomarJ.Bartos,"SimpleModelof Negotiation"in I. WilliamZartman,ed.,The Negotiation Process (London: SagePublications,1978), p. 22.27. Kayhan al-Arabi, 17 March 1998,p. 11.28. I. WilliamZartman,"Negotiationasa JointDecision-MakingProcess," inZartman,ed., The Negotiation Process,pp.76-77.29. Accordingto Benjamin Netanyahu,YitzhakRabin,the assassinated Laborpartyleader and formerprimeminister,"was vely clear thattherewere no limita-tionswhatsoeveron Israeli constructioninJerusalem.Rabin was the one who au-thorizedthe buildingof Har Homa (JabalGhoneim settlement),"Interview,News-week, 23 June 1997, p. 39.30. Commentingon the result,andperhaps justifyingNetanyahuspositionand his own call forredesigningthe Osloagreements,Kissingerstatedthatanyanalogy to the earlystages of the peaceprocess was illusory.As he put it "intheearliernegotiation,step-by-stepprogressrelieved tensionsand builtconfidence.On theWest Bank, the opposite was thecase. Both sides had jumped intothepeace process withouthaving clarifiedworkable objectives and expected towrestthatclarityfromthe process itself.Instead,ithas compounded theirperplex-ities.This was no accident.Clearly,Arafatwas led to believe by Israeli,Americanand European interlocutorsthatthe final
  15. 15. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 19destinationwas at least the 67 bordersand recognitionof a Palestinianstate-hood. But thatignoredthevast differencein the negotiationsbetween Israel and thePLO compared withthose between Israeland the neighboringArab states." HentyKissinger,"The Oslo Piecemeal Process,"WashingtonPost, 24 August1997.31. As quoted by Noam Chomsky,"EasternExposure: MisrepresentingthePeace Process," Village Voice, 6 February1996,p. 6.32. Carl Schmitt,The Concept of thePolitical, trans. George Schwab (NewBrunswick:RutgersUniversityPress,1976),p. 49.33. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,Tariq Misrila al-Quds [Egyptsroad to Jerusalem],(Cairo: Al-AhramCenterforTranslationand Publication,1997), p. 137. Authorstranslation.34. RaymondCohen, NegotiatingAcrossCultures(Washington,D.C.: UnitedStatesInstituteof Peace Press, 1995), pp.55-56. On the Egyptian-U.S.relationship,Cohen writes(p. 56) thatrarely"can a pa-tron-clientrelationshiphave achievedsuch pronounced expression."35. Luc Reychler,"The Artof ConflictPrevention:Theoryand Practice,"in Wer-ner Bauwens and Luc Reychler,ed., TheArtofConfflictPrevention (London:Brasseys,1994), pp. 5-7. See also RogerFisherand WilliamUry,Gettingto Yes(New York: Penguin Books, 1983), as arepresentativeof the HarvardNegotia-tionsProject.36. InterviewwithHusni Mubarak.Al-Hawadeth, 21-27 February1997, p. 21.37. Luttwak,Strategy,p. 194.38. Samuel P. Huntington,"The Ero-sion ofAmericanNational Interests,"For-eign Affairs5,no. 75 (Sept.-Oct. 1997), p.1.39. Burton,Global Conflict,pp.137-38.40. Mohammed Abu-Nimer,"ConflictResolutionin an Islamic Context,"Peaceand Change 21, no. 1 (January1996), pp.33-34.41. Burton,Conflict.Resolution andPrevention,p. 88.42. Schmitt,The Concept of thePolit-ical, p. 79.43. Field,Inside theArab World,p.385. Emphasis added.44. Commentingon several polls intheArabworld relatedto thismatter,Ed-ward Said observed: "In evetyinstancepublic opinion has in factexpressed noenthusiasmfornormalizationwithIsrael.On mass level thissuggeststhatthe senseof defeatis not quite as widespread andprostrateas officialpolicy and the logicof capitulationistintellectualswould haveus believe." See his Peace and itsDiscon-tents(New York: VintageBooks, 1995), p.134.45. Burton,Conflict.Resolution andPrevention,p. 89.46. Schmitt,The Concept of thePolit-ical, p. 79.47. OlivierRoy, The Failure ofPolit-ical Islam, trans.Carol Volk (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1994), p. 78.48. George Orwell,A CollectionofEs-says (New York: Harcourt,1981), p. 40.

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