Defeat Surveillance-Strike-Complexes v1.0

  • 502 views
Uploaded on

combatreform.org/DEFEATSSCS

combatreform.org/DEFEATSSCS

  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Be the first to comment
    Be the first to like this
No Downloads

Views

Total Views
502
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0

Actions

Shares
Downloads
0
Comments
0
Likes
0

Embeds 0

No embeds

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
    No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. Beating enemy Surveillance-StrikeComplexes: destroy the system with 2D/3D ground fire & maneuver
  • 2. October 6, 1973. Egyptian ground forces storm across the Suez Canal and surprise/overwhelm the IsraeliDefense Force (IDF) “Bar-Lev” forward line of troops (FLOT) 3D Projected FLOT 2D/3D 2D 2D
  • 3. The Egyptian Armyadvanced under acomplete radar-guided,high-medium-low altitudesurface-to-air missile“umbrella”, backed up onthe ground by“hunter/killer” infantryteams with RocketPropelled Grenades(RPGs) and Sagger 1Anti-tank Guided Missiles(ATGMs) to defeat IDFtank ground maneuver: aSurveillance StrikeComplex (SSC) in a MajorTheatre of War (MTW)
  • 4. When IDF tanks rushed headlong into Egyptian Armored formations, they are destroyed by Sagger ATGMs and RPGs: the invasion continuedRPGs + ATGMs= Knocked-out IDF tanks
  • 5. "To defeat Israeli armored counter-attacks in 1973, theEgyptians employed an average of 55 infantry anti-tank weaponsevery 1,000 meters. Their anti-tank positions were mutuallysupporting and in depth, using Russian-made RPG-7 armor-defeating rockets, backed up by Sagger anti-tank guided missiles(ATGMs), and Soviet tanks and Saggers in a third echelon. Byusing the maximum stand-off ranges of all anti-tank weaponsand neutralizing the Israeli Air Force with an effective airdefense umbrella over the main battle area ( MBA), theEgyptians repulsed attack after attack of Israeli armor." -- Major Theodore Sendak, U.S. Army Military Review, September 1979 "The Airborne Anti-Armor Defense"
  • 6. The situation desperate, the IDF launches fighter-bombers to strafe and bomb the Egyptian Armored Columns now just a few miles away from the capital city of Israel....But they are shot down inhorrendous numbers.... Avi Zeira was one of thousands of Israeli Soldiers who rushed to the front in a frantic call-up of every able-bodied person in the country: "I was so angry that we were surprised," Zeira says. "I was really angry, too, that they had better weapons and we didnt know about it. I watched as they just shot our planes out of the sky, leaving us without cover."
  • 7. Then a miracle happened...the Egyptians paused.... ...giving the IDF precious time to call up its reserves and re-organize itself to defeat the enemy surveillance strike complex; their new tactics:1. Artillery suppresses enemyair defense and ATGMlocations 2. Tracked M113 Mobile infantry clears RPG/ ATGM locations 3. Tanks suppress ATGM firing signatures, dodge missiles
  • 8. 4. USAF emergency airlift begins from CONUS andUSAREUR to replace all lost equipment5. Ground maneuver regained---with Artillerysuppressing and tanks destroying enemy air defense sitesso the IDF Air Force can fly Close Air Support missions Egyptian Air Defense Artilery Site IDF Centurion IDF Air/Ground Team tank killing ADA
  • 9. IDF recon/covering forcesdiscover gap in betweenEgyptian armies; IDFground maneuver forcesunder General Sharoncross Suez Canal andencircle an entireEgyptian Army! 3D IDF Paratroops! Extended FLOT 2D IDF ArmorEgyptians sue for peace toprevent annihilation!: Israel saved
  • 10. Helicopter-borne IDF GENERAL AVRAHAM Paratroops in ADAN (TEL AVIV, extended FLOT 3D 13/5/97.TRANSLATED.) operations! www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/inter views/episode-17/adan3.html “I decided that I would put a tank brigade in ambush in the sand dunes; I would camouflage them with nets and they would be there to act against the force coming from the south. And in the morning... no, at night, that night we got Paratroopers, and they went out into battle to broaden the passageway to the bridgehead. They arrived quite late; they came from Sharm-al-Sheikh, from a very far-away front, and they200 mile 3D Air arrived in helicopters, veryAssault..at night slowly...and we built up a Paratrooper Battalion, which entered into a very difficult battle.
