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Internet governance models put to a test   alejandro pisanty baruch, pablo hinojosa (2009)
 

Internet governance models put to a test alejandro pisanty baruch, pablo hinojosa (2009)

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On the topic of Internet Governance, there are not yet finalized agreements or stable solutions in the international arena. Less...

On the topic of Internet Governance, there are not yet finalized agreements or stable solutions in the international arena. Less
so there is a cumulus of enough research tools to produce objective evaluations on this matter. There are different fronts --on
the inter-governmental arena, at the private sector, within civil society groups, inside technical communities and, most
importantly, inside new multi-stakeholder organizations-- where discussions take place about how to solve different problems
--usually coordination problems-- related to the operation and evolution of the Internet. Authors of this document have been
active participants at the international discussions about Internet governance, in different fora that include ICANN, WSIS,
IGF, OECD, APEC and others. From their empirical experience they propose five questions and discuss preliminary answers,
as food for thought for further academic research.

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    Internet governance models put to a test   alejandro pisanty baruch, pablo hinojosa (2009) Internet governance models put to a test alejandro pisanty baruch, pablo hinojosa (2009) Document Transcript

    • Pisanty and Hinojosa Internet Governance Models Put to a Test INTERNET GOVERNANCE MODELS PUT TO A TEST Alejandro Pisanty Baruch Pablo Hinojosa* Facultad de Química, UNAM ICANNSociedad Internet de México, A.C. (ISOC Mexico) Manager, Regional Relations apisan@servidor.unam.mx pablo.hinojosa@icann.orgABSTRACTOn the topic of Internet Governance, there are not yet finalized agreements or stable solutions in the international arena. Lessso there is a cumulus of enough research tools to produce objective evaluations on this matter. There are different fronts --onthe inter-governmental arena, at the private sector, within civil society groups, inside technical communities and, mostimportantly, inside new multi-stakeholder organizations-- where discussions take place about how to solve different problems--usually coordination problems-- related to the operation and evolution of the Internet. Authors of this document have beenactive participants at the international discussions about Internet governance, in different fora that include ICANN, WSIS,IGF, OECD, APEC and others. From their empirical experience they propose five questions and discuss preliminary answers,as food for thought for further academic research.KeywordsInternet Governance, ICANN Model, DNS, Internet Addressing, Empirical StudyACRONYMS APWG Anti-Phishing Working Group http://www.antiphishing.org/ DNS Domain Name System http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned http://www.icann.org/ Names and Numbers IETF Internet Engineering Task Force http://www.ietf.org/ IGF Internet Governance Forum http://www.intgovforum.org/ IP Internet Protocol http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Protocol ISOC Internet Society http://www.isoc.org/ RIR Regional Internet Registry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Internet_registry UN United Nations http://www.un.int/ WGIG Working Group on Internet http://www.wgig.org/ Governance WSIS World Summit on the Information http://www.intgovforum.org/ SocietyINTRODUCTIONSince 1997, Brian Kahin and James Keller presented in their book “Coordinating the Internet” one of the first attempts toanswer the questions: “How shall the Internet be governed?” and “if the Internet were an organization, how would wedescribe its management?” This book brought some structure to different ongoing discussions that needed solutions.1 One of* The views expressed by Pablo Hinojosa are in his individual capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICANN as anorganization.1 Brian Kahin and James H. Keller (Eds.) (1997) Coordinating the Internet, The MIT Press, Cambridge.Proceedings of the 3rd ACORN-REDECOM Conference Mexico City Sep 4-5th 2009 257
    • Pisanty and Hinojosa Internet Governance Models Put to a Testthe most pressing at that time was the need to solve the puzzle of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS), and someproposals about its governance models were proposed in a short chapter by Don Mitchell, Scott Bradner, and KC Claffyentitled: “In whose Domain?: Name Service in Adolescence”.2The path towards establishing governance organizations suitable to the nature of the Internet has proven to be a greatchallenge and has not been sheltered from tense discussions. The academic legacy in the decade after Kahin and Keller hasbeen modest and most of the discussions have taken place on a hands-on basis with representatives from different interestgroups that became actual stakeholders of these organizations. Successively the IETF, the RIRs, ICANN and organizations ofmore recent origin like the APWG have been designed to solve coordination problems related to Internet: fromstandardization of technology, allocation of numerical IP addresses, coordination of the domain-name space and other uniqueInternet identifiers, and the struggle against the practice of phishing, respectively. Each organization has inherited the lessonslearned by its predecessors.The governance models featured in most of these organizations, are based on an approach that is problem-oriented, bottom-up, decentralized, and based on the need to preserve and expand the conditions for an inclusive growth of the Internet for allon a basis of interoperability and openness.3 On the opposite extreme there are more traditional views, hardly compatiblewith Internet, that confront those models and support formal agreements or treaties between established sovereign entitiesand where the concept of legitimacy emanates through delegation of authority, mostly governmental.This work is an exercise intended to map the current state of the art in international discussions around the topic of Internetgovernance with the purpose of instigating further academic research and objective evaluation of the institutional models thathave emerged in this arena. In this paper, authors answer five questions on the topic of Internet Governance. Their answersare parsimonious and incomplete. Their succinct and incomplete arguments are intended as reflections from the empiricalfront, to nourish ideas for further academic research. New conceptual frameworks, theories, metrics and parameters forevaluation may be required in order to better understand important discussions, filled with political drama and also technicalchallenges.1. WHAT IS AN INTERNET GOVERNANCE MODEL?The current working definition of Internet Governance was crafted during the discussions at the World Summit on theInformation Society (WSIS), a United Nations summit that took place in two phases, in Geneva in 2003 and in Tunis in 2005.The WSIS summit was unusual for the UN in the sense that civil society groups and private sector representatives were ableto have a strong role in a typically intergovernmental event. During the first phase of WSIS in 2003 there was a risingcontroversy around the topic of who controls Internet and, more specifically, on what is the appropriate role of governmentson the network. WSIS was, in many ways, a point of entry for many governments, particularly those from the developingworld, to start understanding Internet, its virtues and its social consequences. The first Summit in Geneva concluded with anagreement to create a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) and charging it with developing a working definitionof Internet governance and identifying the public policy issues around this topic. WGIG defined Internet Governance in abroad sense, including a broad spectrum of problem realms which includes spam, cyber-security, phishing, the managementof intellectual property, expansion of infrastructure, and many others. Most of the debates focused on questioning a modelthat had already long been in place since 1998, the model for administering the addressing resources of the net by a privatenon-for-profit organization based in the US called ICANN.The WGIG definition of Internet Governance is: Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.42 Don Mitchell, Scott Bradner, and K Claffy (1997) In whose Domain?: Name Service in Adolescence, in Brian Kahin andJames H. Keller (Eds.) Coordinating the Internet, The MIT Press, 258-273.3 The Internet organizational ecosystem has been described graphically by ISOC inhttp://www.isoc.org/pubpolpillar/docs/internetmodel.pdf and the “Internet model” is described briefly inhttp://www.isoc.org/isoc/headlines/20090312.shtml and in more detail by Graham inhttp://www.isoc.org/pubpolpillar/issues/itc_20081211.shtml.4 Working Group on Internet Governance: http://www.wgig.org/Proceedings of the 3rd ACORN-REDECOM Conference Mexico City Sep 4-5th 2009 258
    • Pisanty and Hinojosa Internet Governance Models Put to a TestBased on this definition, we propose, for the purposes of this paper, an Internet Governance model to be the organizationalincarnation of this governance system, preserving the WSIS set of principles agreed in Geneva in 2003.5 This model includes:object, membership (criteria for effective multi-stakeholder participation), organizational structure, written and unwrittenrules of procedure, electoral or other authorities-selection system, schemes for checks and balances, decision-makingprocesses, policy development processes, mechanisms for redress and appeal of decisions, rules for accountability andtransparency, and means for enforcement and compliance.1.1.