  • 11. THE 2D BREAKOUTOnce across, the tankers overcame local resistanceand some determined Egyptian commando attacks ontheir laagers as they reorganized. They thenquickly fanned out into the open desert, crossing thebridges over the sweet water canals. Here was goodtank country at last, resistance scanty and targetsplentiful. Their first task was to destroy the Egyptianmissile bases to clear the skies for the IAF. During theday, Adans and Sharons tankers destroyed everymissile site within a perimeter reaching some 20miles along the western bank, breaking havoc amongadministrative troops concentrated in the many armycamps in the rear zone of the Egyptian armiesnow on the east bank in Sinai. As fast as the Egyptiansthrew in reinforcements, they were destroyed by theroaming Israeli armor. Freed from the threat of thesurface-to-air missiles, the IAF blazed away atanything that moved, sowing destruction galore.
  • 12. WARNING:The 1973 war cost Israel 2,378 men, one third of her airforce (102 planes), and more than 800 tanks, ashockingly high figure for a country the size ofDelaware, with about the same number of people asAlabama. To comprehend such a loss, a comparativelyhigh casualty count on the U.S. armed forces wouldhave resulted in 140,000 dead. As in previous conflicts,no official record of the Arab losses was ever released,but again we estimate that they were higher: about19,000 dead, more than 350 fighter planes, 1,300 tanks,and 11 ships. Israel won on the battlefield, but in worldopinion it was the first three days that counted, becauseit showed that superior force structure in a well-organized system coupled with surprise were not Israeli(nor American) monopolies.
  • 13. Did Israel win? Did the Egyptian SSC work?Egypt knew that she could not defeat Israel militarily, soEgypt set out to lose the war in such a fashion as toinflict maximum casualties on Israel and then win thepeace. Egypt did just that. Egypt halted because Egyptdid not want to over-run its air defense umbrella. As aresult of Egypts "defeat", the Israeli government fell,Egypt got the entire Sinai peninsula back and Egypt wasable to maneuver the U.S. into the Camp David talkswhereby the U.S. ended up guaranteeing Egypts borderswith Israel and pledging massive aid to Egypt. Egyptscasualties would have been less if Egypt had stuck to heroriginal plan, but Egypt succumbed to Syrias pleas tolaunch a limited spoiler attack to take the pressure off inSyrias losing fight with Israel. The spoiler attack waslaunched outside of their air defense umbrella and wasrepulsed. The ‘73 war is a perfect example of the dictumthat war is "a continuation of politics by other means".
  • 14. Nevertheless, this doesnt change the fact that it wasnt the Eqyptian intention tohave Israel cross the Suez and surround their Army. This gave Israel a fairlystrong bargaining position and made it very clear in the mind of Egyptian leadersthat the Israelis could be in Cairo in a matter of hours. Although all Egyptians arerightfully proud of the initial attack they dont like to talk about the end result.Let’s not forget that Syria intended to go all the way to Haifa and Tel Aviv toexterminate the nation of Israel if possible--a simultaneous two “MTW” typescenario that we seem today to want to dismiss as an enemy attack option in orderto cut defense budgets. The Israelis fought a two front war of extreme violence,beginning with surprise attacks on both fronts and ending with both aggressorcountries seeing their capitols in danger. The Egyptian pinning attack didntsucceed as well as hoped and this is what forced the change in plans. The limitedEgyptian attack outside of the ADA umbrella didnt cause that umbrella to goaway-it remained in place and the Israelis used combined-arms to crack it.A staticdefense wouldn’t have changed the outcome since Israel was planning to attack todecide the issue (as per their doctrine).“What ifs” are part of war.
  • 15. IDF Colonel David Eshel writes:"The Israeli command had anticipated the possibility of a well executed crossing intheir operational concepts. A plan based on the techniques of Soviet forced rivercrossing operations was well known to Israeli intelligence; even a film of such ariver crossing maneuver was available and shown in training. But in actuality,surprise was complete - tactically as well as technically. The Israelis were neitherprepared psychologically nor militarily to accept the fact that the Egyptian Army wascapable of effectively mounting such an intricate operation.”The fact that there would not be extensive air support came as a great shock to theIsraeli troops who, lacking the vast artillery forces of their opponents, had beentrained to take air support for granted...So, although we were not prepared, we attacked with part of our forces on 8thOctober, just as they arrived, and again that was a mistake because we did not havethe power, and again we suffered great losses. Only later did we decide to organizefirst and to switch to an offensive, when we were prepared to concentrate all ourforces.”