- SIDE NOTES ON CONTROVERSIES AND THE CURRENT MODELS IN PLACEICANN was the only “Internet Governance” model in place at the time of the WSIS and was placed under meticulousscrutiny during the debates. It attracted the attention of the Summit participants and also many of the members of WGIG,mainly because ICANN has a historical relationship with the government of the United States. Many delegations made thismodel a focal point to advance bilateral agendas (relationship with the US government) in the context of a multilateral forumthat had no mandate to make binding decisions.The results of the WGIG were difficult and consensus was fragile among its members. The conclusions of the group werepoured into the preparatory process of the second phase of WSIS and the processing of the WGIG conclusions generated atense and complicated negotiation process. The definition of the concept of Internet Governance (broad in scope, as opposedto concentrated on the functions ICANN performs) was generally accepted. But there was no agreement in the discussion ofdifferent alternatives that suggested stronger multi-government oversight for the DNS coordination function. The secondphase of WSIS achieved a compromised solution and allowed for the continuation of the debate in the shape of the newlycreated “Internet Governance Forum” with a mandate of 5 years to discuss the broad agenda of Internet Governance, withemphasis in those problematic areas where there was no previous experience or a model in place.Despite the accumulated experience, the field of Internet Governance is still at an early moment in time where much is still tobe defined. While the concept of Internet Governance is very much operative and accepted, its organizational materializationis still to be put to a test. The only models in place with some history and experience are around the technical areas ofstandardization of protocols and coordination of Internet unique addresses. This comprises a very narrow mission that it byfar does not exhaust the concept of Internet Governance. Many lessons are to be learned but there is a wide space in theinternational field where Internet Governance models can, and will, be put to a test.2.- WHAT ARE THE PARAMETERS THAT MAKE AN INTERNET GOVERNANCE MODEL EFFICIENT?There is not yet academic work, comparative analysis or grounds for objective evaluation to judge the validity or value of anInternet governance model: is efficiency a criterion for consideration? In modern societies efficiency seems to be a primaryobjective, particularly when considering the relationship between the State, the market and civil society. We propose“efficiency” rather than “effectiveness” as a parameter to evaluate Internet governance models. Being effective meansproducing powerful outcomes. Efficiency is a metric that deals with how those results were achieved with little waste ofefforts. Most of the work and debates around Internet Governance are still procedural and most of the problems refer tocoordination mechanisms rather than final decision-making: How the views and interests of different stakeholders can build“rough consensus and running code”6. This is why we suggest a parameter that focuses on the process rather than theoutcome. At this point the differences between different organizations and organizational models are large and refer mostly todifferences in how their results are achieved, therefore the unit of result per unit of input effort is relevant.The WSIS process, in particular the outcomes of the WGIG, institutionalized and internationalized some basic principles (theWSIS principles) with normative grounds that should shape any Internet Governance model. These principles defendmultistakeholder, democratic and transparent structures as the most appropriate for Internet policy decision-making.However, participatory and multistakeholder structures are not easily compatible with notions of efficiency. Efficiency isusually related with centralized, top-down decisional structures.There is abundant literature in the academic realm that explains notions of efficiency in democratic structures. Academicendeavors are needed to develop metrics of efficiency to be applied to the more sophisticated realm of Internet governancemodels. In the world of the Internet, where notions of national sovereignty are diluted or at least challenged and where the5 See: Geneva Declaration of Principles, First Phase of the WSIS (10-12 December 2003, Geneva):http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|06 IETF is interested in “practical, working systems that can be quickly implemented”.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rough_consensusProceedings of the 3rd ACORN-REDECOM Conference Mexico City Sep 4-5th 2009 259
    • Pisanty and Hinojosa Internet Governance Models Put to a Testcapacity of coercive enforcement by States is reduced, the ability to achieve a proposed result in an efficient manner seems tobe a great challenge.The IETF, RIRs (Regional Internet Registries, in charge of IP address allocation to ISPs and other aggregators and users),ICANN, and a few others (ISOC, the IETF, the W3C), have made very open and accountable statements of the fulfillmenttheir missions, In contrast with other organizations, i.e. intergovernmental or for-profit corporations, the Internet ones alloweasy evaluations as their information is abundant and public. But these are still notions of effectiveness rather than efficiency:for example, in the case of ICANN, it has been said that it has effectively lowered the price of domain-name registrationglobally, introduced a dispute-resolution mechanism for conflicts between trademarks and domain names that is widelyadopted even among ccTLDs, introduced competition in the domain-name market, introduced measures to increase thestability and security of the DNS, advanced in the introduction of internationalized domain names (domain names beyond theLDH character set, known as IDNs), introduced new TLDs in two rounds already, brought in a continuously increasing set ofparticipants in all stakeholder groups, etc.However, much more work has to be done to evaluate if all these processes have been efficient in terms of transaction costs,time to develop policy, level of participation and representation, level of use of voluntary efforts from the community, andother parameters of efficiency that still need to be developed. Processes can be evaluated with objective metrics once theseare developed for the realm of Internet governance models.3.- WHAT ARE THE PARAMETERS THAT MAKE AN INTERNET GOVERNANCE MODEL LEGITIMATE?The evolution of the processes that defined the model for coordinating the Internet addressing system occurred through ameta-legal framework defined in the bylaws of the organization called ICANN. It was not in the form of legal formalism butin its own internal procedures where the institutionalization process took place. Although ICANN was incorporated as aprivate not-for-profit corporation subject to State defined laws, the active stakeholders (and not the governmentrepresentatives) were the ones that basically shaped its policy decisions and operating procedures according to their self-defined procedures. The bylaws provided mechanisms for accountability (checks and balances and also institutional devicesto avoid capture), transparency and responsiveness. With few exceptional cases where legal battles challenged theinstitutional dynamics, most of the processes and operations were self-contained. As a consequence, traditional notions oflegitimacy were seriously challenged, as these historically have taken a top-down, State-centric approach where delegation ofauthority come from an established legal, even treaty-based (international) agreement. Legitimacy among those “governed”and legitimacy in front of “others” was put to a test.Only very few countries were represented in the initial shaping of the “legitimacy” of the first Internet institutions --however,the majority of the world Internet users at that time were concentrated in those countries. Moreover, the governance modelsthat decided on policies through a bottom-up consensus building processes clearly responded to Western democratic valuesand fitted into the notion of liberal economics where privatization is favored and competitive markets encouraged. Indeed,Internet was invented and had its initial growth within this socioeconomic setting: the technical community that developedthe technology and standardized it into well-known protocols, along with the very few governments that were involved in itsadvancement (particularly the US government) and, evidently, the private sector that was increasingly responsible foroperating the networks, all agreed on an alternative model where “legitimacy” flows bottom-up. Many governments agreedthat their role in this model would be as advisors and not as decision-makers.The WSIS process, initiated by State actors, challenged the notion of self-contained corporate governance and tried to replaceit with formal regulatory frameworks - unsuccessfully. As many governmental delegations were new to this level of analysisand handling of the Internet and as this Summit accepted participation from civil society and the private sector, discussionsturned very complex. There were strong informational asymmetries and most of the participants had no previous experiencein participating and shaping models for Internet Governance. In spite of these complications, the Summit did not break downand ended with some agreements, giving the multistakeholder, democratic and transparent model the benefit of the doubt.Also, the Summit defined the scope of Internet Governance as much broader than the technical coordination of Internetaddresses, as the realm of Internet Governance.WSIS was the first effort that expanded the representation of the developing world in Internet matters. And most of thecritical questions reflected in the debates about Internet governance had to do with legitimacy: how international the WSISprinciples can be and why an inter-governmental organization based in an international treaty was not an automatic answer.Simultaneously, agreements were achieved on the definition of a broad agenda for Internet Governance, not limited to thetechnical coordination of Internet addresses.Proceedings of the 3rd ACORN-REDECOM Conference Mexico City Sep 4-5th 2009 260