  • 16. Lessons Learned for defending MTW aggression:1. Side that establishes an effective SSC first, lands thefirst blows, usually the attacker taking ground2. He that lands all-encompassing massed/precision strikesand/or shattering maneuver wins the first battle, which maybe the war--3. There may be NO RECOVERY to the side receivingmassed, accurate fires if the enemy doesn’t pause (don’tcount on it) and takes ground by maneuver (no territory totrade for time); U.S. doesn’t have ally with hundreds oftanks/planes to resupply it if lost in first hours of battle4. The side receiving SSC fires must be able to absorb,misdirect and shrug off fires long enough to establish itsown SSC and combining of all joint arms to regain theinitiative--or lose the war.5. The key is to asymmetrically attack the enemy’s SSCboldly at its most critical points to collapse it withunrelenting ground maneuver to not give the enemy anytime to recover, then pursue to victory: armored, 2D/3D
  • 17. “There is no one to rescue us if we don’t get this right” --Professor Fred Kagan, U.S. Military Academy on how the U.S. is in the same super-power dilemma as England was in 1939, except without a potential rescuer with huge industrial base and time to re-arm & re-equip her if she fails to prepare for the right pattern of future warIsraels big brother (U.S.) made up all IDF combat equipmentlosses and then some within a matter of days. We may not havethat backup in a conflict of our own. If we are defeated early on itsentirely possible that no close airfields will exist for us to use. Theentirely competent Israeli ground forces didnt need any largetrain up. They were ready-to-go as soon as they unloaded theequipment off the planes. We have a terrible time getting ready forgunnery and NTC deployments. Finally, our complicatedelectronic equipment may not be easily adapted to an existingsituation. If the training and infrastructure dont already exist onthe ground, introducing it might make things worse.ITS TIME FOR THE U.S. ARMY TO RE-INVIGORATE WITH 2D/3DCAPABLE FORCES NOW USING EXISTING EQUIPMENT!
  • 18. How Air-Mech-Strike 2D/3D maneuver warfare defeats Surveillance-Strike Complexes 1. AMS Forces can self-deploy to any location in the world to establish a Forward Line Of Troops despite air/sea anti- access strategems and even in the presence of SSC fires; organic ground armored mobility expands options to include high-altitude delivery offset from enemy SSC, ADA effects and forces in positionTwo-Tiered airlift systemCONUS ---> ISBAirlanding pre-loaded 747cargo aircraft out of enemySSC fire range bulk deliverAMS combat forces QUICKLYunder 96 hours before CONUS/ISB ---> Drop Zonebattle/war is lost; cargo 747s Airdrop USAF t-tail aircraft deliver Forced-Entryavailable NOW in large mobile Assault Echelon (AE) forces under armornumbers at low-cost protection to overcome enemy SSC fires to establish expanding FLOT; aircraft fly to ISB to shuttle-airland remainder of AMS Forces (FOE) into the now secure Assault Landing Zone (AZ)
  • 19. AMS: strategically and tactically agile 2D/3D ground forces that offer NO easy asymmetric weakness for an enemy to exploit Space/Air Cover by USAF/USN 2D/3D BCTs CONUS Coast Assault Combat UAVs Guard/USN Echelon (AE) NMD Border Patrol Follow-On-Echelon Helo SEL NG (FOE) 3D APAF Cargo 747s, USAF aircraft, CH-47F Army helos (in C-5s or self-deploy) airdrop C-130X AGS TSB shuttle AZ OBJ airlandTBAMs = Theater BallisticArtillery & Missiles Twin 120 mortarsTMAMs = Tactical Mortars, 2D Light Mech HumraamArtillery & Missiles Crusader Patriot/THAAD HIMARS/ATACMs Deep rear Rear Close/Far Deep 8,000 km back to CONUS 250km from enemy TBAMs 50km from TMAMs 300km in enemy rear All Echelons protected from enemy missile attack
  • 20. 2. AMS 2D optimized forces extend and/or projectfrom the FLOT to disrupt/suppress/destroy enemySSC air defenses to enable 3D decisive maneuver(encirclements, turning movements) or vise-a-versa Extended FLOT tactics 3D 3D 2D FLOT Enables 3D 2D Force to advance
  • 21. Projected FLOT tactics 3D Enables 2D Projected FLOT Base Force to of Fire/Maneuver advance (Mini-SSC) 2DMain FLOT
  • 22. UAVs/UCAVsRobust 2D/3D BCTs win inANY situation Road Ambushes, C4I verifies Mines, RPGs, data, CAS missiles, obstacles, predictable = DEATH City Kills armor in Tracked BCT Quality infantry meeting defeats enemy x-country infantry engagements mobile avoids road threats RSTA verifies targets hit not decoys Wins far 5-50km fight 2D Force Scout dogs Swims across Wins close 1-5km rivers/lakes fight 3D Force blocks, Mobile Crusader, HIMARS, encircles EFOGM, Twin 120mm mortar fire isolates support KILLS verified targets severs enemy
  • 23. 3. AMS 2D/3D maneuver forces employ maximum fire &maneuver to paralyze enemy SSCs as they collapse theenemy’s centers of gravity with lasting, decisive groundmaneuver, ending the conflict clearly on our favorable terms “What matters in war is VICTORY, not prolonged operations, however brilliantly executed” ---Sun Tzu, The Art of War