    • Pisanty and Hinojosa Internet Governance Models Put to a TestMuch work remains to be done to define parameters of what makes an Internet Governance models legitimate and theyclearly need to factor in meta-legal questions such as internal procedures (bylaws), representation of all stakeholders andopen participation. It is about applying corporate governance to Internet problems, and at the same time, making the solutioncompliant with WSIS principles. The example of the model used for the technical coordination of Internet addresses bringssome experience but there is much more work to do.4.- HAVE ALL STAKEHOLDERS BEEN PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AND REPRESENTED IN CURRENT INTERNETGOVERNANCE MODELS?One of the first steps considered at the time of the creation of ICANN was identifying key stakeholders and how theirinterests could be aggregated to define, through a bottom-up process, policies for the evolution of the Internet addressingsystem. These policies were aimed to serve the public interest (and sometimes had some impact in areas where public policyhad been defined). The space was open for broad participation, but there were some natural economic limitations for thoserepresenting interests different from the ones that could potentially generate a tangible profit from the system.The WSIS process amplified the scope of the concept of Internet governance and, being a forum organized by the UN,increased the number of stakeholders, also including representation from the developing world that was just starting to seethe benefits of Internet. Some of the newly involved actors also tried to participate in ICANN, through the “at-large”structures and also at the different constituencies. Most of the work of civil society groups and other non-commercial groupsis voluntary and most of the times proved to have sustainability limitations.The open, multi-stakeholder, democratic and transparent model was chosen as the ideal to discuss Internet governance issuesby the WSIS participants. The post-WSIS ICANN became more committed internationally and different mechanisms wereimplemented to support the participation of a more diverse set of players. At the same time, new spaces different from thecoordination of Internet addresses were also being created, such as the IGF, and new international discussions started ontopics such as privacy, cybersecurity, spam, phishing, access, etc. New alternative fora diluted participation in existingorganizations but also increased diversity and instigated new definitions of what a stakeholder is. This process is stillongoing.Depending on the evolution of different discussions around Internet Governance, new stakeholders may arise eithertemporarily for specific discussions or more permanently to influence long-term policy processes. As Internet becomes moreglobal and ubiquitous, it is also necessary to address the question of representation and sustainable participation. It seems thatthe principle of openness does not guarantee the solution of representation. However, it has proved problematical to draw aline between: a) those parties that have a specific interest but cannot influence the process because they don’t have sufficientmeans for participation (which indeed put into question the degree of openness of the model); from b) those parties that donot have any specific interest but just want to participate (responding to some particular agenda different from influencing thebottom-up processes). The problem has to do with the mechanisms to allocate subsidies or support without compromising theefficiency of the model.One example of this is reflected in the distinction between the “academic community” and “the technical community”. Theacademic community includes scholars of the social sciences, economics, politics, public policy, and related fields, whereasthe technical community includes engineers, computer scientists, mathematicians and many others who create and modify thetechnology, take part in its standardization, implant it both at pilot and at full scale, and deal with various other issues liketraining users, influencing private and public officials in decision-making, etc. The technical community spans far wider thanthe academic community and its contribution to Internet Governance has been key, feeding Internet Governance decisions inthe same way that Physics governs construction; and in the same way, it provides both boundaries and limits, on one hand,and opportunities for creativity in the governance layer, on the other.In a more-refined approach, evaluation of Internet Governance models will have to assess how well or not, effectively or not,the technical community is involved, and to what extent the academic community’s participation translates into an effectiveconstruction of participatory mechanisms, policy-informed networking among individual forms of decision-making, and themany other contributions this community can make, and are still largely missing.Perhaps some light can be drawn if more research is made around the strategic decisions of an interest group trying toinfluence an outcome in an open, bottom-up consensus building organization and how these decisions may contrast with thestrategic game that could be played, for example, in a membership or top-down decision-making organization. A transparentdisclosure of the interests that each stakeholder represents in an open model is essential for the efficient aggregation ofinterests in a bottom-up consensus building process. A way to illustrate this is the difference between poker and chess. Inpoker, some cards are not visible and players can deceive opponents. In chess, all the pieces are visible in the board andProceedings of the 3rd ACORN-REDECOM Conference Mexico City Sep 4-5th 2009 261
    • Pisanty and Hinojosa Internet Governance Models Put to a Testplayers know the rules on how each piece can be moved. For an Internet governance model to be efficient, it requires thatplayers or stakeholders disclose their interests early in the process --and be able to communicate them appropriately to otherstakeholders— in order to be able to influence the outcome without much loss of time, effort and risk of bad decisions.Language and cultural variables also have an impact on how effective the communication of interests between differentstakeholders occur. As organizations continue to grow internationally and also the topics of discussion become morecontroversial, the strategic game turns more complex, allowing for an array of incentives and disincentives (sometimesperverse) that may produce unpredictable outcomes compromising the efficiency of the model. Much work remains to bedone in the academic sphere to introduce some levels of predictability in the strategic games.5.- WHY HAS THE DEVELOPING WORLD TAKEN SO LONG TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE EVOLUTIONOF INTERNET GOVERNANCE MODELS?The goal of “universal access” of Internet services is still very far away in most of the developing world and will probablynot be achieved in decades. This responds to structural issues in the supply side (lack of competition in the ICT sector,incipient markets, and high investment risks); the demand side (low income and education levels) and also on the policy side(Internet is not a national priority and governments have not developed effective policies). Most governments are still stuckand paralyzed in the old telecom era, with large single-owner networks around which few large-scale equipment andinfrastructure coalesce; digesting liberalization problems (facing strong interest groups to implement competition in thetelecommunications markets) and have not yet developed a vision for the Internet. In some countries there is a severedisconnect with the most agile market, society, and academic actors who are way removed from the owned-networksparadigm.The gaps between urban/rich/connected and the rural/poor/unconnected are huge in the developing world. This is also areflection of the characteristic income/ social/educational disparities. Policies to increase access (teledensity) were based inthe traditional definition of “one fixed-line in every household”. The regulatory frameworks (see also WTO, etc.) conceivedvoice over fixed line as “basic service” and every policy around “access” had this “basic service” as departure point, thenbeing complemented with “more advanced”, usually with lower QoS, mobile services which were also integrated into thedefinition of “basic”. In most of the cases, first goal was “universal access” and not “universal service”; difference being thatthe former could include community/collective “access” through public phones and not necessarily “service” in eachindividual household. Internet was not and is still not mentioned in many of the policies for increasing access around theworld.It is observed that the countries with a more-advanced Internet economy have governmental representation led by theirCommerce or Economy authorities. As experience diminishes, one usually observes Foreign Offices, CommunicationMinistries or regulators, and science and technology councils. This series reflects, in inverse order, the diffusion of theInternet into a country and the level of decision-making at which it is attended to. In general developing countries have takenpart in these debates mostly through the latter authorities and are only now moving to have their representation substantiallymade by telecommunications authorities or regulators. There is room for progress here and many countries are quicklymoving forward.Levels of education are low and users of ICT services are usually not technically savvy in many countries, notably inparticular in the developing world. Adoption and use of technology doesn’t come naturally because most hardware andsoftware is imported and usually it takes time for users to find value in the use of these services. For them, Internet is either a“luxury” item or a very “sophisticated” service. Demand of Internet based services is more application driven rather thancontent driven. Reduction on the cost of the calls (using VoIP); chat services for communication; some basic needs ofinformation (prices, social gossip); etc. Social networks and simple services are the drivers; users are not content developers.E-Commerce and online transactions are not very common as most users don’t have a credit card, and those few that havecredit cards, don’t trust the system.Internet is a monolithic entity for most users in the world. There is no perception of its multiple layers. Users don’tunderstand what files are in their computers and what are in the cloud. They don’t understand the difference betweeninfrastructure, application and content. Most services are provided in a bundled fashion by big companies and the differencebetween access (dial-up, broadband), name registration, webhosting, application-based services, etc. is not obvious.In the developing world there are neither strong virtual communities, nor organized consumer groups and less a clearidentification of “local Internet community” or “Internet users” interests. There is no notion of “stakeholder”. Civicparticipation and fertile ground for interest groups is difficult to find in most countries, especially embryonic democracies inthe post-colonial era.Proceedings of the 3rd ACORN-REDECOM Conference Mexico City Sep 4-5th 2009 262
    • Pisanty and Hinojosa Internet Governance Models Put to a TestHowever, a positive effect of coming late into the discussion is that many developing countries realize that the debate andstruggles around central coordination of the Internet, even if embellished under the name of “Critical Internet Resources”, isof little relevance to development, and they may force a change of direction towards a more effective use of time indiscussing issues of access, knowledge, capacity building, coordination and harmonization to fight crime, and otherpromising avenues.Finally, bylaws or internal (private) agreements are not adequately acknowledged as a basis of a governance model in someparts of the world. Corporate and political structures are not that sophisticated: checks and balances, accountability,transparency, bottom-up processes, capture, even democracy... All of them are new terms that are not yet widely or equallyunderstood in many countries. There is a legal argument to reject the possibility of a legitimate organization whosegovernance model arises from its corporate bylaws.CONCLUSIONThere is not yet enough experience nor momentum to put together an Internet-Governance institution that aggregates in asingle place all topics that require international coordination. The current phase in the evolution of the models calls forcontinuing to address each problem separately when it is ready for treatment, with the proper stakeholders at the table, and acorresponding structure and procedures. In each case, as much as possible, it is essential to inherit learnt experiences fromexisting and simultaneously evolving models and also strong cross-pollination must take place.ICANN has been a testbed for a multistakeholder, private-sector led, bottom-up policy development model since 1998, evenbefore the start of the WSIS process. It is an example of a multistakeholder decision-making mechanism, with all itsattending complications of checks and balances, transparency and accountability, risk of capture by special interests,entanglement in business and politics, etc. However, ICANN’s mission is constrained to the DNS technical coordination andaccordingly does not exhaust either the Internet Governance broad agenda of topics agreed during WSIS, neither the wholearray of potential interested parties or stakeholders. It does set an example and can, by inspection of its evolution, provide alaboratory of how to advance in Internet Governance problems.Reflections around five questions that propose different approaches to put existing and prospective Internet governancemodels into a test have been offered as food for thought to instigate further research and rigorous academic work. Questionshave dealt with definitions, implementation, efficiency, legitimacy, representation and participation in existing Internetgovernance models. The perspective of the authors comes from empirical grounds as active participants in the internationaldebates on these matters, and they would like to promote academic research on many areas that remain open to explanationand rigorous objective evaluation.REFERENCES1. Pisanty, Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior num. 79-80, Gobernanza de Internet y los principios multistakeholder de la Cumbre Mundial de la Sociedad de la Información.2. Brian Kahin and James H. Keller (Eds.) (1997) Coordinating the Internet, The MIT Press, Cambridge.3. Don Mitchell, Scott Bradner, and K Claffy (1997) In whose Domain?: Name Service in Adolescence, in Brian Kahin and James H. Keller (Eds.) Coordinating the Internet, The MIT Press, 258-273.4. Geneva Declaration of Principles, First Phase of the WSIS (10-12 December 2003, Geneva): http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|05. Working Group on Internet Governance: http://www.wgig.org/6. Working Group on Internet Governance: http://www.wgig.org/Proceedings of the 3rd ACORN-REDECOM Conference Mexico City Sep 4-5th 2009 263
    • Pisanty and Hinojosa Internet Governance Models Put to a TestProceedings of the 3rd ACORN-REDECOM Conference Mexico City Sep 4-5th 2009 264